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Laurence Husson

Indonesians in Saudi Arabia: Worship and Work

Abstraksi: *Akar-akar terbentuknya kontak sosial dan politik antara masyarakat Islam Indonesia dengan Arab Saudi seringkali dijelaskan melalui aspek-aspek keagamaan. Kenyataan bahwa jazirah Arabia mencakup tanah suci, pusat peribadatan, sumber pemikiran di bidang keagamaan dan pusat pendidikan ulama bagi masyarakat Muslim di dunia, hampir selalu dijadikan basis analisa terhadap isu di seputar hubungan Indonesia-Saudi. Penjelasan ini tentu saja tidak sepenuhnya salah. Namun demikian, ada implikasi serius dari pandangan yang menjadikan aspek keagamaan sebagai faktor satu-satunya. Paling tidak, pandangan yang relijius sentris itu akan mengaburkan faktor-faktor lain yang barangkali lebih menentukan. Misalnya adalah faktor ekonomi dan tenaga kerja. Tulisan ini bermaksud mengkaji jalinan faktor keagamaan dengan kedua faktor terakhir ini dalam konteks sejarah perkembangan dan naik-turunnya hubungan Arab-Indonesia.*

Pertama-tama, kepergian orang-orang Muslim Indonesia ke Arab Saudi didorong oleh motivasi keagamaan: naik haji. Laporan-laporan yang ditulis pada masa kesultanan Aceh dan Malaka menunjukkan bahwa pada abad ke16 dan ke 17, sejumlah orang dari kelas terdidik dan pemerintah dari Sumatera dan Jawa mulai menunaikan ibadah haji. Jumlah itu semakin meningkat setiap tahunnya, atau menurun tajam karena alasan-alasan tertentu. Karena perkembangan inilah, pemerintah Hindia-Belanda membuka Konsul Haji di Jeddah.

Meskipun demikian, di balik dambaan setiap Muslim untuk pergi ke tanah suci itu, ibadah haji juga diyakini sebagai bentuk ritus yang paling berat, khususnya dalam segi ekonominya. Tetapi sesungguhnya, efek psikologis tentang beratnya perjalanan haji itu ditimbulkan oleh perasaan akan jauhnya perjalanan, perbedaan cuaca dan budaya, bahaya perampokan dan penculikan atau ketiadaan biaya di tengah perjalanan menuju tanah suci; yang sudah pasti diperoleh dari pengalaman generasi jam'ah haji sebelumnya. Misalnya, banyak jama'ah haji yang, karena alasan-alasan tersebut, akhirnya menjadi pekerja sambilan di bawah orang-orang Arab; semata-mata untuk mempertahankan hidup sambil menanti waktu yang tepat untuk meneruskan perjalanan. Masih untung apabila mereka masih bisa menerus-

kan perjalanan ibadah hajinya, atau belajar di bawah bimbingan syaikh-syaikh terkemuka yang banyak bermukim di Makkah, lalu kembali ke tanah air. Laporan-laporan yang dibuat Pemerintah Hinda-Belanda menunjukkan bahwa, banyak dari jama'ah pekerja itu jatuh ke tangan syaikh-syaikh atau suku-suku badui Arab untuk dijadikan budak.

Di sinilah, perbudakan merupakan sisi lain dari masalah yang timbul dalam perjalanan ibadah haji. Hingga akhir abad ke-18, wilayah Hijaz termasuk di antara tempat perdagangan budak di Dinasti Usmani. Kemudian selama abad ke-19, Jeddah tumbuh menjadi kota besar dan, segera setelah itu, berkembang menjadi pusat perdagangan budak terpenting di wilayah Hijaz. Meskipun pada 1857 Dinasti Usmani melarang perdagangan budak secara publik, dan mencoba menghapuskan perbudakan pada 1890, praktik-praktik semacam itu tetap berkembang subur di tanah Arab. Baru 1962, pemerintah Arab Saudi secara resmi melarang perbudakan.

Munculnya jaringan perbudakan jama'ah haji Hindia-Belanda itu juga tidak jarang disebabkan oleh modus operasinal perjalanan haji itu sendiri. Seperti umumnya, jama'ah haji dikoordinasi oleh semacam 'biro perjalanan' yang dipimpin oleh para syaikh, berkaitan dengan formalitas selama kepergiannya dari Hindia-Belanda ke Arab. Syaikh itu sendiri dibimbing oleh syaikh kepala (syaikh al-Masya'ikh), biasanya keturunan Arab, yang mewajibkan jama'ah untuk mentaati segala perintahnya. Syaikh rendahan biasanya memasang tarif sekitar 500 sampai 700 dolar, sedangkan syaikh kepala meminta bayaran 6,000 sampai 10,000 dolar. Banyak jama'ah yang tidak mempersiapkan perjalanannya dengan baik, sehingga di tengah perjalanan hajinya itu mereka kehabisan uang. Salah satu cara untuk bisa mempertahankan hidup, lalu pulang ke tanah air, adalah dengan bekerja di tanah Arab, atau berhutang kepada syaikh-syaikh. Banyak jama'ah yang akhirnya terlilit beban hutang yang luar biasa. Ketergantungan pada hutang inilah yang kemudian menyeret mereka menjadi budak di Arab. Terkadang untuk beberapa tahun, tetapi ada juga yang seumur hidup, tergantung pada beban hutang yang dipikulnya. Konsul Haji pemerintah Hindia-Belanda mencatat, hingga awal abad ke-20, selalu saja ada jama'ah haji dari Hindia-Belanda yang diperdagangkan sebagai budak di Jeddah di setiap tahunnya. Biasanya berasal dari Makassar dan Sumatra.

Semua fakta ini mengisyaratkan bahwa apa yang terjadi dalam kaitannya dengan hubungan Indonesia-Saudi Arabia bukanlah suatu masalah keagamaan yang muncul dalam perjalanan ibadah haji, melainkan jalinan praktik ekonomi yang kompleks dan rumit yang terbangun atas motivasi keagamaan. Praktik ekonomi semacam itulah yang barangkali masih mempengaruhi pola hubungan masyarakat Islam Indonesia dengan Saudi Arabia dewasa ini. Masalah tenaga kerja di Arab yang belakangan ini muncul, barangkali bisa dijelaskan melalui pendekatan studi ini.

الإندونيسيون في المملكة العربية السعودية: العبادة والعمل

الخلاصة: كثيرا ما يتم بيان تكوين الاتصال الاجتماعى والسياسى بين المجتمع الاسلامى الاندونيسي والسعودى من خلال الجوانب الدينية، وتكاد تكون جميع الأسس التى بني عليها تحليل العلاقة بين اندونيسيا والمملكة العربية السعودية تدور حول حقيقة كون الجزيرة العربية تحتضن الاراضى المقدسة، ومركزا للعبادات، ومصدرا للأفكار الدينية ومركزا للتربية الاسلامية للعالم الاسلامى، وإنه ليبدو عاديا أن تصبح السعودية غاية هامة للرحلات الدينية أو للهجرة أو للدراسة، نظرا لأن اندونيسيا دولة بها أكبر عدد السكان المسلمين فى العالم؛ والعكس كذلك بالنسبة للسعوديين فإن توجههم إلى اندونيسيا يمثل جزءا هاما من القيام بنشر الاسلام -أو كما يحدث فى الآونة الآخرة- بتنقية العقيدة الاسلامية، ومن هنا يستطيع المرء أن يتبين لماذا يتوارد ذهابا وإيابا مئات بل آلاف من المسلمين بالارخبيل إلى تلك البلاد منذ أوائل القرن الثالث عشر الميلادى، وكان من النادر أن يوجد منهم من يستقر فى كلا البلدين.

