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THE ISLAMIC REFORMIST MOVEMENT IN THE MALAY-INDONESIAN WORLD IN THE FIRST FOUR DECADES OF THE 20TH CENTURY: INSIGHTS GAINED FROM A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT EGYPT

Giora Eliraz

THE POLITIC OF SALT, NOT THE POLITICS OF LIPSTICK: MOHAMMAD HATTA ON ISLAM AND NATIONALISM

Ihsan Ali-Fauzi

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Giora Eliraz

The Islamic Reformist Movement in the Malay-Indonesian World in the First Four Decades of the 20th Century: Insights Gained from a Comparative Look at Egypt

Abstraksi: *Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam di dunia Melayu-Indonesia sudah banyak mendapat perhatian di dunia akademik. Dilihat dari sisi itu artikel ini tidak memberikan banyak informasi baru. Meski demikian, kekuatan artikel ini terletak pada usahanya untuk membandingkan gerakan pembaharuan di Melayu-Indonesia dengan gerakan pembaharuan di Mesir. Seperti diketahui, Mesir adalah sumber inspirasi gerakan pembaharuan di Melayu-Indonesia. Jamâl al-Dîn al-Afghânî (1839-1897), Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905) dan Rashîd Ridâ (1865-1935) adalah figur-figur pembaharu yang sangat berpengaruh di Mesir, yang pemikiran-pemikirannya banyak mempengaruhi gerakan pembaharuan di Melayu-Indonesia. Tetapi, walaupun berasal dari Mesir, gerakan pembaharuan di Melayu-Indonesia jauh lebih berhasil dibanding dengan di Mesir sendiri. Kenapa demikian? Sebagai sebuah studi, artikel ini mampu memberikan jawaban awal atas pertanyaan ini.*

Gerakan pembaharuan Islam yang dimotori ketiga tokoh Mesir tersebut beranjak dari dua kehendak yang tidak mudah dipertemukan. Di satu sisi ada kesadaran bahwa, karena adanya arus modernisasi, akal dan ilmu pengetahuan (non-agama) harus mendapat tempat dalam Islam, tetapi di sisi lain, ada juga kesadaran bahwa tradisi Islam tetap harus dipertahankan. Keseimbangan akal dan wahyu (dalam hal ini, al-Qur'an dan Hadith) yang diusahakan Muhammad Abduh menciptakan ketegangan di antara keduanya dan, karena pemikiran-pemikiran Abduh yang sering tidak jelas dan tidak sistematik, memunculkan penafsiran yang saling bertentangan di antara pengikut-pengikutnya sendiri. Di tangan Rashîd Ridâ, pengikut Abduh yang sangat penting, misalnya, porsi wahyu menjadi sangat dominan. Dia sangat menekankan pentingnya kembali kepada ajaran-ajaran al-Qur'an dan Hadith dan menghormati pendapat para ulama terdahulu yang disebut Salaf. Gerakan pembaharuan yang dikembangkannya, dengan demikian, lebih berorientasi ke 'fundamentalisme' Ibn Taymiyyah-Ibn Hanbal. Gerakan pembaharuan seperti yang difahami Rashîd Ridâ inilah yang kemudian berkembang di Melayu-Indonesia.

Dengan penekanan kepada pentingnya mengikut ajaran-ajaran al-Qur'an dan Hadith dengan ketat, para pendukung gerakan pembaharuan di Indonesia, yang dikenal dengan Kaum Muda, terlibat dalam pemberantasan praktek-praktek dan faham-faham keagamaan yang, dalam pandangan mereka, bersumber dari adat dan kebiasaan lokal yang tidak ada dasarnya dalam al-Qur'an dan Hadith. Tidak mengherankan kalau Muhammadiyah, gerakan pembaharuan di Indonesia yang paling penting, mendapat perlawanan keras terutama dari kelompok-kelompok yang sangat menghormati adat dan kebiasaan-kebiasaan lokal tersebut, yang dikenal dengan Kaum Tua.

Tetapi, walaupun awalnya gerarakan pembaharuan ini bersifat keagamaan, agama bukanlah satu-satunya medan pertentangan antara Kaum Muda dan Kaum Tua. Untuk keberhasilan misinya, kelompok pembaharu mendirikan sekolah-sekolah modern dengan sistem, materi dan metode yang sama sekali berbeda dengan yang dikembangkan di pusat-pusat pendidikan tradisional seperti pesantren dan surau.

*Selain dunia pendidikan, sosial dan politik adalah juga arena dimana perbedaan pandangan kedua kelompok ini terekspresikan dengan kuat. Ketika Islam difahami sebagai agama yang mengatur segala aspek kehidupan, menggugat keberagamaan seseorang akan berdampak pada kehidupan sosial dan politik orang tersebut. Pandangan kaum pembaharu tentang ijtihad, misalnya, berdampak pada penghilangan otoritas keagamaan tradisional. Dengan ijtihad masyarakat dituntut untuk aktif mencari kebenaran agama bagi dirinya dan, dengan demikian, peran ulama tradisional sebagai pemegang otoritas keagamaan tergeser. Karena dalam penguasaan ilmu ada kekuasaan (*knowledge and power*), maka penghilangan monopoli keilmuan adalah juga penghilangan monopli kekuasaan.*

Sementara di Melayu-Indonesia menemukan ekspresinya dalam spektrum yang sangat luas, gerakan pembaharuan di Mesir justeru terpecah-pecah menjadi kelompok-kelompok kecil dan kadang saling bertentangan. Abduh adalah tokoh penting di al-Azhar, tetapi justeru banyak ulama al-Azhar yang menjadi tokoh penentang fikiran-fikirannya, sementara pendukung-pendukungnya sendiri menghindar untuk bicara terbuka karena pertimbangan politik. Keadaan semakin tidak kondusif untuk gerakan pembaharuan di Mesir ini manakala Kedieve 'Abbas II, yang sebelumnya mendukung Abduh, kini menentangnya.

Karena lemah, gerakan pembaharuan di Mesir tidak cukup untuk menciptakan dikotomi kultural dan politik seperti Kaum Tua-Kaum Muda di Melayu-Indonesia.

Giora Eliraz

The Islamic Reformist Movement in the Malay-Indonesian World in the First Four Decades of the 20th Century: Insights Gained from a Comparative Look at Egypt

خلاصة: أصبحت حركة التجديد في مناطق الملايو – إندونيسيا مثار اهتمام العالم الأكاديمي كثيرا، ولا يأتي هذا البحث بمعلومات جديدة من تلك الناحية، بل على العكس من ذلك تكمن قوته فيما يقوم به من عقد مقارنة بين حركات التجديد في مناطق ملايو – إندونيسيا وحركات التجديد في مصر، وكما يعرف الجميع فإن مصر كانت مصدر إلهام لحركة التجديد في مناطق ملايو- إندونيسيا حيث جمال الدين الأفغاني (١٨٣٩-١٨٩٧) ومحمد عبده (١٨٤٩-١٩٠٥) ورشيد رضا (١٨٦٥-١٩٣٥) وشخصيات أخرى مؤثرة في مصر هم الذين كان لأفكارهم أثرها في نشوء حركة التجديد في ملايو – إندونيسيا؛ ومع ذلك فإنه على الرغم من الحركة التجديدية كان مصدرها مصر فإن نجاحها في ملايو – إندونيسيا أكبر بكثير منه في مصر نفسها، والسؤال لماذا كان ذلك ؟ إن هذه الدراسة تستطيع أن تقدم جوابا أوليا حياله.

لقد كانت حركة التجديد التي يقودها أولئك الأشخاص الثلاث في مصر تنطلق من رغبتين لم يكن من السهولة التوفيق بينهما؛ فمن ناحية كان هناك وعي تام بأنه نظرا لمسار التجديد فإن العقل والعلم (غير العلوم الدينية) يجب أن يكون لهما مكان في الإسلام، بينما هناك وعي تام من ناحية أخرى بأنه يجب الاحتفاظ والمحافظة على التراث الإسلامي وتقاليده؛ ولقد كان منهج التوازن بين العقل والوحي المتمثل في القرآن والسنة الذي طرحه الشيخ محمد عبده يعاني من صراع بينهما لأن أفكاره التي لم تكن منظمة وغير واضحة في كثير من الأحيان تؤدي إلى نشوء تفسيرات بين أتباعه؛ فعند رشيد رضا مثلا وهو من أهم تلاميذ محمد عبده كان الوحي هو السائد؛ فكان يعطي أولوية

مطلقة لضرورة الرجوع بالتعاليم الدينية إلى القرآن والسنة واحترام آراء العلماء السابقين المعروفين باسم السلف الصالح، فكانت حركة التجديد التي قادها تتجه إلى أصولية ابن تيمية وابن حنبل، وهذا النوع من الاتجاه هو الذي انتشر في ملايو- إندونيسيا.

فانطلاقا من ضرورة الالتزام بالرجوع بالتعاليم الدينية إلى القرآن والسنة التزاما تاما تورط مؤيدو الحركة التجديدية بإندونيسيا المعروفون باسم جماعة الشبان (Kaum Muda) في رفض الممارسات الدينية والنظريات المتأثرة بالعادات والتقاليد المحلية التي لا أساس لها في القرآن والسنة؛ فلا غرابة إذن أن تكون جمعية المحمدية التي تعد أهم الحركات التجديدة الإسلامية في إندونيسيا تتعرض لمعارضة شديدة وبخاصة من أولئك الذين يحترمون العادات والتقاليد المحلية المعروفين باسم جماعة الشيوخ (Kaum Tua).

