

STUDIA ISLAMIKA

INDONESIAN JOURNAL FOR ISLAMIC STUDIES

Volume 16, Number 1, 2009



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STUDIA ISLAMIKA

Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies

Vol. 16, no. 1, 2009

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STUDIA ISLAMIKA (ISSN 0215-0492) is a journal published by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta (STT DEPPEN No. 129/SK/DITJEN/PPG/STT/1976). It specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies in particular, and South-east Asian Islamic Studies in general, and is intended to communicate original researches and current issues on the subject. This journal warmly welcomes contributions from scholars of related disciplines.

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STUDIA ISLAMIKA has been accredited by The Ministry of National Education, Republic of Indonesia as an academic journal (SK Dirjen Dikti No. 23a/DIKTI/2004).

Robert E. Elson

Disunity, distance, disregard: The political failure of Islamism in late colonial Indonesia

Islamisme adalah satu bentuk pemikiran Islam yang menempatkan agama pada posisi sentral dalam kehidupan masyarakat, termasuk bidang politik dan kenegaraan. Islam dalam konteks ini dijadikan sebuah narasi utama yang, selain dipatenkan sebagai sebuah ideologi, juga dipahami sebagai artikulasi perjuangan politik yang memiliki spectrum beragam. Jalur yang ditempuh oleh para pengusungnya (kaum Islamis) tersebar utamanya melalui pembentukan hegemoni moral dan intelektual untuk mempengaruhi wilayah civil society. Pada level individu kita bisa mencatat misalnya muncul Alimin, anggota SI yang banyak terpengaruh ide-ide komunis, sementara pada tingkat kelembagaan tercatat peran beberapa partai nasionalis-kebangsaan seperti Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) didirikan pada 1927; semuanya menentang segala proses hegemoni dan pergerakan kalangan Islamis di Indonesia.

Dalam sejarah Indonesia, gerakan islamis mendapatkan momentum kebangkitannya seiring munculnya Sarekat Islam (SI) yang didirikan di Solo 11 November 1912. Pada perkembangannya, organisasi yang merupakan bentuk lanjut dari Syarikat Dagang Islam (SDI)—didirikan oleh K.H. Samanhudi tahun 1905—ini, bermetamorfosis ke dalam Partai Sarekat Islam (PSI) yang dibentuk tahun 1927, sebelum akhirnya berubah menjadi Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) pada 1929. Melalui beberapa tokoh utamanya seperti Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934), Haji Agus Salim (1884-1954) organisasi ini berupaya mendisseminasikan gagasan-gagasan keislamannya. Salim misalnya sangat gencar mengkritik nasionalisme yang dianggapnya sangat rentan jatuh pada imperialisme dan kolonialisme Barat.

Dan dari sinilah cerita diskursus ideologi bermula. Indonesia yang kala itu sedang berada dalam proses pencarian bentuk idealnya sebagai sebuah negara-bangsa, disemarakan pergulatan dua kutub ideologis—selain komunis— yakni kalangan pengusung Islamisme (Islam politik) di satu sisi dan mereka yang umum disebut sebagai kalangan nasional sekuler (pseudo-secular nationalists) di sisi lain. Maka, aroma pertarungan ideologi tersebut terus menjalar hingga beberapa decade selanjutnya. Rentang tahun 1920-an, pihak nasionalis kembali membuka alur perdebatan tersebut dengan menuduh Agus Salim sebagai individu pemecah belah kalangan pribumi Jawa. Terlebih ketika pada tahun 1925, beberapa murid Agus Salim yang awalnya bergabung dalam Jong Java, mendirikan Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB/ Ikatan Pemuda Islam) yang juga menjadi penegas Islamisme di Indonesia.

Selain SI, organisasi lain yang juga turut menegaskan eksistensi gerakan ini adalah Persatuan Islam (Persis). Didirikan di Bandung tahun 1923, organisasi ini sedari awal menolak secara tegas nasionalisme. Dalam pandangan Persis—seperti disuarakan oleh pendirinya Ahmad Hasan— konsep nation-state sangat berbahaya bagi eksistensi komunitas muslim global. Islam dalam pandangannya melarang setiap orang untuk terlibat bahkan bergabung dalam setiap gerakan nasionalis yang merupakan sebuah bentuk kemurtadan. Selain itu, ada juga Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia (Permi) yang didirikan tahun 1930 oleh Ilyas Ya'qub dan Haji Muchtar Luthfi—keduanya merupakan lulusan Mesir—sebagai bentuk lanjut dari perkembangan gerakan Sumatera Thawalib di Sumatera.