وهذا التعليل ليس كله خطأ، ومع ذلك فهناك نتيجة منطقية خطيرة تكمن وراء جعل الجوانب الدينية العوامل الوحيدة فى ذلك، فإن هذا الاتجاه الدينى على الأقل قد يخفى جوانب أخرى يمكن أن تكون أكثر أهمية، ومن ذلك العمالة والعوامل الاقتصادية، وهذه المقالة تحاول أن تلقى الضوء على

العلاقة بين هذين العاملين الدينى من جانب والعاملين الاقتصادى والعمالى فى تاريخ تطور العلاقات بين العرب واندونيسيا.

وبالطبع فإنما يظهر لأول وهلة هو أن قيام المسلمين الاندونيسيين برحلة إلى المملكة العربية السعودية مدفوع بالعوامل الدينية: الحج؛ وعلى الرغم من الرغبة الشديدة لكل مسلم أن يسافر إلى الأراضى المقدسة، فإن فريضة الحج من العبادات المكلفة، لدرجة أن أداءها كثيرا ما يحتاج إلى إعدادات روحية بممارسات تقليدية معينة لتمكين المرء أن يعطي للحج معنى أقصى من الكمال، بيد أن الأثر النفسى الناجم عن هذه الفريضة المكلفة قد ينشأ حقيقة من بعد المسافة، والاختلاف الجوي والثقافي وأخطار النصب والسرقة التى قد يتعرض لها الحاج أثناء سفره إلى الأراضى المقدسة، وفى هذا الصدد وبأسباب معينة يلجأ كثير من الحجاج إلى العمل الإضافى لدى العرب وهم فى انتظار الوقت المناسب لاستئناف الرحلة، ولربما كانوا سعداء الحظ إذا ما استطاعوا أن يستأنفوا الرحلة أو الدراسة على أيدي الشيوخ البارزين المقيمين بمكة ثم يعودون إلى أرض الوطن، وتذكر التقريرات التى أعددتها حكومة الهند الهولندية أن كثيرا من الحجاج العاملين يقعون تحت أيدي الشيوخ أو يتعرضون للاستعباد من العرب البدو.

ومن هنا ظهر الاستعباد فى جانبا آخر لرحلة الحج، ولقد ظلت الحجاز بمدنها الهامة مثل مكة المكرمة والمدينة المنورة مراكز لتجارة العبيد فى الخلافة العثمانية منذ القرن الثامن عشر الميلادى، وخلال القرن التاسع عشر نشأت جدة مدينة كبرى وتصبح بالتالى أهم مركز لتجارة العبيد فى منطقة الحجاز، وعلى الرغم من أن الخلافة العثمانية قد منعت سنة ١٨٥٧م وحرمت تجارة العبيد بشكل مفتوح وحاولت وضع حد نهائي لها سنة ١٨٩٠م، إلا أن تلك الممارسة ظلت معمولا بها فى الأراضى العربية، ولم

تتوقف إلا بعد قيام حكومة العربية السعودية بمنعها وتحريمها رسميا سنة ١٩٦٢م.

ومما تجدر الاشارة إليه فى هذا الصدد هو أن تعرض الحجاج الاندونيسيين للاستعباد كان ناشئا من وسائل أداء هذه الفريضة نفسها، فقد جرت العادة فى الحج أن يقوم بالتنسيق فى العملية مكتب للسفريات برئاسة شيخ يقوم بإتمام الاجراءات الخاصة بالسفر من جاوه-سومطره إلى الأراضى العربية، وهذا الشيخ نفسه تابع لشيخ المشايخ الذى يوجب على الحجاج أن يطيعوا جميع أوامره، فإذا كان الشيخ العادى يطلب من الحجاج أن يدفعوا ما يتراوح بين ٥٠٠ دولار امريكى إلى ٧٠٠ ، فإن شيخ المشايخ يطلب ما يتراوح بين ٦٠٠٠ إلى ١٠,٠٠٠٠ دولارا امريكيا، ولكم من الحجاج من لا يعد أنفسهم إعدادا جيدا، الأمر الذى يعرضهم للافلاس أثناء رحلتهم؛ وكان من بين الوسائل المتاحة لهم للبقاء على حياتهم ثم استئناف الرحلة هو العمل الاضافى، أو أن يستلفوا من الشيوخ، مما أفضى بكثير منهم إلى تكليف أنفسهم بما لا يطاق من ديون، وكان هذا العبء هو الذى جلب لهم الوقوع فى الاستعباد ، وقد يستمر ذلك لبعض السنوات ولكن منهم من يعانى ذلك مدى الحياة، وفقا للديون التى كان عليهم أن يدفعوها.

وجاء فى تقرير القنصلية للهند الهولندية بجدة أن مسألة استعباد الحجاج الاندونيسيين تمثل قضية تحتاج إلى جهود لمعالجتها، لأن الواقع ليس مسألة اجتماعية وسياسية نشأت من رحلة الحج فقط إنما هي ممارسة اقتصادية معقدة مبنية على الدوافع الدينية، ولقد بقيت هذه الممارسة الاقتصادية فيما يبدو تصطبغ العلاقة بين المجتمع الاسلامى الاندونيسي والسعودي اليوم، ولربما يمكن الكشف عما يحدث من اضطراب فى العمالة الاندونيسية بالمملكة فى الآونة الأخيرة من مثل هذه الدراسة.

In 1991 and 1993, during my research into the Madurese out-migration to East Java,[1] I interviewed ten Madurese who, apart from migrating to Java, had also personally lived and worked in Saudi Arabia. I also met ten other people who were helped financially by a relative working under contract in the Arabian peninsula.[2] Both the migrants and their relatives gave two important reasons why they travelled to Saudi Arabia; first, they were interested in making money and, second, they were able to make the pilgrimage (*ḥajj*) to the Muslim Holy Places.

I should make clear from the outset, that even if Indonesia is a leading Muslim country in the world,[3] the standard view of experts on Islam has long been that the conduct of Islamic practice by Muslims in Indonesia is of minor importance. However, as the orientalist Lombard emphasizes, Muslims in the East Indies do not for one moment feel "marginal" or "peripheral". They feel that they are in direct contact with the great centres of Islam in the Middle-East, and that they themselves are a staging post for spreading their religion (*dakwah*) among the last animists (in Irian Jaya, for example), in Chinese communities and even in Japan.

In fact, Indonesia has close links with the rest of the Muslim world. For example, it has maintained close links through the brotherhoods (*tarekat*) and the Arab communities (*hadrami*) which live in the archipelago, through exchanges at the university level; above all, however, through the *ḥajj* and the migrant workers who have brought Indonesia considerably closer to the Middle-East. The relations between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia are deeply rooted and have taken place since at least the last 700 years when the Arab merchants and traders came to Indonesia to spread Islam. Since then, the relations between both Indonesia and Saudi Arabia have developed steadily in various fields as bilateral trade, activities of exchange, cooperation for mutual benefit, and the like.

This article, which opens a new line of research, is intended to make a first assessment of the consequences of Indonesian migration to Saudi Arabia, in particular during the first half of the 20th century—a period when the immigration is bound up with the pilgrimage from which Saudi Arabia draws a large part of its revenues. It must be added that while documentary evidence and partial studies on this period exist, it turns out that documentation on the contemporary period is scarce.