بيد أنه وإن كانت حركة التجديد دينية في طبيعتها إلا أن الدين ليس المجال الوحيد المختلف فيه بين الجماعتين؛ وتحقيقا لرسالتهم لجأت جماعة الشبان إلى إنشاء مدارس جديدة بما لهم من نظام ومواد دراسية وطرق تدريس يختلف عما عليه مراكز التعليم التقليدية مثل المعاهد التراثية والحلقات في المساجد؛ وكانت المجالات السياسية والاجتماعية بجانب المجال التعليمي من الأمور التي تميز طبيعة الجماعتين بشكل بارز؛ فإذا كانت تعاليم الإسلام شاملة لجميع جوانب الحياة فإن السؤال عن تحقيق ذلك لدى كل مسلم يشمل موقفه السياسي والاجتماعي؛ فكان رأي جماعة الشبان مثلا في الاجتهاد يتوجه إلى تهديد السلطة الدينية التقليدية؛ فبالاجتهاد يصبح المجتمع مطلوبا على القيام بالبحث عن حقيقة الدين كل بنفسه وبالتالي يقل هنا دور العلماء التقليديين الذين كان لهم السلطة؛ وبما أن في التمكن العلمي سلطة فإن انعدام الحاجة إلى علمهم يقلل من سلطانهم.

وفيما كانت حركة التجديد في ملايو — إندونيسيا تأخذ مسارها في مجال أوسع تمزقت حركة التجديد في مصر كطوائف صغيرة تتناحر فيما بينها أحيانا؛ فالشيخ محمد عبده من رجال الأزهر ولكن أكثر المعارضين لأفكاره من علماء الأزهر نفسه في حين كان أتباعه يحاولون تجنيب أنفسهم قيام صراع فكري مفتوح لاعتبارات سياسية، وازداد الأمر سوءا عندما تحول الخديو إسماعيل الذين كان مؤيدا للشيخ محمد عبده إلى معارضته؛ ونظرا لهذا الضعف لم تستطع حركة التجديد في مصر أن تخلق ثنائية ثقافية وسياسية كتلك التي بين جماعتي الشبان والشيوخ في ملايو- إندونيسيا.

The narrative of the reformist/modernist Islamic movement[1] in the Malay- Indonesian world[2] is an outstanding one in the modern history of Islam there. The first four decades of the twentieth century are a particularly intriguing chapter in this narrative, mainly because the given span of time, to a lesser degree the 1930s, is closely interwoven with the fierce and multi-dimensional conflict and dichotomy between the *Kaum Muda* ("young group") and the *Kaum Tua* ("old group")[3]. "It needed only one *haji* to return from the Middle East fired with reformist ideas, one religious teacher to study at a *Kaum Muda madrassah* in Singapore, Perak or Penang, to divide a village temporarily into two embittered factions", William R. Roff wrote very descriptively, referring to the *Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua* conflict in the Malay peninsula.[4]

From a broad perspective, this outstanding chapter in the modern history of Islam in the Malay-Indonesian world constitutes a remarkable milestone in the continuous and substantial influence, in the Islamic context, of the Middle East on the region under discussion. In Von der Mehden's view, during the century before World War II the "Modernist movement" was "the intellectual import from the Middle East with the greatest impact on public Islam" (1993: 13). Reformist ideas like those of Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida fired the imagination of Indonesian youths, Deliar Noer asserted, referring to the first four decades of the twentieth century (1978: 296). No doubt, the narrative of the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay- Indonesian world is intimately and deeply connected with the Middle East in general, and with Egypt in particular.

The transmission of Islamic reformist ideas from the Middle East, in particular from Egypt, to the Malay-Indonesian world stimulates interest in observing and examining this formative chapter in the history of the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world by taking a comparative look at Egypt. Similarly, an observer of both the center of Islamic world and its "periphery" is surely tempted to try to link them. Hence, this article aims to search for the insights that may derive from such a comparative view. Of course, a comparative view of this type also has

basically vulnerable points and biases which will be mentioned in this particular context in the course of the discussion. Notwithstanding, it appears that taking Egypt as a comparative case study vis-a-vis the Malay-Indonesian world in this regard may enrich knowledge about this fascinating chapter in the modern history of the reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world. Perhaps it may even provide insights regarding the movement that go beyond the confines of the said period.

Muhammad 'Abduh's Heritage: Preliminary Comments

Near the end of the nineteenth century, Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905) systematically laid the conceptual foundation of the modern Islamic reformist movement in Egypt, following the spirit of his mentor and colleague, Jamâl al-Dîn al-Afghânî (1839-1897).[5] But the conceptual heritage which he left behind is given to contradicting interpretations. This is mainly due to its being in part an ambiguous formula which suggests harmony in true Islam between the religious claim "to express God's will about how men should live in society" and the "irreversible movement of modern civilization"[6], or between revelation and the Tradition of the Prophet, on one hand, and human reason and science on the other hand.[7]

Thus, after the death of 'Abduh, the leading influential Muslim thinker, the delicate conceptual balance which he created was overturned by his followers. One group of followers was inspired by the Syrian Rashid Rida (1865-1935) who made Egypt his home from 1897 and became 'Abduh's prominent disciple, biographer and the spokesman of his ideas. Rida was also the founder and editor of the successful Cairo-based journal, *Al-Manar* (1898-1935), which he used as an organ for promulgating 'Abduh's reformist ideas, taking his heritage in the direction of a puritan approach and calling for a return to the strict values and ideals of the *salaf* (the formative forefathers of Islam) and to the purist origins of the Qurân and the Sunna.[8]

The followers of this group even replaced, in their journal *Al-Manar*, the influence of the "great conciliator," al-Ghazali, with

that of the "fundamentalist," Ibn Taimiya.[9] Known as the *Salafiyya* movement, they imbued 'Abduh's insistence on the unchanging nature and absolute claims of the essential Islam with an orientation of Hanbali fundamentalism.[10] Other followers of 'Abduh developed his emphasis on the legitimacy of social change[11] into a de facto division between two realms, that of religion and that of society.[12] Nadav Safran states that 'Abduh's ideology and program, as a whole, gained support in Egypt only among a tiny group of reformers, but some of his disparate and general ideas had a considerable influence on Egyptian thought and development. Much of that thought and literature, he adds, carried some of 'Abduh's ideas far beyond what he had intended, while "both schools could lay claim to his authority because his thought did indeed lend itself easily to radical and conservative interpretations" (1961:74).

Malcolm H. Kerr points out that the great moral purpose of practical reform that characterized Islamic modernism at the turn of the twentieth century was quietly dissipated (1966: 15). Modernism's adherents have found other homes, explains Kerr, at either end of the nationalism-conservatism spectrum, and thus the dissipation has scarcely been noticed. No one in Egypt, elaborates Kerr, "is heard today mourning the legacy of Muhammad 'Abduh: on the contrary, everyone claims it as his own. The difficulty is that the teachings of 'Abduh and his circle rested on intellectual foundations that were, on the whole, vague and unsystematic".[13]

This very tradition of Islamic reformism —inspired initially by Jamâl al-Dîn al-Afghânî, formulated in essence mainly by Muhammad 'Abduh and carried on and interpreted by Rashid Rida— constituted the dominant breeding ground of the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world.[14] It is there that the Islamic reformist heritage transmitted from Egypt —one of the main active historical centers of reformist Islamic thought in the Muslim world— was planted and grew in the first decades of the twentieth century into an influential movement. This movement retained the authentic features of the Egptian reformist heritage, including motivations, fundamentals, and terminology. Furthermore, during the first decades of the twentieth century this

Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world appeared to be actually introducing innovations into this heritage.

The Challenge of the Islamic Reformist Movement in the Malay-Indonesian World

When observing the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world in the first four decades of the twentieth century (to a lesser degree in the 1930s) one is struck by strength of the religious, social and political challenge it posed, which threatened primarily the various "guardians" of the traditional values and institutions. This challenge, which generated the *Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua* conflict between the Islamic reformists (or modernists) and the traditionalists, was salient mainly in the Indonesian archipelago and the three British colonies, the Straits Settlements (consisting of Singapore, Penang and Malacca). In British Malay, despite its geographic proximity to the Straits Settlements, Islamic reformism is assessed as one of the least successful organizationally.[15]

The Reformist Motivation

Jamâl al-Dîn al-Afghânî and Muhammad 'Abduh's diagnosis about the "inner decay" of Islamic societies and their "backwardness",[16] that motivated their reformist drive, clearly had an impact on the initial motivating power of the reformists in the Malay-Indonesian world as well.

In Singapore, in the first decade of the twentieth century, the Islamic reformist journal, *Al-Imam* (1906-1908), the first newspaper that carried the message of reformism to the Malay-Muslim world,[17] which was greatly influenced by the reformist ideas of the Egyptian *Al-Manar* and closely modeled on it, [18] analyzed the ills of Malay society in a manner and language resembling al-Afghânî and Muhammad 'Abduh's diagnosis of the state of Islamic society. The journal pointed to "the 'backwardness' of the Malays, their domination by aliens, their ignorance of modern fields of knowledge, their laziness, their complacency, their feuds among themselves and inability to cooperate".[19] This failing of the Malay, argued *Al-Imam*, was one shared by the whole Islamic world

in consequence of their ignoring the commands of God.[20] Similarly, Kijahi Hadji Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhamadiyah —the reformist organization founded in Jogjakarta in 1912 and still is a major character in the narrative of the reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world [21]— was motivated by the realization that the Indonesian Muslims were in a state of decline and undergoing a crisis of faith.[22] Since Dahlan was inspired by Jamâl al-Dîn al-Afghânî's and Muhammad and 'Abduh's thought, it is not surprising at all to find the clear conceptual imprint of both of these men in his reformist drive.