Selain melalui beberapa organisasi tersebut, islamisme juga mencoba di tumbuh-kembangkan melalui ranah media—terkhusus media cetak—seperti surat kabar, majalah, pamflet, brosur ataupun buku-buku keislaman. Penting di catat di sini adalah kemunculan majalah Pembela Islam terbitan Persis ataupun Suara Muslim, yang akhirnya sangat berperan penting bagi terjadinya disseminasi pemikiran keislaman saat itu. Melalui media-media itulah, Mohammad Natsir, murid Agus Salim, Haji Rosul (Haji Ahmad Karim Amrullah), serta beberapa kaum Islamis lainnya melibatkan diri dalam pusaran perdebatan dengan pihak nasionalis ataupun pihak lain yang gencar mengkritik pemikiran-pemikiran kaum islamis.

Akhir tahun 1920an, saat dimana nasionalisme memuncak dan Islam berhasil menjadi sebuah ide pemersatu, gerakan Islamisme tak sepenuhnya dapat memanfaatkan moment yang ada. Alih-alih berhasil mewarnai bentuk bangunan Indonesia, gerakan ini justru larut dalam pusaran konflik internal. Gerakan Islamisme terlihat sangat lemah jika dibanding organisasi lain yang menjadi oposisinya.

Disunity, distance, disregard: The political failure of Islamism in late colonial Indonesia

الخلاصة: قد تم تسجيل الإسلام كفكرة تسعى إلى جعل الإسلام مركزا لجميع أبعاد الحياة الاجتماعية التي ترسم سائر جوانب الحياة بما فيها بعد سياسي مع النظام المحاط به. والإسلام في هذا السياق أصبح رواية أساسية والذي لم يكن مسجلا كأيديولوجية، بل أيضا يفهم أنه معنى لكفاح سياسي ذي الطيف المتعدد. والطريقة التي سلكها أنصاره الإسلاميون تكوين الهيمنة الخلقية والثقافية للتأثير على ولاية مجتمع مدني.

لكن في السياق السياسي الإندونيسي هذا الأمر يؤديه جميع عناصر المجتمع، إلا أن الإسلام كحركة أصبحت مهملة لأنها في الاعتقاد متخلفة ومبهمة في فكرتها وحركتها. هناك البعض رغم أنهم مسلمون ويعرفون بمجموعة وطنية ومنهم شيوعيون يعترضون دائما عليها وينقصون وجودهم. إذا كان في المستوى الشخصي نجد "الأمين" وهو عضو في "الشركة الإسلامية" الذي يتأثر إلى حد كبير على أفكار شيوعية، ففي المستوى المؤسسي نجد حزب الوطني الإندونيسي Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) الذي تأسس سنة ١٩٢٧ يرأسها "سوكارنو"، يعترض في جهوده على الهيمنة الإسلامية وأنصارها.

في إندونيسيا كان الإسلاميون يحصلون على وقت مناسب لنهضتهم مع تأسيس الشركة الإسلامية Sarekat Islam (SI) التي تأسست عام ١٩١٢ في سولو. وفي تطورها عام ١٩٠٥، تحولت إلى شركة التجارة الإسلامية Syarikat Dagang Islam (SDI) على أيدي كياهي الحاج سامانهودي K.H. Samanhudi، ثم تحولت مرة أخرى إلى حزب الشركة الإسلامية في عام ١٩٢٧ وأصبحت حزب الشركة الإسلامية الإندونيسية (PSII) Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia في سنة ١٩٢٩. ومن خلال بعض قيادتها مثل الحاج عمر سيد شكر وأمينوتو Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934)، والحاج أغوس سليم Haji Agus Salim (1884-1954)، كان الحزب يسعى على تعريف أفكاره الإسلامية. والحاج أغوس سالم مثلا كان ينتقد على الفكرة القومية التي يعتبرها معروضة للوقوع في الإمبريالية والاستعمارية الغربية.