This article also is concerned with describing the evolution of

certain striking aspects of the close relation between the pilgrimage to Mecca and Indonesian migrants looking for work. We need to consider the methods of hiring labor, the networks involved in recruiting it, the organization of travel, as well as the increasing indebtedness of the migrants through intermediaries who, more and more professionally, arrange these attempts to live abroad, prompted in many cases by the same desire for wealth.

The Pilgrimage: A Religious Duty but a Dangerous Journey

The deepest desire of every Muslim is to go to the Holy Places (*tanah suci*) of Islam, to kiss the "black stone" (*hajar aswad*) in the Ka'bah and drink the water at the Zamzam spring to purify themselves.

There are reports of Sumatrans and Javanese going to Mecca in the 16th and 17th centuries, but this concerns only a tiny minority of the well educated classes or rulers. The number of pilgrimages grew rapidly with the improvement of sea transport, although the numbers have fluctuated over the years. Up to 1878, they increased slowly. Then there was a marked growth after 1910, which peaked for the first time after the First World War, and reached an absolute record in 1926-1927 with 52,412 pilgrims. It is noteworthy that the pilgrims from the Dutch East Indies made up nearly half (42-49 %) of the total number who made the *hajj* in 1914 (when the number of pilgrims from Mediterranean countries was seriously affected by the war), 1921, 1924, 1927 and 1931 (Bousquet, 1939:34).[4]

A considerable number of Indonesia made the pilgrimage until 1932, when, with the worldwide economic crisis, there was a steep decline. In 1937, the numbers began to increase again, but fell off seriously during the Second World War. The Japanese occupation and the Indonesian revolution practically put an end to it until 1949.

The growth in the number of pilgrims from the Dutch East Indies, then, really took off in the second half of the 19th century. In 1850, only 71 persons took part, while five yews later there already were 1,688. The pilgrimage had become "fashionable" by 1870, when 3,258 pilgrims fulfilled their religious duty in the land of the Prophet (Van der Plas, 1931:128). Because of this increase, the government of the Dutch Indies decided in 1872 to open a consulate in Jeddah (Bousquet, 1939:36).

It should be made clear that the Dutch become worried about the possibility of an anti-colonial oriented Islam at a time when they

were faced with rebellions in Java and above all in Sumatra. In 1825, in order to limit the number of pilgrims, the Dutch East Indies government required that in the future those making the pilgrimage had to obtain a passport costing 110 florins, a considerable sum at the time. Pilgrims were increasingly thought to be a threat to the precarious political stability of the Dutch East Indies, even more so because when they returned they enjoyed a high status in the community and had great influence in society.[5]

The French orientalist Bousquet, citing Snouck Hurgronje, the adviser to the Dutch East Indies government, denied that the threat existed. The opinion held by pilgrims, that their voyage to Arabia wipes away their sins, is no more naive than the opinion in certain European circles that these natives, crammed like sardines on their way to Jeddah and back, taken care of by rapacious guides, staying a few weeks in the middle of bustling hordes of people whose language they did not understand, could return home as wild fanatics. In fact, the spiritual effect of the pilgrimage on most of them was slight. At the very most, they would have experienced the importance of the variety of the people who shared their religious beliefs. (Bousquet, 1939:35).

Nonetheless, the government of the Dutch East Indies and the Netherlands government were afraid that the Muslims whom the pilgrims met in Arabia could set them against the Dutch colonial authorities. The consulate opened there had, above all, a political mission, namely to keep an eye on the pilgrims, spotting possible suspects among them when they returned home. It also keep an eye on Arabs who were prepared to smuggle subversive propaganda or even arms to the Indies. At the same time it had the delicate and difficult task of protecting the pilgrims from all sorts of danger, in particular from being enslaved, robbed, or swindled in all sorts of ways, and subjected to poor health hazards and epidemics.

Slavery had not been explicitly condemned by the Prophet, even if the Qur'ân described the freeing of slaves as a praiseworthy act in honor of Allah. Because of this, it was a common practice in the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the Hijaz, around Mecca and Medina where slaves were sold at public auctions. Throughout the 19th century, Jeddah was the most important slave market in the Hijaz (Ochsenwald, 1980:118-123).

The central government in Constantinople, which under the pressure of the European powers seriously tried to take measures against

the importation and public sale of slaves, were quickly faced with the discontent of the local authorities and merchants of the Hijaz. These locals were closely implicated in this profitable trade and were, because of this, outraged by this serious blow to "local traditions". Constantinople, fearing a rebellion, quickly made it clear that the system of slavery was not at stake, but only the slave trade, and had to admit that every Muslim had the right to own slaves. In 1857 the slave trade was abolished everywhere in the Ottoman Empire, except in the Hijaz where the importation and sale continued normally throughout the second half of the 19th century. The only change was that the sale of the "goods" was made in private and no longer in public. Finally, it should be noted that slavery was only officially abolished in Saudi Arabia in 1962.

The Dutch East Indies consulate was aware from the outset that certain of its subjects were held in slavery. The building where the slaves were held was right opposite the consulate, and each day the consul could see groups of twelve men chained together, marching through the streets of the town (Archief BZ, dossier no 74, 15/O2/1875).

The Pilgrims in Debt

There were many different circumstances whereby pilgrims ended up as slaves, but the principal cause was always the financial difficulties in which they found themselves. Certain pilgrims did not have enough money when they started out, others did not manage their funds very well or were robbed on the way and then became destitute[6] and could not pay for their return fare. The consul in residence, in Jeddah in 1879,[7] informed the government in The Hague that the pilgrims could not be held responsible for their lack of money because, according to him, the *shaykh*s who chose the pilgrims in the Dutch East Indies were swindlers and charged the pilgrims too much for organizing and supervising their journey. A report dated 1897 (*De Indische Gids*: 390) described the sheikhs as born crooks, hypocrites with no respect for others, who pretended to be pious and, under the cover of religion, were completely unjust. The report made clear that the worst swindlers were Sumatrans and Bugis.

The pilgrimage was in fact organized by a sort of travel agent (*ḥajj shaykh*) who was in charge of feeding and lodging the pilgrims and dealing with the administrative formalities during the voyage from Java to Jeddah. This shaykh was himself supervised by a chief shaykh (*Shaykh al-Mashâ'ikh*) who insisted on absolute obedience to his or-

ders, and was severely criticized by the consuls. He was considered quite unnecessary. The simple sheikh demanded between 500 and 700 dollars and the chief sheikh between 6,000 to 10,000 dollars (*De Indische Gids*, 1897:390). When they arrived at their destination, the pilgrims were taken in charge by a sheikh in Mecca, or by his representative (*mutawwif*, *dalil*), who accompanied them whenever they went to the Holy Places. These agents, who operated in Java, but also in Singapore,[8] were not necessarily Arabs; quite often they were Indonesians who had already made the pilgrimage, or who had worked in Mecca. Vredenbregt (1962) noted that in 1880 the pilgrims from the Dutch East Indies were in the hands of 180 sheikhs; in 1914 there were 400 sheikhs. The Malaysian Haji Abdul Majid, who made the journey in 1925, mentioned 600 to 700 sheikhs (1926:270). These sheikhs were also in touch with religious leaders (*kiyai*) or *'ulamâs* who taught in Dutch East Indian *pesantren* (Qur'ânic schools) and who were paid to make the choice of who would make the pilgrimage. Certain shipping companies and ships' captains also paid the sheikhs a bonus on every ticket sold to a pilgrim. The latter, because of the profits made by these different intermediaries at every level, had to pay exorbitant sums to their agents.