The Religious Dimension

In essence, the message of the Islamic reformist movement is grounded in the religious sphere, in a search for salvation and for answers within Islam. The remedy to the crisis can be largely found by revealing the truths of Islam, purifying its commandments and obeying them. Consequently, the reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world, following the steps of reformist ideas from the Middle East, initially regarded its challenge as a religious one. The significance and dominance of the religious dimension in the world-view of Islamic reformism may have caused some methodological difficulties in the attempt to draw demarcations between this and other important dimensions - educational, social and political - that reveals themselves in the actions and thought of the reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world.

Since it bore a reformist religious message and a puritanic orientation, Islamic reformism ran counter to the world-view of the greater part of the diversified Muslim communities in the Malay-Indonesian world, which were located at different points on the imaginary line extending from the orthodox Islamic pole, on one hand, and syncretic Islam on the other hand. Primarily, two provocative fundamental tenets stand at the center of the religious platform of Islamic reformism.

The first is the theological call for *ijtihâd*, the individual and independent rational interpretation of the formative scriptures, the Qurân and the hadîth. It was proposed as a legal mechanism in lieu of the blind and uncritical acceptance (Malay: *taklid buta*) of

the interpretations of the great masters of the past, namely those of the four schools of canon law: *al-madhâhib*. The *ijtihâd* was expected to be carried out by the religious scholars and specialists[23] and not by laymen and was conceived, in accordance with 'Abduh's concept, as a call to utilize *'aql* (reason) in reference to worldly matters in order to apply the prescriptions laid down in the Qurân and the hadîth to contemporary conditions and demands, in contrast to the unchanging nature of the essentials of the divine doctrine and prophetic message. Inspired by the concept of the *ijtihâd*, in 1927, the Muhamadiyah established a council of prominent religious scholars, called Majlis Tarjih, in order to consider matters of religious beliefs and practices.[24]

The second tenet is a decisive demand to purify Islamic doctrine and practice from *bid'ah* (heretical and improper "innovation", namely those accretions of practices and beliefs that historically lack Islamic justification), non-Islamic mysticism, magic,[25] superstition as well as animist, Hindu and Buddhist elements that had been incorporated into Islam in Southeast Asia.[26] This demand was one of the main reasons for the conflict between the reformist *Kaum Muda* and the *Kaum Tua,* the guardians of traditional values and institutions. The conflict included various issues, among them the basic dichotomy between the "sharî'ah-mindedness"[27] of the reformists, who claimed to be governed by Islamic law in all aspects of life, and the defenders of *adat*, local traditions and customs.[28]

The *adat*, which were accepted by sizeable segments of Indonesian Muslims, prominent among them the *abangan* (the unpracticing nominal Muslims, as opposed to the *santri*, the orthodox Muslims), were regarded by the reformists as remnants of animist or Hindu-Buddhist traditions and as syncretic in their nature. One of the issues that aroused heated disputes was also the reformists' rejection, such as *bid'ah*, of the *usalli*, the pronouncement of the formulation of intention at the beginning of the prayer.[29] Another controversial issue, rejected as well by the reformists on the grounds of it being *bid'ah*, was the reciting of the *talqîn* ("instruction"), the short address recited over the grave at the burial, consisting of advice to the dead about how to reply in his questioning by the angels.[30] Another outstanding issue, which

was a bone of contention, was the acceptance by the Muhamadiyah organization, definitely in opposition to the traditional orthodox position, of the principle that the Friday sermon could be conducted in the vernacular, rather than in Arabic (Federspiel 1970: 66; see also Berg 1932: 270).[31]

This sizeable organization, described by James L. Peacock at the end of the 1970s as "the most powerful living reformist movement in Muslim Southeast Asia, perhaps in the entire Muslim culture" (1978b: 6),[32] also has been striving for years to purify, at least the lives of its members, of the major traditional Javanese rituals. This applies to the major ritual complexes around which "the existence of the Javanese has been organized for a millenium" (Peacock 1975: 189): *slametan* (the ritual feast shared by neighbors) which is at the core of the entire Javanese religious system[33]; *wayang* (the shadow play with the leather puppets); *hormat*, [34] the various rituals for venerating rank.[35] At the same time, this organization, which declares itself as a movement for *dakwah* (Islamic missionary activity calling for the performance of good deeds and forbidding the bad ones)[36], tried to promote among Muslims those practices and beliefs it regards as religiously correct.[37]

The Educational Dimension

The Islamic reformist efforts in the field of education also posed a threat to traditionalists in the Malay-Indonesian world during the period under discussion. These efforts were largely motivated by a basic interest, inspired by Muhammad 'Abduh's ideas, in improving the level of religious education and in modernizing the educational system in order to adapt it to pressing contemporary needs. Hence, a type of modern school, *madrasah*, was established by the Islamic reformism movement, both by organizations and individuals, in the Indonesian archipelago and in the Malay peninsula. This type of school was a reaction to the old-fashioned Islamic school, *pondok, pesantren* or *surau*.[38] Instead of the traditional method of teaching, the *halaqah* ("study circle"), where students irrespective of age sit in a circle around the teacher and learn the material by rote, a classroom method was introduced by the reformists. There the students sat in rows, used graded texts and

were encouraged to participate actively in the class. In addition to the religious subjects, secular subjects were also included in the curriculum. Thus in Indonesia, where the reformists recognized the advantages of adopting Western methods and techniques in the field of education, science was also incorporated into the curriculum, following its introduction into the Dutch government schools (Noer 1978: 306-307).

A great deal of effort was made in the field of education in the Dutch East Indies by Muhamadiyah. In the spirit of 'Abduh's tradition, the organization has carried out, since its formative years, a massive and multidimensional reformist program in the field of education (see Federspiel 1970: 61-64) both general and religious. Furthermore, the organization —probably influenced to a certain extent by ideas of 'Abduh and his disciples about equality between men and women and the need for training and educating Muslim girls and women, as well as improving their social condition in general— also promoted the education and training given them. At the beginning this was done through the women's section of the organization, Aisyiyah, that was founded in 1912 and has been since 1923 an independent organization, under the guidance of Muhamadiyah. This activity, which was originally initiated to help women understand the meaning of practicing Islam as a way of life and to purify their faith, has been widened in the long run, beyond the confines of the discussed period, to include varied educational, social and economic activities, which have had profound effects on the modernization of Indonesian women (see Baried 1986; Noer 1978: 79).

The reformist activities of Muhamadiyah in the field of education reflect multiple motivations: making Muslims "better Muslims" (see Von der Mehden 1986a: 90) ; reforming and modernizing their life; spreading Islam among the population; promoting religious life among the members of Muhamadiyah (see Noer 1978: 75); promoting the goal of building Muslim society; and defending Islam against European influence and Christian "attack". The emphasis laid by Muhamadiyah on *tabligh*,[39] as a missionary work of propagating Islam, expresses some of these motivations.

The efforts made in the field of education for women and girls

was initially motivated to a large extent by an interest in improving their understanding of Islam and their practice of its precepts as well as in enabling them to function properly as housewives and mothers. Much was done in this regard by Aisyiyah (see Johns 1987: 411-412; Baried 1986: 147-148; Noer 1978: 79). In Malay, besides the call to broaden women's opportunities in the field of education, the *Kaum Muda* advocated greater freedom for women to participate in social affairs (Roff 1967: 78-79).

The Social and Political Dimension

Basically, the reformist message was anchored mainly in the religious sphere, and the Islamic reformists saw their mission, particularly in the first two decades of the twentieth century, as having primarily religious and educational, not social, ends, not to mention political ones.[40] However, both the social and political dimensions became deeply grounded in Islamic reformist ideas in the Malay-Indonesian world. Consequently, these two dimensions also became involved in the heated dispute and conflict between the reformists and their opponents, mainly the traditionalists. The nature of Islam as a total way of life (see Roff 1967: 57), the comprehensive meaning of the reformist-modernist message (see Roff 1962: 176-177), the demand for rapid social change, as well as the inner dynamic of the conflict, caused the reformist message to slide easily beyond the confines of the strictly religious domain to the social and political dimensions and to involve issues like stratification and power-sharing.

The very tenets of Islamic reformism, and the concept of *ijtihâd* in particular, have provocative social-political connotations. They challenged the traditional world-view and its guardians, as they incorporated within themselves a certain defiance to traditional authorities and social stratification. Thus, even though reformist spokesmen originally limited themselves to religious reform as such, especially to the purification of worship and ritual and the modernization of religious education, their teachings did engender far-reaching social and political repercussions (see Benda 1970: 185). For this same reason, the appellations *Kaum Muda* and *Kaum Tua*, which were originally used to specifically designate Muslim

religious reformers and their traditional religious opponents, came to stand for innovators and conservatives in a far wider sense (ibid.; see also Bowen 1997: 159). Deliar Noer argues that *ijtihâd* led the modernists to pay regard to opinions rather than to personalities or leaders and that the modernist teacher, often called *kyai*, did not enjoy the infallible position of the traditionalist *kyai*.