من هنا بدأت مقالة الايديولوجية. وفي هذه الفترة كانت إندونيسيا في حالة البحث عن وضع أمثل لكونها دولة، إذ ظهر قطبان من الايديولوجية بجانب

الشيوعية، والقطب الأول يتمثل في أنصار الحركة السياسية الإسلامية والآخر يتمثل في أنصارى الحركة الوطنية. كان الصراع الأيديولوجي بينهما مستمر في السنوات التالية. وفي عام ١٩٢٠، فتح أنصار الوطنية من جديد طريقة الجدل المذكور بتوجيه الأهتمام على الحاج آغوس سليم بأنه شخص مسبب لتفريق الجاويين المحليين. لا سيما في عام ١٩٢٥ إذ هناك بعض التلاميذ لآغوس سليم كان ينتمى إلى "اتحاد الشباب الجاويين" في البداية، ثم يؤسس اتحاد الشباب المسلمين الذى يؤكد على أيديولوجية الإسلام في إندونيسيا.

بجانب الشركة الإسلامية، توجد منظمة أخرى تؤكد على هذه الحركة وهى "اتحاد الإسلام" (Persatuan Islam (Persis) الذى تأسس في بندونج عام ١٩٢٣ والذى منذ البداية يرفض الوطنية صراحة. يرى اتحاد الإسلام بلسان مؤسسه أحمد حسن أن فكرة الدولة القومية تهدد وجود مجتمع المسلمين العالمى والإسلام في رأيه يحرم من يشترك في أية حركة وطنية ويعتبرها من أنواع الردة. هناك أيضا منظمة "اتحاد المسلمين الإندونيسيين" (Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia (Permi) التى تأسست في سنة ١٩٣٠ على أيدي إلياس يعقوب والحاج مختار لطفى وهما من خريجي الجامعة المصرية التى امتداد من تطور حركة سومطرة طوالب في سومطرة. وفي المستوى الآخر من خلال المنظمات المذكورة، ظهرت وتطورت فكرة إسلامية في مجال وسائل الإعلام خاصة في المطبوعات مثل الجرائد والمجلات والمنشورات والكتب الإسلامية. وجدير بالملاحظة هنا أن صدور المجلة "Pembela Islam" (الدفاع عن الإسلام) من منظمة اتحاد الإسلام PERSIS أو المجلة "Suara Muslim" (صوت المسلم) كان يلعب دورا مهما في نشر أفكار إسلامية في ذلك الوقت. من خلال هذه وسائل الإعلام كان محمد ناصر وهو تلميذ آغوس سليم والحاج رسول (الحاج أحمد كريم أمرالله) وبعض الإسلاميين الآخرين يشتركون في الجدل مع أنصار الفكرة الوطنية أو مع الآخرين الذين ينتقدون كثيرا على أفكار هؤلاء الإسلاميين.

إن هذه المقالة بجانب محاولتها للعثور على ناحية تاريخية للحركات السياسية الإسلامية الإندونيسية في أيام الاستعمار، تسعى كذلك على تقديم وقائع الفشل حركة إسلامية، لاسيما في جهودها لبناء أول نظام السياسة في إندونيسيا. وفي أواخر عام ١٩٢٠ إذ كانت حركة وطنية في قمتها، والإسلام أصبح فكرة موحدة، لم تتمكن حركة إسلامية في استغلال هذه الفرصة بالكامل. وكيف يتسنى هذه الحركة النجاح في المساهمة لبناء إندونيسيا وهى تقع في الصراع الداخلى المستمر. وفي منظمة الشركة الإسلامية على سبيل المثال، كان الصراع في المستوى القيادى الذى ينتهى بقضية إقالة "سوكيمان" و"سوروبرانوتو" في سنة ١٩٣٣، يؤدى إلى تفريق المنظمة إلى بعض الأقسام، بما فيها تقسيم أعضائها إلى مجلس الحزب مثل آغوس سليم وآم سنجاجي ومحمد روم وصابرين من ناحية، ومن ناحية أخرى إلى اللجنة التنفيذية مثل آيكوسنو ووندوأميسينو وكارتوسويريو. بالإضافة إلى عناصر البنية التحتية للمنظمة، بما فيها إدارة المنظمة واستراتيجية الحركة حتى الثقافة الأساسية لأعضائها، تبدو الحركة الإسلامية ضعيفة للغاية بالمقارنة على المنظمة الأخرى المعارضة لها.