In the Holy Places, to make up for their lack of money, the pilgrims from the Dutch East Indies set about looking for work, or borrowed what they needed to pay their fare home. After this they were at the mercy of their employer, or those who had lent them money. A number of them never succeeded in paying off the loans and fell deeper and deeper into debt. Their dependence on others resulted in a form of slavery.

Consular reports between 1872 and 1879 contain accounts of kidnapping and attacks on convoys of pilgrims, who were immediately carried off into the interior of the country, and were never heard of again. The job of the consuls was not an easy one as everything they did could put the very existence of the consulate in jeopardy. In addition, the jurisdiction of the consul only extended to Jeddah; the territories outside the town were the Holy Places, where the spiritual leaders and the local authorities would take offence if he attempted to exercise his authority there.

There are accounts in some consular reports of the rare occasions when persons were rescued from slavery. For example, in 1872 a Indonesian was sold as a slave for 125 florins. The consul intervened and the sale was annulled and the person concerned was sent back

home a free man. The consul added in his report that slaves who had been freed but who continued to live in Arabia, sooner or later fell into the hands of their former owners again and, what was worse, in the Hijaz a slave that found protection in a Christian house was not freed but killed. In 1874, a slave who was native of the Dutch East Indies found refuge in the consulate. The consul was afraid that the owner, with the aid of the local authorities, would demand that the slave who was in a very bad physical state, be returned to him. The consul immediately asked for advice from Constantinople and, receiving an evasive reply, took the risk of acting on his own initiative. The slave was hidden on an Austrian ship bound for Suez, where he was taken aboard a Dutch ship which took him to the Dutch East Indies. In 1877, another slave found refuge in the consulate, where he told that when he was very young he had accompanied a fellow countryman on the pilgrimage and was subsequently sold to a Javanese "priest", who forced him to work for seven years. Again, the consul succeeded in sending him back to his own country.

However, the consul could only help those subject to Dutch authorities. For example, when two slaves, one from the Dutch East Indies, the other from Zanzibar, put themselves under the consul's protection, the first was freed and sent home while the second was handed over to the Turkish authorities, and beaten to death by his owner (Witlox 1991:27). In 1877 and 1878, a particularly pugnacious consul twice succeeded in convincing the local authorities to arrest and fine the Arabs owners of subjects of the Dutch colonial powers, and to free the subjects.[9] The Dutch Minister of the Colonies disapproved of these actions, considering them undesirable and diplomatically dangerous. He alerted the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who warned the consul against his "excessive" zeal, reminding him that a consul's duty was to maintain good diplomatic relations at all costs, while taking into account the causes which led to enslavement. It was up to the pilgrims themselves to deal with their financial problems, and to pay off their debts.

Sometimes slaves who originated from the Dutch East Indies were freed without the intervention of the consul, by being bought out of slavery by a wealthier fellow countryman, who was then able to take the ex-slave home, once he had a certificate stating that the slave had been freed. The benefactor took the slave in his own company, and had the satisfaction of performing an action approved by Allâh (Kolonien aan BZ, B-Dossier 187).

The Fortune of Some Brings Happiness to Others

If the majority of pilgrims escaped being enslaved, a good number of them, dead or alive, were robbed of their money and all other goods they had with them. The Islamic expert Snouck Hurgronje (1924, IV: 179) remarked that pilgrims carried gold or silver to pay their expenses, but these precious metals were often used to pay the debts of a relative stranded in Mecca, to make generous donations to mosques or spiritual leaders as well as to buy all sorts of the inevitable amulets. The practice of *badal hajj*, which consisted of making the pilgrimage for someone who had died, and distributing part of his legacy to charitable and religious establishments in Mecca, explains why certain pilgrims carried considerable sums of money. It goes without saying that these fortunes whetted other people's nefarious appetites. In 1870, the government of the Dutch East Indies, on learning that some pilgrims had been robbed by so-called organizers of pilgrimages in Singapore where a great number of them stopped-over, decided to have a list of sums and goods carried entered on their travel documents. Witlox (1991:32), who has studied these documents, has drawn up a table of the considerable figures involved:

Periods of pilgrimage	Number of passports recording the sums of money	Total (in florins)
1872-1873	3.127	1.392.113
1873-1874	2.679	1.317.093
1874-1875	3.673	2.392.003
1875-1876	4.331	2.100.944
1876-1877	3.642	1.768.429
1877-1878	5.294	2.524.896
1878-1879	4.467	2.176.520

If the pilgrim had not been robbed, in the Hijaz he became the prey of sheikhs, the authorities in Mecca, local citizens, or Bedouins who were on the look out for convoys of pilgrims. The Dutch consul in Jeddah could write in 1874 that: Dutch East Indian pilgrims are the easiest prey. Among the pilgrims, the Javanese are those who carry the most money. Their docility, their kindness, their resignation explains why they are, more than the others, the victims of the insatiable rapacity of the Arabs. Although the Javanese are smart operators in their own country, they seem to lose all their common sense when they stupidly obey their Arab *shaykh*s.

While the consul in residence in 1895 stated that the pilgrims, threatened in Arabic with all the punishments of heaven and hell when they had dared to protest at the consulate, immediately withdrew their complaint (*De Indische Gids*, 897:39 1).

However, in spite of the different exactions of the sheikhs, whether Malaysians or Arabs, the consul concluded that the pilgrims from the Dutch East Indies ought to be thankful, because he had noted that pilgrims of other nationalities, who travelled without sheikhs, quite seldom survived the voyage. In addition, Turkish authority outside the urban centres had been undermined by the continuous rebellions and pillaging by the Bedouin tribes. In the hinterland, the safety of the pilgrims was precarious and very often their caravans were pillage (Haji Abdul Majid, 1926:279). Pilgrims who only lost their possessions were the lucky ones. In their reports the consuls also denounced the confiscation of possessions which belonged to those who had died, either through violence, of old age, or from disease. In these great gatherings of human beings, travel fatigue, bad hygiene and the lack of drinkable water explains the frequent epidemics of cholera, smallpox, and yellow fever which raged in the Hijaz until late in the 19th century in spite of the imposition of obligatory quarantine on the island of Kamarân. When a pilgrim died during the voyage or during the pilgrimage, the sheikh was required to report the death to the consul, who then had to return the dead man's possessions to his family. Very often, however, the sheikh omitted to contact the consul and simply confiscated the possessions. Chailley-Bert (1914:29) reports on the number of pilgrims and their mortality rate:

Year	Number of pilgrims	Mortality	Mortality rates (%)
1896	8000	-	
1900	5172		
1905	5205	-	
1910	14743	1120	726 %
1911	25260	2798	11 %
1912	18353	2334	12,7 %

The sums of money spent in Mecca, moreover, show the economic importance of the pilgrimage. Bousquet (1939) speaks of the financial support brought from the Dutch East Indies for Arabia where the sums spent are relatively high (between 500 to 600 florins), and where the pilgrims stay for some weeks and even some months.

He even makes clear that it is one of the characteristics of the Indonesian *hajj*; there is no special boat which takes the pilgrims to Jeddah and waits for them there. These are ordinary boats; Dutch ships on their way to Europe which, in the months which precede the month of *Dhoû el Hidjja*, call there. So the voyage there and back, including the stay in the Holy Land, easily lasts three to four months, and sometimes even longer (Bousquet, 1939:37). That is, if the pilgrims do not settle down for one or more years in the towns of the Holy Places.