Similarly, they thought that the modernist teacher had no monopoly on the knowledge of Islam or any other knowledge, but merely made it available to the public which has an equal right to discuss it (1978: 306). Therefore, discussions on Islam were not confined to *pesantren*, *surau*, *langgar*[41] and mosques, but were brought out into the open through newspapers. William Roff, referring to Malay of the first four decades of the twentieth century, argues that while the main disputes focused on religious questions, social questions related to them became easily involved as a result of social change and the wider implications of *Kaum Muda* ideas. He continues, saying that arguments about whether it was permissible for a Muslim to wear European dress and to receive interest from post-office saving banks and rural co-operative societies "divided people along the same lines as arguments about the holiness of the local *keramat* (spirit shrine) or whether a teacher had correctly interpreted a verse of the Kuran. In short, to be *Kaum Muda* came to mean espousal of modernism in any form; to be *Kaum Tua* was to be in favor of all that was traditional, unchanging and secure".[42]

The wide scope of the *Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua* conflict also manifested itself in the direct defiance of traditional stratification and the division of power and even in efforts to delegitimize the source of authority of the traditional elite. This was clearly demonstrated in the heated conflict that erupted in the second decade of the twentieth century within the large and influential Hadrami emigrant community in the East Indies. Members of this community who were classified, according to the immobile and dominant stratification of their Hadrami homeland, to the low stratum of *masâkin* or to the middle level of religious leaders, *mashâyikh*, began to espouse Islamic reformist concepts in order to change their social position in their new land. Being organized in an Islamic reform-

ist organization, called Jam'iyyat al-Islâh wa-al-Irshâd, and inspired by Muhammad 'Abduh's and Rashid Rida's ideas, they defied traditional stratification and values. In particular, they opposed the privileged position that was assigned even in East Indies to the *Sâdat* (singular: *Sayyid*), who stood at the top of Hadrami society. Expressing a basic Islamic reformist argument about the equality of all believers before God and the equal rights that should be enjoyed by all[43], they argued, inter alia, that in principal the *Sâdat* enjoy no privilege in society (Kostiner 1984: 214). Knowing that the *Sâdat* dominated society through the field of education, by shaping private and public opinion, the Hadrami reformists sharply criticized their opponents' monopolized education system as an inferior, stagnant platform for spreading superstitions, and as such, as the source of under-development in Hadrami society. They also called for a more flexible and mobile society and freedom of thought and even tried, through the educational system they established, to provide the population with proper tools.[44]

The Islamic reformists really challenged the very existence of the traditional order, crossing their initial religious field to the social and political sphere. Hence, the attacks of *Kaum Muda* in Malay upon established Islam and their ideas were regarded as attacks upon the traditional elite as well, which stood behind and was involved with the religious hierarchy (Roff 1962: 176). Similarly, although *Kaum Muda*'s criticism of *adat* was limited to its detrimental effects on the practice of Islam or linked to their insistence upon the equality of all men before God, both critiques could be regarded as having subversive implications for the existing social and political as well as the religious order (ibid: 177). Shanti Nair writes that Islamic reformism, as it was articulated by the *Kaum Muda*, challenged the traditional religious authority that was located in the village-based ulama, scholars and functionaries to the sultans, largely constituted by the *Kaum Tua* movement, "whose ideals rested in the preservation of the Malay elites and of the royal courts" (1997: 16).

Moreover, already in the first decade of the twentieth century, at an earlier stage of the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world, the Islamic reformist journal, *al-Imam*, in

Singapore, that together with Penang formed "the intellectual nerve-centers of the Islamic renaissance" in Southeast Asia (Benda 1970: 184), dared to sharply decry the traditional Malay rulers, the sultans (or the rajas), who constituted the focus of political authority in traditional Malay society (the journal did not limit itself to the Malay peninsula, but was a platform for criticizing traditional rulers in the Indonesia archipelago as well). This journal even challenged these rulers' basic divine power and authority that was rationalized and legitimized in Islamic terms[45] and the whole royal ideology, *kerajaan*. In its bold defiance of the ruling elite in the peninsular states (the Sultanates), *al-Imam* did benefit from the liberal climate in Singapore, a British-governed enclave as well as the fact that it was beyond the reach of this elite. The Malay rulers, the rajas, were criticized by the journal, inter alia, for not enforcing the Islamic law, the shari'ah, and even disobeying it. They were also censured for their failure to respond to the European challenge, for neglecting the welfare of the Malay community, for their injustice; in brief, they were denounced as the source of all the ills this community suffered from. The life style of the court elites was also criticized. The titles and ceremony of the *kerajaan*, for example, were rejected as being frivolous and the emphasis on luxurious display was condemned. The whole basis of the *kerajaan* was even brought into question by *al-Imam*, including the basic position of the sultan (*raja*) as the focus of loyalty and the symbol of Muslim unity. Islam, not the sultanate and royal allegiance, was presented as the focus of the Islamic community, *umat* (Arabic: *ummah*). The divine law of God, the *sharîah*, not the royal court, was presented as the one that should be the basis of this community.[46] *Al-Imam*'s arguments implied that the ulama, not the *rajas*, should guide the ummat by being involved and influential in all aspects of Muslim community life and preparing this community for the challenge of the new world.[47] In British Malay, where Islamic reformism was also ethnically motivated, the *Kaum Muda* also criticized the existing feudal structure, urging the Malays to modernize in order to compete against the economically advanced non-Malays (Mohamad Abu Bakar 1986: 156).

From the 1910s, Islamic reformist ideas began to spread into the domain of political parties, and consequently the conflict between the *Kaum Muda* and *Kaum Tua* also extended into it.[48] But the essential politicization of the image of the *Kaum Muda*, according to William Roff, began to make itself evident only in the mid-1920s. He attributes this to the involvement of Islamic reformists in the debate and conflict in the Malay-Indonesian world about the collective identity of the political communities. Ostensibly, the initial involvement of the Islamic reformist movement in this kind of issue could have been identified at an earlier stage, in the first decade of the twentieth century, when *al-Imam* used the term *ummat* for Malay society. In that way, allegedly, it actually rejected the ideological basis of the traditional group identity, *kerajaan*, and implicitly granted a secondary significance to a group identity based on the Malay race, *bangsa*. But William Roff assumes that it would be a mistake to regard *al-Imam*'s concern for the Malay/Muslim *ummat* as a form of political nationalism (see 1962: 171).

The intellectual discourse among Islamic reformists in the Malay-Indonesian world in the 1920s about the issue of the collective identity was manifested primarily in two reformism-oriented journals published by Indonesian and Malay students at the University of al-Azhar in Cairo: *Seruan Azhar* ("Voice of al-Azhar"), 1925-1928, and *Pileban Timour* ("Choice of the East"), 1927-1928.[49] These two journals, that were banned by the Dutch in Indonesia but had a free entry to the Straits Settlements, were involved in an overt political discussion that included the expression of Pan-Islamic ideas and expectations. This discussion was largely influenced by Egyptian involvement at the time in attempts to resurrect the Caliphate. The two journals were also used as a stage for the expression of support for the idea of Pan-Malaynism (union between Indonesia and Malay), as well as for anti-colonial nationalism.[50] Cairo, particularly in the 1920s, also provided a fertile ground for the students from the Malay-Indonesian world to freely express their political sentiments in general and their anti-colonial sentiments in particular.[51]

The Islamic reformists did contribute to the development of a national identity both in Dutch East India and Malay. In the former

they worked, at a preliminary stage, to foster collective ideas and sentiments beyond diversified ethnic origins, playing the role of "pre-nationalism" (Roff 1967: 87), establishing a "proto-nationalist movement" (Stockwell 1986: 323) and adapting a sort of anti-colonial attitude.[52] In Malay, they even created an interesting conceptual linkage between Islam and nationalism. This was done by introducing the concept of universal Muslim community, the *ummah*, into the debate about Malay nationalism In this manner, the Islamic reformists strengthened the equation, that had pre-colonial roots, between the Malay ethnic element in the national identity and the Muslim religious element. By this conceptual approach, they allegedly also established the first linkage between religion and politics in the earliest forms of Malay nationalism (Nair 1997: 16). Hence, contrary to the intense struggle in the history of many Muslim societies between nationalism and Islam, Malay nationalism, in its earliest articulation, combined Malay nationalist and Islamic ideals. Shanti Nair adds that historically then "Malay nationalism more accurately reflected an ethnic assertiveness incorporating religious identity".[53]

This process of politicization in the Dutch East Indies was nourished by the reformists' need, in the first decades of the twentieth century, to confront other contradictory world-views and ideologies. One prominent among these was Communism. The reformists' rivalry with this ideology was confined in the said period to the twenties, since the Communist message began to find a willing ear then, but was suppressed by the Dutch in 1927.[54] Another competing ideology was Javanism, as a Javanist separatist idea, or nationalism of a Javanese character, which inevitably contradicted the idea of establishing Islam as a collective bond of unity.[55] But the far most serious conflict that the Islamic reformists also participated in was that between Islam and "secular"[56] nationalism.[57] In this debate and conflict, which reached its height in the 1920s and the 1930s, the "secularists," prominent among them the Dutch-educated Indonesians, proposed a type of nationalism, *kebangsaan* (see Noer 1978: 248 note 125). They called for a joint collective identity outside the context of Islam that compromised all the people of Indonesia, irrespective of faith and ethnic origin. Their

message seriously defied Islam by questioning the justifiability of various Islamic teachings and institutions, such as the pilgrimage to Mecca and polygamy, and by disparaging the benefits of its services and rituals as obstacles to progress.

The *kebangsaan* was viewed by Islamic reformists, among others, as a kind of new religion.(Noer 247-295, 318-321). This conflict of the 1920s and the 1930s was a preliminary stage in regard to a very significant and lasting issue in the political ideological debate that has taken place in Indonesia since the 1940s between Islam and state, also known as a the issue of *umat* and *negara*. It was largely epitomized in the 1945 debate about the "philosophical basis" for independent Indonesia and the prolonged discourse about the meaning and interpretation of Pancasila, the Indonesian national ideology.[58]

The extension of the reformists ideology to the political sphere, as an expression of the unity between religion and politics embodied in the Great Tradition of Islam, was also regarded with anxiety by the Dutch colonial regime in the East Indies. It was deeply concerned about the militant and political aspects of Islam, observing them according to its revised policy toward Islam in the East Indies. This revised policy, based on the guidelines drawn at the end of the nineteenth century by "the architect of Netherlands Islamic policy in the Indies" (Benda 1970: 187), Christian Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936), was less suspicious of and relatively moderate towards Islam. The major guidelines of this policy postulated toleration of the Muslim faith, combined with repressive vigilance toward Islamic, especially Pan-Islamic, political activities. These guidelines continued to characterize the policy of the Dutch colonial administration even after the appearance of Islamic reformism and the rapid growth of Muslim activism that threatened "to blur the thin and artificial dividing line between the religiously tolerable and the politically intolerable".[59]

Nevertheless, suspicious of the potential political threat embodied in Islamic reformism and guided, allegedly, by a policy of *divide et impera*, the Dutch government officials tried to obstruct and suppress the spread of Islamic reformism in the East Indies. Therefore, traditional indigenous rulers like *priyayi* (Javanese no-

bility) and *adat* chiefs, who regarded the reformists leaders as their rivals, were favored by the Dutch, and traditionalist Muslims, who were concerned mainly with purely religious questions, also enjoyed a more preferred position.[60] It may also be explained by the overemphasis on *adat* by the Dutch colonial rule in the East Indies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century for the purpose of developing the juridical system there (see Roff 1985: 12-13).