It took Islamism—by which I mean the belief that Islamic values must systematically guide and interpenetrate the state and, as a consequence, society at large—until the third decade of the twentieth century to assert itself politically in Indonesia. Even then, Islamism remained underdeveloped and vague in idea and purpose. In the late 1920s, however, with the destruction by the colonial government of its major opponent, the Indonesian Communist Party, there seemed to be an opportunity for Islamism to make a decisive advance and perhaps even to fill the political space vacated by populist Marxism.

That opportunity was never taken up effectively. For the most part, the last decade or so of the colonial period witnessed Islamism's intellectually unsophisticated, internally divided and counter-productive efforts to progress its agenda. This article examines the failure of Islamism to make a greater political impact in Indonesia through these years. That failure would have decisive ramifications for the future shape of the Indonesian state, in that it left Islamism politically and intellectually impoverished and politically marginalised in the face of the dominant claims of pseudo-secular nationalists. In part, its failure flowed from organisational and administrative weakness, but it was centrally rooted in the strategic, political and intellectual shortcomings of Islamist politicians.

An Islamist Sarekat Islam

In the late 1920s, while it no longer dominated the political scene as it had in the mid-1910s, the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association) movement remained easily the largest political grouping in the Indies. No longer a broad umbrella for Muslims of every stripe, it now identified itself as the Partai Sarekat Islam (Sarekat Islam Party - PSI), and had moved, as a consequence of its long and debilitating competition with the Communists, to adopt a firmly Islamist position. But the party faced numerous problems. The ideological narrowing resulting from its Islamist turn had weakened the populist image of its charismatic leader, Umar Said Cokroaminoto; "Haji Cokro", it was said, "is no longer the Cokroaminoto of old".¹ There were allegations of corruption against the party leadership, financial management was weak and ineffective. The bulk of the party's 20,000-odd members were purely nominal and inanimate, in some places its numbers were in decline, and the party was notably unsuccessful in establishing institutions like cooperatives and

unions to improve the economic circumstances of the masses.² As well, Indonesian Islamists were only slowly coming to terms with the dismal reality of the final collapse of the pan-Islamic caliphate movement in 1927.³

The greatest challenge confronting the PSI and Islamism in general, however, was the sudden emergence and surging popularity of the arresting new idea of Indonesia: the notion that the territory of the Netherlands East Indies was a modern nation-in-becoming and that it should be free from the grip of Dutch colonialism. That idea had developed only slowly through the 1910s and had previously been expressed most unequivocally amongst the tiny group of Indonesian students in the Netherlands and later in a small number of study clubs at home.⁴ It became firmly institutionalised only in 1927 with the founding of Sukarno's Indonesian National Party (Perserikatan (later Partai) Nasional Indonesia – PNI). Growing consciousness of the national, combined with the simple, deeply attractive idea of freedom, inevitably meant that the message of the idea of Indonesia was cast in terms of broad inclusiveness and unity based solely upon commitment to the imagined nation. As Sukarno himself put it, "the existence of different languages and religions need be no hindrance to the forming of a nation".⁵ Indeed, he made it clear that the PNI "would be closed to religion, because [otherwise] ... not only would important groups which would be able to give necessary support in the construction of the Fatherland be excluded, but at the same time there would be wrangling and discord".⁶ A Christian newspaper correspondent echoed that view: nationalism "requires a complete cooperation of the nationalists, setting aside all religions. Only then can the goal of nationalism, national independence, be easily achieved".⁷ Perennially trapped between local and universalistic dimensions of its beliefs—including the notion that Islam was "super-territorial"⁸—Islamism found great difficulty in accommodating its profound sense of "being Muslim" with the surging pre-eminence of the rapidly gestating, religiously non-specific idea of Indonesia.

Defensive exclusivism

By the end of the 1920s, the PSI, in the words of Petrus Blumberger, "thought Islam to be the means par excellence to awaken the popular spirit and to keep it alert; they can conceptualise no democracy, socialism or nationalism separate from Allah and his religion".⁹ But