Repaying Debts

In 1876 a consular report estimated that about 30 % of the pilgrims from the Dutch East Indies ended up completely destitute during their stay in the Holy Places (Witlox, 1991:30). Nevertheless, most of them did leave Arabia having borrowed, individually or collectively, money from a sheikh for the return journey and having signed papers acknowledging the debt. Groups of five to fifteen persons declared that they were collectively responsible for the repayment of the debt. By their signature, the pilgrims obtained transport to Singapore, Penang or Johore, and on arriving there they generally had two weeks to repay the money. These collective debts were very restrictive, for, if a member of the group failed to pay his share of the debt because of death, sickness or disappearance, the others were collectively bound to pay his share. Only half of the groups succeeded in paying back the debt on time. For the others began what the consular reports called "disguised slavery". They found jobs, on the basis of individual contracts this time, on the plantations in the region, and had to repay their debts by such heavy work and under such hard conditions, that it was very difficult for them ever to be freed from their obligations. For example, a man who contracted a debt of 200 *ringgit* had to sign a contract to work for 25 months, with a monthly wage of 6 *ringgit*. Three *ringgit* each month were immediately withheld to repay the debt, and the three remaining *ringgit* were insufficient for him to live on during the 25 months of forced labor, not counting the inevitable extras such as correspondence, clothing, and tobacco. Strongly encouraged to do so, he took on a fresh debt which condemned him to work far longer than his first debt. In view of this situation, the Minister of Foreign Affairs considered these workers to be "debt slaves".[10]

Vredenbregt (1962) suggests that those who worked under these

conditions, either to earn enough money to make the pilgrimage or to repay the costs of the *ḥajj*, contributed to the introduction of commercial cultures such as the havea which provides the latex used in the production of rubber in the archipelago.

A Safer and Better Organized Pilgrimage

It must be pointed out that for most of the pilgrims—who often came from rural areas—travelling to Mecca was the one and only voyage they made in their lives, and because of this, it was much easier to swindle them than other foreigners. Because of the considerable amount of evidence that pilgrims from the Dutch East Indies were exploited in many ways (Snouck Hurgronje, 1931; Wiranatakoesoema, 1925),[11] the Dutch authorities, followed by private Muslim organizations, tried to improve health controls, to increase the food rations on the journey, and to set up stricter regulations on board ships. The government also tried to make sure that the poorest people did not go on the pilgrimage. Thus, in 1859 the permit to make the *ḥajj* was only guaranteed after the Regent of the province in which the candidate lived issued a declaration stating that the latter had sufficient money to pay for the journey to Mecca and back, and had sufficient means to provide for his family which stayed at home. Eisenberger (1928:175) remarked, however, that checking the financial means of the pilgrims was far from effective because, in the milling crowd of the native passengers, it was impossible to be sure that the pilgrim was showing his own money. In 1922, this risk was considerably reduced, because the pilgrim had to have a return ticket.

That year Muslim organizations were founded to work for, if not for the independence, then at least for the emancipation and the improvement of the lives of the natives. Improving the conditions of the *ḥajj* was one of their objectives as well. The two organizations, the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama, did all they could to improve the conditions under which the pilgrims were lodged, and above all, to reduce the activities of the racketeers which preyed on them, both in the Dutch East Indies and in Saudi Arabia. They kept an eye on the intermediary agents, obliged the shipping companies to improve the conditions aboard, and sent missions to Saudi Arabia to demand that the authorities in Mecca take steps to protect the pilgrims. Their most important activity however was to inform and prepare the pilgrims themselves. Just before the Second World War, these two Muslim organizations succeeded in creating a joint com-

mission for improving the *ḥajj*. Unfortunately for them, during the war period, the number of pilgrims dropped dramatically.

Be that as it may, in 1949, when the Indonesian government revived the pilgrimage under the aegis of a special section of the Religious Affairs Ministry, two problems were still outstanding: information for the pilgrims, and the elimination of rackets from which they suffered before and during the *ḥajj*. The Minister of Religious Affairs at the time, Wahid Hasyim, stressed the ignorance in religious matters among the candidates for the pilgrimage, and decided to remedy this. He also pointed out that the pilgrims were all peasants and rich businessmen, rather than intellectuals and educated people, who were economically less well-off. This preoccupation led to the institution of a sort of examination for the future *ḥajj* in 1959, as well as courses of religious instruction on the journey.

When the Minister of Religious Affairs was bombarded by applications to take part in the pilgrimage, he decided to dissuade the poorest applicants and, subsequently to impose a quota on the number of pilgrims.[12] He had two main reasons for doing this, namely a concern about the flight of Indonesian currency out of the country, and the lack of structures able to receive pilgrims in Saudi Arabia. In 1950, the number of pilgrims was limited to 10,000, while there were twice as many applicants. Five years later, the quota had been increased to 10,400, while the number who applied was about 100,000 (Van Dijk, 1991:48). This system, while it reduced the individual's chances of making the pilgrimage, prompted an increase in the number of applicants. Faced with this situation, the Indonesian government in 1960 decided to abandon registering new applications, and to replace the system of selecting pilgrims by drawing lots. Instead, pilgrims were chosen on the principle of "first come, first served".

To limit the role of intermediaries, the government refused to issue visas to the sheikhs in Mecca and to those suspected of representing them; they attempted to outsmart the intermediaries who encouraged old or sick people and pregnant women to go to Mecca at all costs, because it was thought to be more meritorious (*pahala besar*) to die in the Holy Places or to have a baby there, than at home. Like the Dutch authorities before them, the Indonesian government issued regulations about the conditions of the journey to Arabia. However, since 1978, the pilgrims travel by air and their number has increased fourfold in ten years, from 38,000 in 1984 to 200,000 in 1993. The *ḥajj* has now become commonplace.

The Pilgrimage at the Present Time

Oil has made Saudi Arabia a rich country and Indonesia a country with a high rate of economic growth. This prosperity has had a considerable and favorable influence on the conditions under which the pilgrimage takes place. The steps undertaken by the Indonesian and Saudi Arabian governments have greatly improved the standards of transport, lodging, hygiene, and the like. In 1965, when the quota system was still in place, the number of Indonesian pilgrims was about 10,000. In 1980 this had risen to 73,000 and ten years later 91,000 went to Mecca by plane. The pilgrimage is now strictly organized by the government, and the pilgrims receive advice about travelling and the necessary medical information, as well as a solid religious preparation. It should be made clear, that the increase in the number of overseas pilgrims is not limited to Indonesia, but is part of a worldwide phenomenon. While the total number of pilgrims before the second World War did not exceed 100,000, it reached more than 300,000 in the 1980's; 15 % of which were Indonesians, 7,4 % Malaysians, and 10 % Indians (Byrne McDonnell, 1990:112).

A candidate for the *ḥajj* has, first of all, to obtain a medical certificate and then pay for his air ticket and his accommodation in Saudi Arabia at one of the many specialized travel agencies. The marketing of the pilgrimage is a state monopoly, and the actual cost of the pilgrimage is about seven million rupiah (about 2,800 US dollars), a sum which is practically doubled if one takes into account the indispensable and lengthy festivities which come before and after the pilgrimage itself. There are two types of pilgrimage, one at the "economy" rate, the second at the "VIP" rate, which is about one and a half times more expensive. The latter entitles the pilgrim to stay in Saudi Arabia in an approved hotel, travel in an air-conditioned bus and to fly there and back with a regular airline.