In the Malay states, in contrast to the Dutch East Indies and the Straits Settlements, the consolidating unity between Islam and politics was less influential, as the very message of Islamic reformism was limited there. This is due largely to the British colonial policy in the Malay states, that differed from the policy applied by the British in the Straits Settlements. British colonial policy in the Malay states favored and strengthened all the traditional elements of Malay society in general and the traditional rulers and elite in particular. Hence, the British encouraged concentration of doctrinal and administrative religious authority in the hands of the apparatus dependent on the sultans. This policy also promoted economic modernization whose major impact was on the non-Muslim immigrant groups. Therefore, social change among the Muslim community was relatively limited and the traditional social linkages of the rural Malay community were scarcely dislocated. Another result of this British colonial policy was to play down the relevance of high Islamic culture to the Malay community, on one hand, and to play up the folklore of the "real Malay," on the other hand.[61] It has to be noted that basically British colonial rule in the Malay peninsula was considerably less fearful than the Dutch of Islamic militancy and Pan-Islamism, This was partly due to the absence of an organized class of ulama in Malay (see Roff 1967: 71) as well as the absence of a strong tradition of ulama opposition to secular authorities, that did exist in Sumatra and Java (see Stockwell 1986: 323).

Consequently the British colonial regime in the Malay peninsula made no attempt to restrict the Muslims' pilgrimage, as was done by Dutch colonial rule in the East Indies in the nineteenth century, viewing the *hajis* as a source of serious unrest. This British policy may also partly explain the relatively liberal attitude of

the British toward Islamic reformist activity in the Straits Settlements,[62] the nerve-center of Islamic reformism in the Malay-Indonesian world at the beginning of the twentieth century, as noted above.

Challenging the Traditional World-Summing up

The Islamic reformist movement in the Dutch East Indies was also involved, in the 1920s and 1930s, in a conflict with secular ideologies,[63] that would become more crucial in the post-colonial period when the formulation of the collective identity of Indonesian political community moved to the center of the political stage. However, the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world, in the period spanning the first four decades of the twentieth century, was essentially an arena for the *Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua* conflict.[64] In this span of time, the Islamic reformist ideology in the Malay-Indonesian world was primarily a challenge to the very traditional status quo. It brought about a deep cultural conflict between fundamentally conflicting doctrines, ideas, practices, values and institutions: *ijtihad* versus *taqlid*, Islam versus *adat*[65], *shari'ah* versus *adat*, modern *madrasah* versus traditional religious training and teaching systems *—pesantren, pondok ,surau*. This conflict can be epitomized by a variety of antonymous terms that are used to describe cultural dichotomy and antithesis: religious reformism and modernism versus conservatism and traditionalism[66]; orthodoxy, "pure" faith (or purism) and Scripturalism versus heresy, heterodoxy, syncretism and mysticism; Great Tradition versus Little Tradition[67]; universal religion versus local custom; urban Islam versus rural Islam; and "high" culture versus popular or folk culture.

Due to this overall multi-dimensional challenge posed by Islamic reformism, it is not surprising that the conflict between the Islamic reformists and their opponents became so intense and heated (see Roff 1967: 85-87; Taufik Abdullah 1972: 228; Noer 1978: 67; Hussin Mutalib 1993: 23). Neither does it come as a surprise that Islamic reformism in the Malay-Indonesian world, essentially an urban-centered phenomenon (see Roff 1962: 187; Nagata 1986: 38; Benda 1970: 191, 194; Drewes 1963: 301; Nair 1997: 16; Samson

1980: 142), aroused the opposition of considerable and varied elements in the traditional elites, the upholders of status quo. These elites included traditional and conservatives ulama, rural ulama in particular; the official religious hierarchy in Malay (see Roff 1962: 180-181); the custodians and guardians of *adat-adat* chiefs, or *adat* functionaries[68]; religious teachers; leaders of Sufi orders; and traditional rulers. A clear response on the organizational level of the traditionalists to the reformist challenge was the establishment in 1926 in Java, by traditional ulama, of the Nahdatul Ulama (N.U) organization. This organization, although established for anti-modernist purposes (see McVey 1983: 216), was the first modern-style organization of the traditionalists, copying some of the reformists' innovations in regard to its structure and activity.[69]

A Comparative Look at Egypt

An attempt to compare the challenge of Islamic reformism in the Malay-Indonesian world to the challenge posed by Islamic reformism in Egypt may to suffer from a certain degree of methodological weakness. Whereas in the Malay-Indonesian world, in the first decades the of the twentieth century, a reformist movement, significantly influenced by 'Abduh's heritage, made such a strong, vivid impact, 'Abduh's heritage in Egypt dissolved, at an earlier stage, into various and contradicting conceptual trends, world-views, ideologies and movements. Actually, its components were almost everywhere in Egypt in the first decades of the twentieth century, and it echoed in almost every ideological and intellectual discourse, debate and conflict that took place then in Egypt. Prominent among them were those that resembled the major cultural and ideological debates and conflicts in the Malay-Indonesian world; modernity versus tradition and the determination of the collective national identity. But at the same time 'Abduh's heritage, with many of its authentic characteristics, did not exist there as a solid, vivid corpus of ideas, and definitely not as a formidable organizational reality, like the Muhamadiyah organization in Indonesia.

Nevertheless, taking a comparative look at Egypt seems to be required, from the perspective of the history of ideas, by the inner logic of the subject, i. e., the crucial role played by the trans-

mission of Islamic reformist ideas from Egypt in laying down the conceptual basis of the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world.

During his lifetime, Muhammad 'Abduh faced antagonism in Egypt to his reformist ideas, projects and activities that were mainly connected to his positions as chairman of the Committee of Administration of al-Azhar, the Mufti of Egypt, member of the Superior Council of *Awqâf* Administration and member of the Legislative Assembly. A high degree of antagonism was expressed by the conservatives. The ulama within al-Azhar were among the leaders of this opposition. They were apprehensive about the significance that 'Abduh attributed to reforming and modernizing al-Azhar, the stronghold of Islamic sciences, as a imperative step in reforming Islam throughout the Muslim world. Part of the opposition to 'Abduh was more a reflection of political interests and considerations than an expression of a conservative world-view per se. Indeed, there were some in al-Azhar and many more outside it who favored 'Abduh's ideas and activities, but avoided expressing their position publicly. Thus, the boldness and decisiveness of 'Abduh's opponents and, in contrast, the weakness of his sympathizers, as well as the fact that the Kedieve 'Abbas II changed his initially favorable attitude to 'Abduh's ideas to a determined opposition to his proposed reforms, frustrated many of his hopes and efforts to put his reformist ideas into practice.[70]

But in comparison to the extent of the threat to the essentials of the traditional society that was revealed in 'Abduh's heritage in the Malay-Indonesian world, the concrete challenge posed by 'Abduh, in his lifetime, to the traditional society in Egypt was somewhat limited in its subjects, cautious in its approach, and less provocative in its implications. For this same reason, the reaction and antagonism in Egypt to 'Abduh's reformist ideas, projects and activities did not develop into a real cultural conflict as it did in the *Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua* conflict. Similarly, Islamic reformism, per se, did not express itself explicitly and directly in the bitter cultural, conceptual and literary debate and conflict that took place in Egypt between tradition and change in the first decades of the twentieth century.

This conflict, also known as the conflict between the "old" (*al-qadîm*) and the "new" (*al-jadîd*) or between the "old school" (*al-Madrasah al-Qadîmah*) and the "modernist school" (*al-Madrasah al-Hadîthah*), reached its zenith between the two World Wars, becoming one of the main characteristics of Egypt's history in that formative period of time (see Eliraz 1980; Eliraz 1979; Gershoni and Jankoweski 1986: 119, 125, 201, 212). Thus, while the conflict between the *Kaum Muda* and the *Kaum Tua* in the Malay-Indonesian world was almost totally connected with Islamic reformism as a solid ideology, which clearly manifested itself in organizational structures, in the conflict between the "new" and the "old," in Egypt, Islamic reformism seems to be an amorphous and intangible entity, an inspiring heritage that dissolved into varied conceptual directions and world-views.

The "sounds" of Islamic reformism in Egypt did echo everywhere through the conflict between the "new" and the "old," and in almost every issue, serving many - individuals, groups and organizations - who used them eclectically. 'Abduh's heirs, argues Malcolm H. Kerr, "were, of course, the product of various other influences as well, which sometimes combined with the ambiguity of 'Abduh's legacy to promote additional tensions and equivocations of their own" (Kerr 1966: 15). Hence, 'Abduh's thought was doomed, in the intensive conceptual and ideological climate of its birth-place, to pass through channels that obscured and even distorted its essentials, making it almost impossible to evaluate its influence.