the party's mood bore few signs of confidence or assurance. Its attitude was characterised by a mood of stubbornly defensive, assertive resentment towards the religiously-neutral politicians who had ridden the rising tide of the idea of Indonesia and rapidly established themselves as the core of the Indonesian nationalist movement. There emerged amongst Islamists a sense that Muslims were being boycotted, ignored, not accorded their due, their ideas not considered worthy or relevant, not embraced and employed by their fellows. Thus, asked *Pembela Islam*, the monthly journal of the Islamist Persatuan Islam (Islamic Unity - Persis) specifically established to defend Islam in the face of attack, "does not that [religious] neutrality narrow the means for uniting itself with the religious group? Does not that neutrality become a hatred of religion, especially the religion of Islam?"¹⁰ Further, it asked of "those who do not like religion, who are opposed to the religion of Islam, the religion of most people in Indonesia ... what is a people without soul? What does a people or a country mean which has no spirit? And if the religion of Islam is not acknowledged, upon what does marriage stand, what is the basis of life and heritage?"¹¹ PSI leader Haji Agus Salim felt impelled to ask whether the adoption of religious neutrality by a nationalist youth group was a statement to the effect that "religious principles among the young are dead".¹² In response to Sukarno's assertion of his great regard for Islam and other religions, *Pembela Islam* asked "how can people hold Islam in high regard if they do not apply Islamic principles?"¹³

Nonetheless, the PSI found itself forced to seek some common ground with the surging, even dominant, power of the nationalist message. By late 1929, there were more than 5,000 PNI members in Bandung alone, three times that location's membership earlier that year.¹⁴ Salim remarked on "the growth of the spirit of an Indonesian unity, which is felt more and more as a need in the Indonesian nation that is coming to be and which, indeed, is also beginning to live amongst the broad swath of the people".¹⁵ The idea of Indonesia, in short, was a powerful idea that could not be ignored and had to be engaged. "Don't think", remarked a prominent PSI figure, S.M. Kartosoewiryo, "that we in the nationalist group which is based on Islam and Islamic matters do not dream of a free Indonesia".¹⁶ *Pembela Islam* remarked that the PSI had "never been afraid to jump into the breach for nationalist associations and leaders, irrespective of religious, racial or party differences".¹⁷

Islamism's developing desire to embrace the idea of Indonesia was expressed most obviously in the addition of the word "Indonesia" to PSI's name in 1929; it became the Sarekat Islam Party of Indonesia (PSII).¹⁸ Indeed, as early as 1927, Cokroaminoto had included a special section on nationalism, edited by Sukarno and Sartono, in the PSII newspaper *Bandera Islam*.¹⁹ Even far away in Mecca and Cairo, Indonesian Muslims were appropriating the discourse of "Indonesia".²⁰ But Islamist efforts to demonstrate Islam's compatibility with the national struggle and, indeed, the necessity for Islamic thinking to leaven nationalism,²¹ were generally guarded and restrained; its engagement with religiously-neutral nationalism was one in which Islam's ascendancy was always deemed uppermost and it was underlined by a strong suspicion that the nationalists were essentially anti-Islamic.²² While Salim asserted that "we are a dead people, and will become a stinking corpse if we do not strive for national freedom",²³ and while the young Kasman Singodimejo argued that "nationalism and internationalism cannot be separated from each other Islam considers nationalism as one of its obligations",²⁴ Cokroaminoto remarked that "we can strive for freedom, but our greatest goal remains Islam".²⁵ "Nationalism", he later remarked, "cannot bring freedom, that can only be obtained by means of Islam".²⁶ Kasman himself remarked that "the best means of unity is Islam",²⁷ and thought of Islam as "the national religion", adding that "the obligation rests on our leaders, in every case, to know this religion, even if they are not themselves Muslim, for certainly 80% of the Indonesian people are Muslims".²⁸

Moreover, Islamists saw freedom essentially as the means to improve faith and devotion. Leaders spoke of "the striving in a legal manner towards the freedom of 'Indonesia' as the major condition for an undisturbed prosperity and growth of the Muslim religion and for the lifting up of land and people on a democratic-religious basis".²⁹ Cokroaminoto thought of Indonesia's freedom as the "first condition for the free and undisturbed faith in the Muslim religion",³⁰ while maintaining that "in order for 'Freedom' to be obtained as speedily as possible, members need to develop the conviction they must feel themselves subject only to God".³¹ Wondosudirjo (later known as Wondoamiseno), a senior PSII figure, asserted that "we want our own law, handed down in the Qur'an and hadith, applied in relations between man and women, between brothers, between nations", even as he recognised the specific authority of government, "on which we do not want to tread".³² Cokroaminoto asserted that the PSII not only

strove "for independence but also wished that the Muslims of the whole world should stand under one flag".³³ For the West Java PSII leader, Aruji Kartawinata, the goal was "freedom from slavery, raising up of Islam, and the freeing of 'Indonesia'".³⁴ Suryopranoto, a veteran labour leader and PSII notable, remarked that the PSII "in the first place strives for what Islam prescribes but after that stands in great sympathy for action for a free Indonesia".³⁵ For *Pembela Islam*, Indonesia was, above all else, "a land of Islam".³⁶