Armed with his medical certificate and his receipt, the pilgrim goes to the regional *ḥajj* office, which is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of the internal affairs. There he will be given his permit to travel and will be provided with the first of the necessary instructions and will receive his Pilgrim's Guide. He will finally spend the two nights before his departure in a reception centre in one of the towns (Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan or Ujung Pandang) where pilgrims board their plane. In this center he undergoes another medical check-up, receives a detailed program consisting of brochures, conferences and activities, as well as his pilgrim's garments (*pakaian ihram*).

Recent Indonesian books on the *ḥajj* (Hamka, 1985; Zaini, 1989) indicate that the pilgrims still have a number of complaints. There is the difficulty of performing their ritual ablutions and prayer in the seats on the planes; it is impossible to sleep during the flight, because of the speeches and lectures taking place; there are lengthy custom formalities and difficulties in identifying their luggage because the Indonesian authorities insist on a uniform type. Furthermore, the hotel rooms are cramped and the water is cut off from time to time. To this list of random complaints, we can add that pilgrims with a rural background find it difficult to adapt to new surroundings, preferring to cram together on the ground floor, or in the corridor of the hotel, rather than go to their bedrooms. There are also the town dwellers who forget to perform their religious duties and go shopping instead, and those who stray from their groups and cause many delays; and, finally, there are problems with the food.[13]

However, the journey nowadays does not take long and the sanitary conditions are much better, so that the pilgrims' health is much less affected. The mortality rate, which was 10 % in the 1920s, has dropped to 1,5 % in the 1980s (Van Dijk, 1991:55). Nevertheless in 1980, 20 pilgrims were unaccounted for, even though they had been strictly supervised.

The explanation for these disappearances might well be that the pilgrims had gone underground to look for work. The frontiers of Saudi Arabia are closely guarded, and only a very small number succeed in entering the country clandestinely using a pilgrim's visa or a similar method, to work to pay for their journey. Since 1977, a coordinating commission has been created to deal with the problem of illegal workers. The Saudi Arabian press, as well as that of the Gulf States,[14] regularly announces that illegal Asian workers have been expelled. It is difficult to say much more about this problem, as precise information is scarce. What is certain however, is that there is a Malay community which has been in place there for a long time.

The "Jawah"; A Long Established Community

It must be remembered that at the beginning of the 20th century, the journey and pilgrimage could easily last six months, and that at that time one could consider the trip itself as a migration. It should also be made clear that the pilgrimage is the origin of a sort of "Arabomania" of long standing. It is not only because this region is the cradle of Islam, but also because of the economic importance of the

hajj and subsequently the riches gushing up in the desert, which nourishes the "stuff that dreams are made of". During his visit to Mecca in 1855, Snouck Hurgronje already noted the presence of a "Jawah" community of 8 to 10,000 emigrants from the Dutch East Indies, or a sixth of the total population of the city, which then only numbered between 50 and 60,000 inhabitants (Lombard, 1985:42). This prosperous community traded, planned and organized the recruitment and the journeys of its compatriots. In his report on the pilgrimage of 1913-1914 (*De Indische Gids*, 1915) the consul's estimate of the size of' this community was much smaller than Snouck Hurgronje's had been, putting the number at only 1,600 people, not counting children less than 12 years old. The consul listed several types of migrants, but stated that the principal reason for the development in Mecca of this community from the East Indies, was the attraction of the Holy Places for believers. Certain of them, like Haji Abdul Karim, chief of the Kampung Jawa in the Malaysian State of Selangor (Byrne McDonnel, 1990:117) and a good hundred of Dutch East Indians studied in Saudi Arabia for several years, after they had completed their pilgrimage.[15] Others stayed on for several years, so that their children could study theology. In the same way, older pilgrims frequently settled in Mecca for the rest of their lives, others simply joined members of their family already settled down there. The report on the 1913-1914 pilgrimage even mentions some wealthy and idle young people who spent some years as pleasure-seekers in Mecca! (*De Indische Gids*, 1915).

The first category of "Jawah" migrants lived on money sent from home. The second category, which was smaller, made a living doing business. Among these were three quarters of the 200 sheikhs who took charge of the Dutch East Indies pilgrims, and a very small number of those who owned shops or did manual work. One of the principal profitable activities of those who earned their living in Mecca was making pilgrims' garments for newcomers. In 1913, the "Jawah" community numbered seven shopkeepers who sold garments, 17 dressmakers, one tailor who worked at home, and 17 itinerant sellers of ritual garments. The town also numbered 23 tailors of everyday clothes, 13 goldsmiths, 12 food shops, and one shop selling perfumes and incense.

If one compares the number of shops to the size of the "Jawah" community, the proportion of people earning their living in Mecca was small. But the consul makes clear that 25 years earlier, that is in

about 1890, there was only one Dutch East Indian, who came from the province of Aceh, who worked as a vendor in a local shop. He even adds, that the hard work involved in the building industry did not suit his compatriots, who were oversensitive to the sun and the heat, and who unlike the Indians never took part in the wholesale trade. This was, quite simply, because they did not make the pilgrimage to make money, but principally to fulfil the *ḥajj* and to receive a religious education.

It is important to mention this and to make clear that this education, acquired at great expense abroad in a place as famous as Mecca, ensured that they would be treated with great respect when they returned home, which brought its own material advantages. However, the report on the 1913-1914 pilgrimage suggested that the reputation of the University of al-Azhar in Cairo was starting to overshadow Mecca, and mentions 25 Dutch East Indies students having gone to al-Azhar, 22 of whom would have originally opted to study in Mecca.

No study has been made of the "Jawah" community in Mecca since Snouck Hurgronje made his observations on it. These overseas Indonesians remain not at all well known, but some appear to occupy influential positions in Jeddah, and have not lost their own cultural identity.[16]

Whatever the situation may have been at that time, it was much easier then for the pilgrims to spend extended periods in the Holy Places, or to even settle there permanently —all property registered at the Dutch East Indies consulate or by Malayan Colonial officials— as there were no restrictive immigration laws to put a stop to it.

Since the end of the Second World War however, the time spent on pilgrimage has been shortened considerably to four or even two weeks on an organized tour, without any chance of prolonging it or settling permanently in the country. Nevertheless, the Gulf States and, in particular Saudi Arabia, long recognized as the cradle of Islam, and an obligatory place of pilgrimage for the faithful (but performed mainly by men), nowadays has a strong appeal to young Indonesians of both sexes. They often have few skills and come from a rural background, but hope to combine the pilgrimage with the possibility of working for a higher salary than they could ever have done at home. A housemaid in Indonesia is lodged, fed and paid about 120.000 rupiah a month (about 52 dollars) in Jakarta, or 50.000 in small towns, while Indonesian and Philippine domestic servants earn

about 350 dollars a month in Saudi Arabia (Stalker, 1995).

Choosing this destination turns out to be relatively easy, because of the long standing political, economic and cultural links between the East Indian world and the Middle-East. Economically, the Gulf States have invested heavily in South East Asia, and there has been large-scale migration of workers from South East Asia to the Arabian peninsula, which during the 1980's had become a most desirable place for jobs.