However, bearing in mind the marked movement of 'Abduh's heritage in Egypt toward *salafi* positions, since the end of the 1920s, it might be assumed that Islamic reformism in the Malay-Indonesian world could not avoid "sliding" into *salafi* positions as well, even though 'Abduh's heritage so clearly and substantially underpinned the conceptual basis of the reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world in the first decades of the twentieth century. This is true if for no other reason than the fact that Rashid Rida's Egyptian *al-Manar* was a very significant channel for transmitting reformist ideas from Egypt to the Malay-Indonesian world throughout the formative period of the reformist movement there

(see Weyland 1990: 224-225). Allegedly, from a broad perspective beyond the boundaries of this formative period, into the 1960s, 1970s and the 1980s, the very sizeable reformist organization, Muhamadiyah, in Indonesia, has shown more of a link with Rida's salafism, than with the modernist ideas of 'Abduh and has adopted position of "neo-salafism," including an ideological emphasis on a return to pristine Islam and strict scripturalism (Syamsuddin: 1991; 268-270, 287-288).

The Islamic Reformist Movement in the Malay-Indonesian World: Historical Role and Impacts

From the religious standpoint, the Islamic reformists in the Malay-Indonesian world in the first decades of the twentieth century succeeded, chiefly in Dutch East Indies and the Straits Settlements and much less in Malay, in establishing an impressive reformist movement. Conceptually, this movement preserved over time, in a relatively unique way, the formative ideas and ideals of that Islamic reformism which was shaped basically in Egypt by 'Abduh. Furthermore, it was carried out by a relatively massive movement that demonstrated a considerable historical presence. It even succeeded in influencing, in relation to several issues, the traditional orthodoxy.[71] Espousing purism and Scripturalism, Islamic reformism there also strengthened the religious and cultural position of the Great Tradition of Islam in the Islamic mosaic of the Malay-Indonesian world.

From the cultural standpoint, the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world crystallized as an elaborate phenomenon,[72] with implications transcending the Islamic religious sphere. Thus, Islamic reformist ideas inflamed the confrontation between the orthodox Islam and the syncretic religion, between the "high culture" and the popular culture, between the global type of Islam and the local one, between the *sharî'ah* and the *adat*. [73]

It is noteworthy that the reformists in the Malay-Indonesian world succeeded during their formative period to creatively[74] take the ideas borrowed from Egypt far beyond their original boundaries. They made 'Abduh's ideas, basically religious in their character, a platform for an original and comprehensive reformist

project that posed a substantial challenge to the traditional status quo. In this way, the reformists in the Malay-Indonesian world also played a modernizing role, which included adapting the transmitted ideas to their own locality and particular conditions and making them a basis for their own intellectual creativity. At the same time, they were very successful in maintaining the authentic "sounds" of the borrowed ideas in general and 'Abduh's heritage in particular.

Another prominent role played by Islamic reformism in the Malay-Indonesia world in the said period, which was clearly distinguishable in Indonesia, was that of an agent of social change and modernization among its followers in particular (see Alfian 1989:345-346). Notable in this context are the substantial and intensive efforts made by the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesia world in the field of educational reform, including promoting women's opportunities in the field of education and employment. The steps made by the reformist movement in the first decades of the twentieth century seem to have designated one of the main paths in the movement's activity in the Malay-Indonesian world in later decades as a modernizing factor.[75] This phenomenon may also attest to the shortcomings of the tendency of social scientists to view religion in the context of modernization as an obstacle and hindrance to progress (see Von der Mehden 1986a: 1-19).

From the broader perspective of the last century, the vitality and energy of the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world, particularly in Indonesia, in the first decades of the twentieth century, may have contributed substantially to the fact that in contemporary Indonesia the orthodox Muslims are mainly divided between reformists or modernists, and traditionalists or conservatives.[76] Indonesia is also the only place in all of Southeast Asia where Islamic reformism remains "a major organized force". The mere presence of the reformist movement in Indonesia is certainly significant in light of the fact that Indonesia is the most populous Muslim country in Southeast Asia and even in the entire world, where about one hundred and eighty million, from a total number of about two hundred and ten million, are Muslim be-

lievers. In Malaysia, the second populous Muslim country in Southeast Asia, where there is a high level of homogeneity within the Islamic population, the vast majority of Muslims are traditionalists and reformist religious thought is represented by "a small number of thinkers in the Abduh-Afghani tradition" (Nagata 1980:138). This can be historically connected to the fact that the Islamic reformist movement in Malay in the first decades of the twentieth century was much less widespread and influential than that in the Dutch East Indies.

An assessment of the impact of the formative period of Islamic reformism on later developments may suggest a hidden link that seemingly connects it with the *dakwah* movement in the Malay-Indonesian world. The *dakwah*, the Islamic resurgence in the Malay-Indonesian world, which is generally dated from the early 1970s and has emerged as a part of world-wide Islamic resurgence, is viewed, among others, as an outgrowth of the *Kaum Muda*. Both the *Kaum Muda* and the *dakwah* are regarded as a type of development that tends to be cyclical in nature (Peletz 1998: 233-234). Perhaps it is also possible to explain the existence of some sort of historical continuity from Islamic reformism in the Malay-Indonesian world to the dakwah movement there by using Marshall G. S. Hodgson' category of new Shari'ah-mindedness (see 1974, vol. One: 238, 318, 351; vol. Three: 386-394). In reference to the centrality of the *sharî'ah* in the reformist approach of *al-Imam*, the above mentioned rather early organ of the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world, Anthony Milner says that the journal's editors can be perceived as members of a long-established Muslim group which Marshall Hodgson refers to as the "*sharî'ah*-minded" (1994: 147; see also Milner 1993: 110-112).

In speaking about the critical aspects of this *sharî'ah* -minded approach in regard to the Malay rajas, Milner argues that a direct line may be said to lead from Ibn-Taymiyyah to the Wahhabi movement, and from there to the *al-Manar* groups of Egypt, that had such a great influence on the editors of *al-Imam* (1994: 152). Perhaps this historical line suggested by Anthony Milner can be extended to the *dakwah* movement, assuming that it can be included in Marshall G. S. Hodgson's category of new *sharî'ah*-mindedness.

Maybe the emergence of *dakwah* in both Malaysia and Indonesia in the 1970s was partly facilitated by the strengthened position of the Great Tradition of Islam there and by the closer cultural and intellectual linkage between the Islamic periphery and its center. This is largely due to the spirit and actions of the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world in the first decades of the twentieth century. This kind of argument in a way recalls the historical contribution to the rise of Islamic reformism in the Malay-Indonesian world attributed to the Sumatran Paderi movement, the Wahhbi-oriented militant movement of the early nineteenth century, about a century after the rise of that Wahhbi offshoot. [77]

A similar attempt to identify the historical role played in Egypt by Islamic reformism and to find its impact involves some serious methodological difficulties inasmuch as 'Abduh's thought there, in a rather early stage, dissipated into various conceptual and ideological paths. 'Abduh's ideas echoed everywhere in Egypt throughout the twentieth century, being used by many, consciously and unconsciously, in ways that often made it difficult to identify them, per se. The following statement by of Malcolm H. Kerr describes the situation very well:

> "Such diverse individuals as the liberal constitutionalist Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid, the militant fundamentalist Hasan al-Bana of the Muslim Brethren, and Jamâl 'Abd an-Nasir can all be identified, each in a different way, as heirs of 'Abduh. 'Abduh's historical role was simply to fling open the doors and expose a musty tradition to fresh currents. His intention may have been more specific, but the effect was not. His heirs were, of course, the product of various other influences as well, which sometimes combined with the ambiguity of 'Abduh's legacy to promote additional tensions and vocations of their own (1966: 15)."

Islamic Reformism in the Malay-Indonesian World: Explanatory comments

The insights gained from taking a comparative look at Egypt stimulate an interest in elucidating the factors that enabled the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world, in the first decades of the twentieth century, to impressively shape itself, as a reviving, innovating and challenging force, as well as to sur-

vive, although it defied the mainstream's traditional values, cultural codes and institutions. The following factors may explain this phenomenon: a pluralist religious context; historically, clever cultural borrowing; the existence of a developed organizational basis; the creative adaptation of reformist ideas into varied fields of activity and playing a varied historical role; and maintaining a low political profile.

Robert W. Hefner says that from the political perspective the most unusual feature of Islam in Southeast Asia is its long-established tradition of intellectual and organizational pluralism: "even in an earlier era when virtually all Javanese, Malays, or Minangkabau called themselves Muslims, neither the courts nor the ulama exercised an effective monopoly of power over the Muslim community's moral and intellectual life. There were varied religious views even in premodern times and diverse ways of being a good Muslim." (1997: 29). He adds that this pluralism was perhaps more pronounced in Indonesia than it was in Malaysia (ibid.; see also Hefner 1998b: 21; Hefner 1998a: 314). It is likely that the absence of a strong central Islamic establishment in the Malay-Indonesian world, similar to that of al-Azhar in Egypt – which was more marked in Indonesia than in Malay[78] – as well as the existence of basic pluralism gave the Islamic reformists more room to maneuver in the Malay-Indonesian world, and also provided them with an imperative precondition for their survival in the Muslim community there.

Another explanation may found in an insight, conjectural by nature, concerning the transmission of Islamic reformist ideas from Egypt to the Dutch East Indies and the Malay peninsula. According to this suggested insight, the large- scale transmission of ideas - via a broad, complex cross-regional cultural network of cultural brokers and intellectual institutions - and their transplantation in the Malay-Indonesian world may have been more than a mere outcome of the random imitation of fashionable ideas or of the unavoidable traffic of ideas from the center of Islamic world to its periphery. Rather, this transmission of ideas may express a clever, intuitive historical selection. In other words, in face of the threatening clash between tradition and modernity and the collective

mood of weakness in the entire Islamic world in the first decades of the twentieth century, many in the Muslim community in the Malay-Indonesian world were receptive to a conceptual heritage that emerged in Egypt toward the end of the nineteenth century in a similar historical predicament. Witnessing confusion, weakness and the sense of being threatened, on the crossroad of the "old" and the "new," Muhammad 'Abduh, who followed the aspirations of his teacher and colleague Jamâl al-Dîn al-Afghânî, hoped to propose a comprehensive reformist doctrine to the Muslim community in Egypt and to the *umma* in general. Since they were attentive to the "center" of the Muslim world, many in the Muslim communities in the Malay-Indonesian world adapted this doctrine in a way marked by conceptual confidence, diligence and creativity.