Despite this fixity of idea, PSII shared some ideological similarities with nationalist groups. Like some of them, it adopted a policy of non-cooperation with the colonial government (which meant, most of all, the refusal to serve in various colonial advisory councils), which it termed its *hijrah* policy; it signified its wish, as Salim remarked, to remain "exclusively independent in its work of feeding the people".³⁷ Like many of the nationalists, PSII opposed capitalism and imperialism which "must be uprooted root and branch",³⁸ and which "just like Satan are enemies of Islam".³⁹ According to PSII notable Sukiman Wiryoanjojo, who had been in 1925 chair of the secularist Perhimpunan Indonesia student group in the Netherlands and who was close to the nationalists, Islam's goal of creating a "peaceful world" implied the struggle against those things like "capitalism, imperialism, colonialism and so on" which disturbed that peace.⁴⁰ For Cokroaminoto himself, the certain fall of imperialism and capitalism would "facilitate and accelerate the achievement of our goal: to obtain the freedom of the Community (Ummat) (National freedom) in its fullness".⁴¹ In the context of the nationalist insistence on popular sovereignty, Sukiman asserted that the PSII too "honours democratic principles and strives for brotherliness".⁴² But such similarities masked deep and abiding contradictions with the thinking of the non-religious nationalists.

The end of the embrace

The PSI's efforts at engagement with the nationalists included involvement with the PPPKI (Permuafakatan Perhimpunan-perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia), the confederation of nationalist parties created by Sukarno in 1927 to strive for enhanced unity within the movement. While the PSI had initially welcomed the PPPKI initiative, and Sukiman had been an active architect in its organisation, the relationship was an unhappy and reluctant one almost from the start.⁴³ The fact that the unity signified by the

PPPKI was always more symbolic than real, that member organisations could maintain their specific stances, and that the unanimity of all members was required for the framing of policy, served both to deaden and marginalise the federation's impact.⁴⁴ Its unity, accordingly, was built "on loose sand".⁴⁵ *Pembela Islam* provided its own resentful description of a PPPKI conference, remarking on

the behaviour of "Indonesian leaders", of "Mr's" with their sturdy and gallant appearance, eyes glowing with nationalist fire, quick of movement and sharp of word; and then the "Dr's", with penetrating eyes which stare into space, full of the highest ideals, of the finest feelings and of the two lowly people, representatives of the P.S.I. at the congress, surrounded by all those "neutrals" who do not like Islam yes, who hate Islam.⁴⁶

PSII members, notably Salim, were suspicious of what they saw as the PPPKI's false unity, its secularist core, its anti-Islamic tendencies,⁴⁷ its lack of responsiveness to PSII complaints, and the competition its dominant ideas offered to those of the PSII, and were quick and regular in their criticism of it.⁴⁸ Thus wounded, PPPKI supporters were quick to respond to these attacks with their own vitriol; Mohammad Husni Thamrin spoke of the "self-centredness" of the PSII,⁴⁹ while Samsi Sastrowidagdo penned a brochure entitled "Defending the P.P.P.K.I.". ⁵⁰ One critic of the PSII thought it fanciful to link religion with nationalism: "Religion is imperialistic, hegemonic and just causes discord".⁵¹ Another asserted that "a political association with Islam as its basis will bring division and will find adherents only amongst serious Muslims".⁵²

By early 1930, the relationship was such that the PSII congress sought to withdraw from the PPPKI, restrained only by Cokroaminoto himself. But the extreme bitterness that arose as a consequence of a series of anti-Islamic pieces that appeared in *Soeara Oemoem*, the journal of another body attached to the PPPKI, Sutomo's Indonesian Study Club—they suggested, amongst other criticisms of the hajj, that it was preferable to go to Boven Digul as a political prisoner of the Dutch than to make the pilgrimage to Mecca⁵³—together with Sutomo's own uncompromising attitude towards the PSII,⁵⁴ further deepened PSII suspicion of non-religious nationalism. PSII leader A.M. Sangaji, indeed, likened that nationalism to aggressive, expansionist and enslaving Western nationalism and drew a contrast with the truth, peace and right of Islamic nationalism.⁵⁵ The party turned further in on its Islamist core and finally withdrew from the PPPKI at the end of 1930.⁵⁶