Present Day Official Migration

After the oil boom, the countries in the Arabian peninsula reduced their dependence on non-Islamic countries and decided to employ more Muslims, although they were on their guard against Arab agitators who might stir up political or religious trouble. However a 1980 *fatwa* forbade the employment of local women and Saudi Arabia therefore began to look for its manpower in Asia, initially in Pakistan and India. Quickly however, they developed a preference for immigrants from South East Asia: Buddhists from Thailand, Christians from the Philippines and above all, Muslims from Indonesia, who were highly thought of because they were "humble and patient". This was how the Gulf States came to draw their immigrants from South East Asia, arriving with ready made contracts in hand, which accounts for the increase in Asian immigration to this region during the last ten years.

Also during the 1980s, Indonesia, which was looking for ways to increase its non oil resources, wanted to promote the export potentialities of its manpower. However, the Indonesians arrived late on the already declining labor market in these countries, and could not compete with other migrant populations already settled there. Indonesian immigration, therefore, never reached the proportion of that from Pakistan, Sri Lanka or the Philippines. Only one opening remained, work as domestic servants, the demand for which intensified when India forbade its women workers to go to Saudi Arabia. Pakistan insisted that its women should be accompanied by their husbands, and the Philippines would only allow its women to work for the Royal Family.

Since 1974, the authorities in Saudi Arabia have published no statistics about the number of foreigners working there, as they feared an increase of xenophobia within their own population. It is known, however, that immigration from Indonesia has not ceased to grow

after 1983, when the Saudi government put a brake on immigration. 99,8 % of the Indonesians who go to the Middle-East have Saudi Arabia as their destination, and it is not surprising that 72.5 % of these are women (Diederich, 1995).

At this stage of my research, an exhaustive assessment of Indonesian emigration cannot be made, but I can stress how the pilgrimage and migration for work have points in common. In this way, the movements of migrants looking for work highlight a little known aspect of the relations between the Middle-East and Indonesia, and are reminiscent of the diplomatic relations between these two regions during the colonial era. Formerly, the Dutch East Indies consuls had to help the subjects of the colonial power who were badly treated in Arabia, but had to be careful not to offend local authorities. Nowadays, the Indonesian government is confronted with similar problems. The press in Indonesia from time to time carries reports on the tense situation in which women emigrants live; they are afraid of losing their jobs, and are treated badly, as often happens to emigrants in this part of the world. Between January 1984 and February 1986, nearly 3,600 migrants lodged formal complaints at the embassy, accusing their employers of not paying their wages and of confiscating their passports. They said they had been exploited, beaten, and sometimes raped.

The Indonesian authorities, under pressure from the Saudi government, asked the migrants not to speak publicly of what had happened to them. Indonesia, careful to maintain good diplomatic relations because their economic dependence on Saudi oil imports, is not able to assure effective protection to its migrant workers. On the other hand, certain members of the Muslim association Muhammadiyah, and an Indonesian ambassador resident in Saudi Arabia, are expressly demanding that the flow of women should be stopped (Finfin, 1987:7). Incidentally, the recent book by the German researcher Diederich (1995) analyses in detail the different positions taken by the Indonesian press; some are for the migration, some criticize it, and some oppose it altogether.

Another point in common is the presence of intermediaries. Even if migrants are recruited openly and officially in agencies in Jakarta, private agents succeed in fully playing their profitable role as intermediaries or touts. They canvass for customers, give them the information they need and conduct them to Jakarta, for which, of course, they are paid. The costs are 3 or 4 times higher for men than for

women, whose journey is paid for by their employers. However this may be, the intermediary often manages to lend money to pay for the journey to and the cost of staying in Jakarta where the candidate has to take a training course. The agent is amply repaid, often at a rate of interest of 200 %! This system will last as long as there are migrants who defer to their village chiefs or religious leaders, and prefer to put themselves in their hands or use nonofficial networks, rather than using official channels of which they are either unaware or find a burden to deal with.

Conclusion

Indonesians have long been interested in the pilgrimage and with revolutionary changes of the means of travel —steamships took over from sailing ships and were succeeded by planes, the number of pilgrims has increased, and the time spent on the journey has been shortened. The pilgrimage itself has been transformed into an instance of organized and institutionalized mass travel.

The pilgrimage to Mecca and the international migration of people looking for work are two closely linked population movements. Both pilgrims and migrants are looking for a more prosperous future and a higher standing in the community. The migrants looking for work abroad also want to make the pilgrimage as cheaply as possible, while those who go on pilgrimage hope to work afterwards in the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia. Others borrow so much money that they are obliged to work abroad in the Emirates, Singapore or Malaysia to pay back their debts to the sheikhs and guides who have organized their pilgrimage, and who very often are notorious usurers. It is certainly true that the *hajj* who become *kiyai* through the pilgrimage have developed networks to recruit heavily indebted workers, as well as new candidates for the pilgrimage. They profit financially from their experience, by providing information and assistance during the future migrants and pilgrims long journey.

In the case of the pilgrimage, it is clear that from the 1870s Arab, Malaysian and Indonesian sheikhs or intermediaries played a leading part in the organization and the rapid growth of this journey which took people far away and was full of risks. The sheikhs had every motivation to find as many clients as possible. It appears then that even when the candidate pilgrim satisfied the conditions suggested by Islam for a successful pilgrimage to Mecca, namely:

- to have sufficient means to get to the Holy Places and return home,
- to be able to make the pilgrimage in complete safety,
- to be in a good physical condition, and
- to arrange that the family has sufficient means to live on while the pilgrim is away, the journey could nevertheless turn out to be dangerous financially as intermediaries made their appearance throughout the trip.

In the case of international migration, whether legal or illegal, the migrant cannot or does not want to rely on government institutions or official recruiting agencies. The fact that the journey he is planning is often lengthy and hazardous, and that he faces a certain number of drawbacks, such as a lack of information or money, the would-be migrant cannot get started without help. At the simple level of East Java my thesis has shown the quite decisive part played by mutual aid networks; in fact, non-migrants are often individuals who belong to communities which have not developed a tradition of migrating. It becomes apparent that would-be migrants turned for help to networks, often run by non-official or semi-professional recruiters or agents. There were different types of recruiters: relatives, friends, government officials, businessmen and very often, religious leaders. Even when the would-be migrant appealed to relatives or friends, the arrangements were handled more and more professionally and had to be paid for. This dependence on intermediaries, often *kiyai* or *ḥajj*, with an all-powerful religious status and an important social position, illustrates the system of clientelism which bears so heavily on Indonesian society.