On a more practical level, it is almost obvious that the historical accomplishments of Islamic reformism in Indonesia, not only in the first decades of the twentieth century but throughout that century, are very closely linked to the existence of Muhamadiyah, a well established, broad-based and successful organization, modern in its structure and still dynamic. The fact that Muhamadiyah outwardly adopted a non-political character largely contributed to its political room for maneuver and perhaps to its very survival. That, for example, enabled the organization to avoid taking a radical political position against Dutch colonial rule (see Alfian 1989: 346-354).[79]

The varied roles that were played by the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world, may also explain its survival and vitality. By being active in varied spheres of life and fulfilling multidimensional historical missions, the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world seems to have adopted a survivor's strategy in the sense of a broad *raison d'etre* and a relatively wide range of alternative courses of action. This kind of strategy seems to have proved itself in the obstacle course of history.

An examination of the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world in the first four decades of the twentieth century by taking a comparative look at Egypt has its own ana-

lytical advantages in the context of Islamic studies from both the Southeast Asian perspective and the Middle Eastern perspective. It may also provide evidence about the added value of an analytical view that bridges the "periphery" of the Islamic world and its center.

Primarily, the powerful challenge that was posed by the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world is revealed by comparing it to the one posed by the Islamic reformist movement in Egypt. The same can be said about the historical role played by the reformist Islamic movement in the Malay-Indonesian world: it appears that the multidimensional nature of that role unfolds in a better way when one turns a comparative gaze on Egypt.

Another pronounced analytical advantage is the insight it reveals about the decisive impact that the local context had on the "historical destiny" of 'Abduh's heritage. Once the Islamic reformist ideas mainly shaped by Muhammad 'Abduh were disseminated from the Middle East to the Malay-Indonesian world and transplanted there, they seem to have exposed in their "new home," a new historical portrait: vivid, clear, challenging and influential. There is a great deal of difference between this portrait and the one that revealed itself to observers whose view was confined to the Islamic reformist heritage in the Middle East. Similarly, considering the lot of Islamic reformist ideas, mainly borrowed from Egypt, in the context of the Malay-Indonesia world, one may begin to doubt the common assumption that 'Abduh's conceptual heritage contains within itself an intrinsic ambivalence and ambiguity and that therefore it was predestined to be absorbed into more assertive ideologies.

This comparative view may also provide insights that are helpful in an attempt to historically assess the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world. In the absence of this view, which functions as an additional analytical "lens," the observer may miss the uniqueness of the Islamic reformist movement there and underestimate its accomplishments. In other words, the comparative view reveals that the successful way that 'Abduh's thought and heritage survived and functioned in the Malay-Indonesian world is by no means self-evident.

Endnotes

1. As elsewhere, varied terms are given to this movement in the Malay-Indonesian world. Some of these, among others; were: Islamic reformism, reformist Islam, modernist Muslim movement, modern reformation movement, the modernist movement.
2. As concerns the colonial era, this term is used here to refer to the Islam in the realm that was the main scene of Islamic reformism in Southeast Asia, constituting the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), in abbreviation East Indies (alternatively Netherlands East Indies), Malaya, and the three Straits Settlements (Penang, Singapore and Malacca). In the post-colonial context, this term is used here to refer to the Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia, where the great majority of the Muslims in Southeast Asia live. The term Malaya is used here consistently for the colonial period, to differentiate it from the later term, Malaysia. In contrast, the terms Dutch East Indies, East Indies and Indonesia are used alternatively.
2. see Roff 1962, 1967: 56-90; see also Noer 1978: 6-7, 86-87; von der Mehden 1993: 13–14; Nagata 1980: 128; Hefner 1997: 15; Horvatich 1997: 197; Peacock 1978a: 18; Benda 1970; Taufik Abdullah: 1972: 217-245; Hussin Mutalib 1993: 23. The dichotomy between the conservatives and the modernists/reformists in Indonesia is also known as the *modern-kolot* conflict (Geertz 1976: 141-161)
3. Roff 1962: 182; see also Roff 1967: 86.
4. On the thought and ideas of Jamâl al-Dîn al-Afghanî, Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida see: Adams 1968; Gibb 1947; Kerr 1966; Hourani 1970: 103-160, 222-244; Safran 1961: 43-50, 62-84; Keddie 1968: 36-97.
5. Hourani 1970:161.
6. See Safran 1961: 62-75.
7. See Safran 1961: 75-84; Hourani 1970: 222-244; Gibb 1947: 34.
8. See Gibb1950: 34-35; see also Hourani 1970: 231.
9. Hourani 1970: 163.
10. Ibid: 145-149.
11. Ibid: 163.
12. Malcolm H. Kerr 1966.
13. On the impact of Muhammad 'Abduh's ideas in particular, as well as those of Jamâl al-Dîn al-Afghanî and Rashid Rida on the Islamic reformist movement in the Malay-Indonesian world and on the diffusion of the reformist ideas from Egypt to Southeast Asia see: Johns 1987: 410-413; Von der Mehden 1993: 12-15; Roff 1967: 56-67; Federspiel 1970: 60; Weyland 1990: 221-226; Peacock 1978a: 18; Peacock 1978b: 23; Peacock 1975: 188; Abaza 1993: 3-11; Adams 1968: 100-103; Taufik Abdullah 1972: 225.
14. Benda 1970:186; see also Peacock 1978a: 19-20; Von der Mehden 1993: 14; Roff 1967: 186.
15. See Hourani 1970: 136; Adams 1968: 108.
16. Benda 1970: 184.
17. The Egyptian *al-Manar* of Rashid Rida played a considerable role in the transmission of reformist ideas from Egypt to Southeast Asia and even conducted a quasi-dialogue between the reformist movement of the Malay-Indonesian world and Egypt. On the dialogue established between the Egyptian *al-Manar* and the

Malay-Indonesian world, see Bluhm 1983. One of the many names that were given to the reformist group in Malaya was "Kaum *al-Manar*", referring to the modernist "*al-Manar* Circle " in Egypt (Roff 1962: 172 note 31; Roff 1967: 59; cf. Gibb 1947: 34-36). On the role played by *al-Manar* and his "near-replica" Malay journal, al-Imam, in the transmission of the reformist ideas from Egypt to Southeast Asia see: Berg 1932; 268-269; Benda 1970: 184; Gibb 1947: 36; Johns 1987: 410-411; Milner 1994: 137-166; Noer 1978: 34-35, 40-41, 61-62; Roff 1962: 165-171; Roff 1967: 43-67. Another reformist journal in the Malay-Muslim world that was largely influenced by the Egyptian *al-Manar* is al-Munir. It was published in Padang, the major West Sumatra port town, in the period, 1911-1916 (see Johns 1987:411. Noer 1978: 35-36, 39-42; Benda 1970: 188-189; Taufik Abdullah 1972: 217).

18. Roff 1962: 166; see Roff 1967: 57; Milner 1994: 168, 176; Weyland 1990: 225.
19. Roff 1967: 57. Delier Noer argues (1978: 298) that in contrast to Jamâl al-Dîn al-Afghanî who stressed Pan Islamism and was concerned with the political condition of the Muslim countries in general, the Islamic reformists in Indonesia, especially those who operated in the political field, were more concerned with the political condition of their own country and their own people than with the over-all Muslim community.
20. On Muhammadiyah see: Peacock 1978a; Peacock 1978b; Peacock 1975; Alfian 1989; Federspiel 1970; Noer 1978: 73-83; Baried 1986; Benda 1970: 190-199; Drewes 1963: 295-307; Kiem 1993: 101-122.
21. See Baried 1986: 146.
22. The scriptures, both Qur'an and hadit literature, and the foundations of Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) are taught in depth only in the specialized religious training schools in the large educational system of Muhammadiyah (Federspiel 1970: 62; see also Bowen 1997: 164).
23. See Federspiel 1970; 67-69; Noer 1978: 80-82, 96, 302-304; Milner 1994: 176, 183-187; Roff 1962: 168; Roff 1967: 57-58; Peacock 1978a: 18;see also Berg 1932: 271; Bowen 1997:163; Geertz 1976: 158-159; cf. Layish 1978: 263-277.
24. In the spirit of 'Abduh's rejection of improper beliefs and practices in the popular Islam (see Adams 1968: 161-164), the reformists in Malay-Indonesian world attacked the use of magic and charms by the Sufi orders, tarekat (see Noer 1978: 34, 38, 95; about the tarekat in Indonesia see also Ibid.10-24).
25. See Peacock 1978a: 18; Federspiel 1970: 64-67; Noer 1978: 6 note 6.
26. Milner 1994: 183-187.
27. See Taufik Abdullah 1966: 20-22; Noer 1978: 6 note 6. For a broader definition of adat as the basis of all ethical and legal judgment and the source of social expectations, see Taufik Abdullah 1966: 1-3.
28. See Bowen 1997; Drewes 1963: 294; Noer 1978: 86-87, 95, 220-221, 226; Roff 1962:176; Federspiel1970:66; Berg 1932: 271.
29. See Roff 1967: 78 note 73; Roff 1962:176; Noer 1978: 95, 220-221; Federspiel 1970: 66.
30. Bowen (1993: 164-165) argues that the modernists emphasize the religious importance of translating scripture into vernaculars not so that people can judge and interpret freely on their own – for that, he adds, you need specialists – but in order to enable them to know what they say in worship and thus to have the correct intent.