End Notes

1. L. Husson, *La Migration maduraise vers l'est de Java*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1955. In this work, I examine migration in the third ethnic group in Indonesia (they number 10 million of whom only 2,5 million still live in Madura) from the 13th century to the present.
2. In general, I realized that these people owned material goods - exterior signs of wealth - that their neighbors did not have: televisions, videos, hi-fi equipment, motorbikes, pictures of Mecca and were very often their own boss. These migrants had worked under contract of one, two or three years, either as chauffeurs or building workers in the case of men, or as female domestics. Their stay in the Gulf States had made it possible for them to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, and to provide for their families at home.
3. Some 87 % of the 190 million Indonesians are Muslims and the country has one mosque for 554 inhabitants as against one for 2 280 inhabitants in Algeria (A. Feillard, "L'Islam Indonesian", Perspectives indonésiennes, Paris, 1995: 46).
4. "De bedevaart naar Mekka", *De Indische Gids*, 1897, pp. 354-395.
   "De bedevaart naar Mekka van 1898", *De Indische Gids*, 1899, pp. 552-572.
   "Een oordeel over Hajji's", *De Indische Gids*, 1905, pp. 1066-1069.
   "De bedevaart naar Mekka 1909/10", *De Indische Gids*, 1910, pp. 1637-1641.
   SPAT (C.), 1912. "Gouvernement en Bedevaart", *De Indische Gids*, pp. 337-354.
   "Bedevaartverslag 1912-1913 van den consul te Djeddah, *Hajj* 1330", *De Indische Gids*, 1913, pp. 1629-1644.
   "De Djawakolonic en de mysticke broederschappen in Mekka", *De Indische Gids*, 1915, pp. 538-540.
   "Mekkagangers", *Tijdschriff voor Nederlandsch-Indië*, 1898, pp. 639-661.
   "Verhaal eener pelgrimsreis van Singapoera naar Mekah, door Abdoellah Bin Abdil Kadir Moensji, gedaan in het jaar 1854", *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde*, 14, 1867, pp. 384-410.
   Foreign Affairs archives (*Buitenlandse Zaken*): A-dossier n° 74 "Correspondentie over woelingen, slavenhandel en slavernij in dc Hejaz 1872-1936"; Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA) en B-dossier n° 187 "Mekkagangers: pelgrimaangelegenheden in de Hejaz 18711917", *Buitenlandse Zaken*).
5. The pilgrimage is also a stage in the life cycle like birth and marriage, through which a sort of symbolic rebirth, a renewal is enacted. The pilgrim leaves for distant places, is separated physically from his social milieu, and by performing various symbolic acts he is purified and gains knowledge and awareness. Afterwards, the *ḥajj* returns to his community, where ritual period continues, because for forty days, just like a new-born baby, he has to stay indoors. This period is described as *molang are* (Nichof, 1985:246), which means "return to life". At the end of this retreat, the *ḥajj* can return to normal life; but his status has changed and from now on he is considered to have been cleansed of all his sins and is supposed to behave in conformity with his pure state. He has been blessed by God, has been close to the Almighty, and therefore has great prestige in his community. The charisma attached to this is a recognition of the supernatural origin of the power and authority conferred on him. The prestige of his new position brings with it a number of moral obligations as well as material advantages: respect and confidence, assurance and daring (luck - *rejeki* - comes from God and will be granted to him) money and gifts in kind. These gifts are

particularly important ones if the *hajj* is a master in religion (*kiyai* or *guru agama*), a healer (*kiyai lele*), or a specialist in magic.

6. The consular reports describe the destitution of the pilgrims, especially those from British India who were begging and even dying in the streets of Jeddah at the end of the pilgrimage season (Consul aan Buitenlandsc Zaken, Djeddah, 28/1111873 and, 27111/1889)
7. Koloniën aan Buiteniandse Zaken (BZ:B-dossier n° 187, porteuille 2), The Hague, 111411879).
8. Consul aan Buitenlandse Zaken, Djeddah, 3011211877, 511/1879, 814/1878
9. Koloniën aan Buitenlandse Zaken, The Hague, 21/211878.
10. Koloniën aan Buitenlandse Zaken, (BZ/ B-dossier n° 187), The Hague, 3111211877.
11. The Regent of Bandung, Raden Aria Wiranatakoesoema, is the first Indonesian to have published his diary of a journey to Mecca, in Dutch and Sundanese , in 1925. It is easy to read and gives a good idea of the privations and difficulties borne by pilgrims in the 1920s, and exposes the risks entailed in the pilgrimage. He writes, "the pilgrimage to the Holy Places is considered an ideal by most people, because they mistakenly think that it washes away all their sins. Both well-to-do people, and those who are not rich, think that not going to Mecca is a serious neglect of a religious duty, but in this they are mistaken. It is the cause of all their troubles, but also of those of their families who, after the pilgrim leaves, find themselves destitute" (1925: 1).
12. The Indonesian government give two reasons for the quota system: the lack of currency and the lack of plans for accommodating the pilgrims in Saudi Arabia. Each province in Indonesia had the right to a certain number of pilgrims who are chosen by lots. Those who are not chosen might have to wait years for their turn. Priority is given to government officials, members of the armed forces and ex-service-men, and certain political opponents or activists whom the government wants to win to its their side, or send away. Similarly, those who informed against crooks could skip the draw, and were given permission to depart for Mecca immediately (Mursyidi and Harahap, 1984).
13. The Indonesian pilgrims seemed to be worried about the food as they find it difficult to adapt themselves to Arab cooking. They do not go to the Indonesian restaurants in Mecca, but can get provisions in special markets or from itinerant vendors who have settled in near the Haram mosque. These latter, who came from South-East Asia, although dressed like Arabs and often in an illegal situation, provide cooked food familiar to the pilgrims, and attract them by their pleasant behavior which contrasts well with that of the rude local traders.
14. An overwhelming majority of the population in the United Arab Emirates is composed of immigrants; there are only 400,000 Emirate citizens out of a population of 2.2 million.
15. The report on the pilgrimage in 1913-14 (*De Indische Gids*, 1915:539) mentions leading personalities in the hundred or so students and professors of Muslim theology ..

    Raden Mohammad Mochtar, son of the former commandant of Manggapasar in Batavia, who was a student of Sayyid Aboe Bakr Sjatta and Hasab Allah, wrote an essay on the Sarekat Islam and is considered to be a specialist on Islam in the Dutch East Indies.

    Ahmad Djaha from Bantam, is also considered an important scholar. He was a pupil of *Hajji* Samaoen and continued his studies in Mecca under the direc-

tion of the learned Arab teacher, Moestafa Afifi.

Ahmad Marzoeki from Tanara who was related to the Javanese scholar Mohammad Nawawi (Shaykh Nawâwî), because he began his studies at Purwokerto (Krawang) and continued his education with the learned teacher Hasab Allah in Mecca.

Abdoel Hamid Kudus from Central Java and *shaykh* of the *ḥajj*, was born in Mecca of an Arab mother, and had among his teachers the ulema Sayyid Ahmad Dahlan (representative of the Sanusiyiah brotherhood) and Sayyid Bakri.

Ahmad Chatîb Padang and Abdul Kadir Mandailing, both from the West coast of Sumatera, were taught by the learned Arab teachers mentioned above, as were Oemar Sumbawa, Sjadelie Banten, Asja'ari Bawean, Abdullah Nawawi, Mafoez Patjitan, etc.

The *tarekat* or Muslim brotherhoods also had followers in the Dutch East Indies. We can mention Hajji Abdoerrahman Semarang and his students from Sumatera, the Priangan and from Semarang, all disciples of the Naqsybandiyah. *Hajji* Mohammad Demak and his students from Madiun and Pasuruan, *Hajji* Hassan Garut and his disciples from Cirebon, Bogor or Sunda, Mohammad Ali Banjoemas and his disciples from Banyuwangi and Banyumas, Jahaj Sambas and his students from Borneo were disciples of the Qadiriyah. Abdoel Karim Bugis, Abdoerrahman Bugis et Aboe Hoerairah, represented the Sanusiyah brotherhood, and so forth

As their patronymics, followed by the birth-place indicate, they came from Java and the neighboring islands and they attracted students from their regions of origin to Mecca.

16. A Saudi spoke to us about a family called Alatas, a name of Sumateran origin. This family was rich and respected, and their women folk spoke only Jawa and cooked Indonesian dishes. He told us about his own housekeeper, a Sundanese slave, whom he wanted to free after fifty years of loyal service, but refused to accept her freedom, ending her days with the family and leaving her savings to her master.

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