31. Nowadays the number of the members and the supporters of the organization is about 28-30 millions throughout the Archipelago (Nakamura 1999: 91; see also Mietzner 1999: 186; Zenzie 1999: 256).
32. See Geertz 1976:11; see also Noer 1978: 16-17.
33. The reformists' rejection of hormat, which expresses the emphasis on hierarchy and status which is deeply rooted in the traditional Javanese civilization, was also motivated by the basic premise in Islam and in Islamic reformism in particular that all believers are equal in the eyes of God (Peacock 1978a: 101-111).
34. See Peacock 1975: 189-190; Peacock 1978a: 44-48, 101-108, 201; Hefner 1985: 104-110. On other religious issues —both doctrine and practice— that were in dispute between the reformists and traditionalists, see Drewes 1963: 294; Taufik Abdullah 1972: 227-228.
35. See Baried 1986: 147; Amien Rais 1985: 43.
36. See Federspiel 1970: 64-67, 69-74.
37. *Pesantren* a traditional religious teaching center, also known as *pondok*. In Minangkabau, (West Sumatra) it is called *surau* (Geertz 1976: 177-180; Noer 1978: 10 note 15. see also 13-15, 29, 221).
38. The efforts of the Christian missions served as a model for the activities of Muhammadiyah, first and foremost the propagation of the faith (see Drewes 1963:302; see also Kiem 1993: 102). On the tabligh activity of Muhammadiyah see also Noer 1978: 75-76, 79; Abaza 1991: 214).
39. See Roff 1962: 186; Roff 1967: 57.
40. Langgar is a small prayer-house, usually attached to individual house (Geertz 1976: 180-182; Noer 1978: 12).
41. See Roff 1967: 86-87.
42. See Roff 1962: 177; Peacock 1978a: 107.
43. Ibid: 215-216; see also Noer 1978: 56-69.
44. On the Islam and the Malay kingship, see Milner 1985; Nahir 1997: 15.
45. Milner 1994: 137-166; see also Roff 1962: 171, 176-177; cf. Milner 1993.
46. Milner 1994: 171-172, 175-176.
47. See Taufik Abdullah 1972: 228-229; Noer 1978: 101-161; Benda 1970: 190-193; Drewes 1963: 295.
48. About *Seruan Azhar* and *Pilehan Timor* see Roff 1970a; Hussin Mutalib 1993: 2; Noer 1978: 153-157.
49. Roff 1967: 87-90; Roff 1962: 183-185; see also Hussin Mutalib 1993: 22.
50. See Roff 1970a; Abaza 1993: 3.
51. See Alfian 1989: 347-348.
52. Shanti Nair 1997: 17; see also Mohammad Abu Bakar 1986: 156-157.
53. See Noer 1978: 6-7, 318-319; Drewes 1963: 294-295; Alfian 1989: 349.
54. See Noer 1978: 247-248, 318-319.
55. Deliar Noer prefers to use the term "religiously neutral nationalists," and argues that they were "emancipated" Indonesians who were generally Muslims and adopted a neutral and often an indifferent, if not hostile, attitude toward Islam in their struggle for independence (Noer 1978: 216). "Secularism" has historically been associated in Indonesia with Communism (Ramage 1997: 12).
56. In British Malaya since the late 1920s the reformists were squeezed between new forces that had entered upon the scene, the Western-trained elite and a

young Malay-educated intelligentsia. The political movements that emerged from these two forces – neither of which placed Islam in the center of their concern - succeeded in the 1930s to overtake religious reformism as a vivifying force in Malay society (Roff 1962: 188-192).

57. See Ramage 1997: 44; Noer 1978: 321-324; Mcvey 1983: 213-215.
58. Benda 1970: 188; see also Noer 1978: 20-29, 307; Stockwell 1986: 323; Roff 1970b:180-181; Drewes 1963: 296; Mcvey 1983: 199-200, 206-207.
59. Noer 1978:162-215,313-316; see also Roff 1970b: 181; Alfian 1989: 342.
60. See Stockwell 1986: 323-325: Benda 1970: 186-188; Roff 1967: 71-73; Roff 1962: 173-175.
61. See Roff 1967:32-55,71; Roff 1970b: 176-177; Milner 1994: 156; Weyland 221-226.
62. In Minangkabau there was in the 1910s, for a period of time, cooperation between religious reformers and secular reformers. Both were regarded part of *Kaum Muda*, opposing *Kaum Tua* ulama and adat-oriented groups that called themselves *Kaum Kuno* ("Conservative Group") (Taufik Abdullah: 1972: 234-236).
63. In the 1930s the bitterness and heat of the conflict in the Malay-Indonesian world between the Islamic reformists and the Islamic traditionalists and conservatives began to decrease. Several explanations are suggested. Among them the fact that Islamic reformists in Malaya drew closer to the Islamic traditionalists and conservatives as a result of the common situation in which they found themselves in face of secular nationalism, as well as the improved religious education and the demise of an older generation (Roff 1962: 192). Perhaps in Malaya it was somehow connected with the fact that Islamic reformism in the Malay peninsula toward the end of 1930s was no longer a substantial vivifying force there (see Ibid.; Funston 1976: 59). In the Dutch East Indies the rapprochement between the reformists and the Islamic traditionalists and conservatives in the 1930s also partly resulted from changes and reforms introduced by the traditionalists, partly as adoption of the reformists' ideas and activities including modernizing some schools. It was also a result of a mutual realization that despite the differences of opinion regarding certain religious ideas and practices, their basic creed remained the same. The traditionalists also began to share the reformists' concern regarding the Dutch encroachment in the realm of religion (Noer 1978: 221, 316-317; see also Benda 1970: 199-207; Roff 1962: 192; Funston 1976: 59: McVey 1983: 216; Peacock 1978a: 202; Federspiel 1970: 65).
64. On the conflict between Islam and adat as illustrated in the interesting case of Minangkabau, see Taufik Abdullah:1966; see also Taufik Abdullah1972).
65. On the conflict between Islamic modernism and Islamic conservatism in Indonesia as a contrast between the modern and the *kolot*, see Geertz 1976: 130, 148-161.
66. See Eickelman 1982: 1-15; see also Taufik Abdullah 1966: 11-13; Nagata 1986: 38.
67. About the adat functionaries, see Taufik Abdullah 1972:198.
68. (see Noer 1978: 222-234, 316; Kiem 1993: 92.; Benda 1970: 194; McVey: Ibid). The Nahdatul Ulama organization has an overwhelming dominance of the traditionalist camp since the 1920s (Mietzner 1999: 173) and is now even the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia (see Nakamura 1999: 91).

69. Adams 1968: 70-83; see also Safran 1961: 62-63; Hourani 1970: 131, 135, 143, 154-155.
70. See below note 24.
71. James l. Peacock defines Islamic reformism in Southeast Asia as an "independent cultural construct" and a "cultural complex" (see 1978a : 187-206). Nevertheless the reformists share with the others a strong allegiance to their root culture: "Javanese, whether reformists, traditionalists, or syncretists, are Javanese, and Malay reformists and nonreformists are both Malay" (ibid.; 201).
72. James L. Peacock also notes that Islamic reformist ideas have even affected their followers in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore on in relation to diverse cultural and psychological variables that fall into the category of modernizing factors. He points out that reformists (as well as those whom he defines as progressives), tend more than conservatives and syncretists, to reject beliefs in spirits, to show concern in planning and organizing time, to express ambition rather than tranquility and to choose mobility over security and independence over conformity (1978a: 195-196).
73. Deliar Noer points out that the reformists in Indonesia did not stop at 'Abduh's writing and that many of them delved deeper into the writings which had inspired him. That is to say, in the first place, according to Noer, the views of Ibn Taymiya and Ibn al-Qayyim. He adds that they also naturally attempted their own interpretations of the Quran and hadith and their conclusions then might be drawn independently of 'Abduh's or any other scholar's views (1978: 297).
74. James L. Peacock argues that the Malay-Indonesian world, in general, moves toward equality, including even moving toward a wider role for women in the mosque. He largely attributed this trend to the power that the Islamic women reformist organization, Aisyiya, had gained and to the basic modernizing tendencies of the Muhammadiyah, that apparently overpower the conflicting patriarchal tendencies in it (Peacock 1978a: 108-111, 116). M. Sirajuddin Syamsuddin, who has analyzed the political activities of the Muhammadiyah since the mid of the 1960s through the 1970s and the 1980s points to the ineffectiveness of the movement as an agent of social reformation that allegedly results from a political articulation of Muhammadiyah that tends to be conservative (ibid.: 265-266).
75. See Von der Mehden 1980: Von der Mehden 1986b: 222; 164; McVey 1983: 200; Amien Rais 1985: 44; Samson 1980: 142.
76. In the Dutch East Indies, the reformists were also called "Wahhabis" like the group of Muhammad 'Abduh in Egypt (see Adams 1968: 103).
77. The officials in the Islamic administration in Malaya, whose establishment took place from the 1870s onward, were directly dependent on the sultans for posts and power (see Yegar 1984: 198).
78. As an answer to the question of how Muhammdiyah has survived a long and stormy period of almost ninety years, the following explanations are suggested by L. James Peacock: its declared separation from politics although involved in politics at various levels; its not being strongly tempted by the rewards of power so that its leadership has been the least corrupted of any major Indonesian based organization; and a continuous relative lack of politicization (1978b: 57; see also: Syamsuddin 1991: 217-275; McVey 1983: 212-213, 217-218).

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