From the PSII's point of view, of course, the party was in no way anti-nationalist. It opposed, rather, the "anti-religious camp" in the nationalist group,⁵⁷ such as those PNI leaders who condemned child marriage and polygamy.⁵⁸ A vague attempt to rejoin the PPPKI in March 1931 came to nothing when the federation refused the PSII's request to remove mention of "the Indonesian Nation" from PPPKI's regulations as a condition of PSII re-entry.⁵⁹ PSII also refused to participate in the PPPKI's "Indonesia Raya" (Great Indonesia) congress; in Salim's eyes, the congress represented "only a parade of unity. If people want to hold a real national congress, then it must be an 'all party congress' in which decisions can be taken by a majority of voices".⁶⁰ Such developments were evidence of the growing estrangement between the PSII and the secular nationalist movement; as one newspaper put it, "the national movement of Indonesia has come to a phase in which the religious associations take their own road the national parties can now work freely to achieve their goal, without worrying about the limiting rules of religion".⁶¹ Salim, for his part, thought an independent PSII would be "more productive than working together with other associations which have different goals".⁶² Indeed, the growing sense that the nationalists were a dangerous threat, and that Muslim solidarity essential, saw Sukiman and Syam (Raden Syamsurijal) commissioned to study whether that realisation should be acted upon; Syam concluded that the PSII should no longer seek association with the nationalists but rather pursue alliances with other religious movements, "which no matter how bad they were still better than the anti-Islam-minded nationalists".⁶³

That strengthening sense of the Muslim community was reflected in the rebirth of the Al-Islam congress, the first since 1926 and the eighth overall.⁶⁴ The congress itself was notable for what had by now become a characteristic sense of Muslim apprehension and defensiveness and a high degree of sensitivity to anti-Islamic sentiment. A scathing attack on the Prophet by a Jesuit priest in Muntilan, followed by a similarly fierce slander by a writer, Oei Bee Thay, in a Surabaya magazine,⁶⁵ prompted the Surabaya PSII branch to form a local Al-Islam committee, and similar committees sprang up elsewhere, under PSII auspices, which "at public meetings [gave] voice to the indignation aroused among Muslims".⁶⁶ In mid-year, at a meeting of forty-eight associations, PSII initiated the establishment of a permanent Al-Islam Central Committee, intended to combat and rebut "attacks and insults on the religion of Islam", to defend

the name, purity and truth of Islam, and to connect the Indonesian *ummat* with the *ummat* overseas.⁶⁷ Those efforts were followed by another AI-Islam congress the following year in Malang, attended by about 4,000 people,⁶⁸ before the congress “shared the inglorious fate of many other P.S.I.I. initiatives”⁶⁹ and faded from view, not to be revived until 1938.⁷⁰ PSII’s version of Muslim solidarity was premised on its leadership and direction; it had no strong sense of the need for broader intellectual or political collaboration with other Muslim groupings and remained essentially isolated from them. The party was, in its own view, sufficient unto itself.

Sumatra: a new approach

PSII’s efforts to realise its goals were mainly Java-based. In Sumatra, however, where modernising reformers had made the greatest progress, a new kind of Muslim vision was emerging, in large part in response to the need for a more aggressive politics to combat the government’s efforts to control religious instruction through its Guru Ordinance.⁷¹ In May 1930, the thriving and radically-minded Sumatera Thawalib school system⁷² transformed itself into a political party, the Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Union - Permi); it aimed to combine, just as PSII was attempting to segregate them, the concepts of nationalism and religion. Permi pretended to a national, all-Indonesian, not just a regional presence and influence, despite being almost entirely limited to Sumatra. It was, as the Dutch Islam advisor Gobée reported, an expression of “a striving for development in a nationalist sense”.⁷³ Henceforth, one Dutch report opined, “the education at Sumatera-Thawalib schools will be religious-nationalistic”.⁷⁴

In striking contrast to the PSII, Permi consciously modelled itself on the secular national parties; it based itself upon “Islam and nationalism, parallel roads of politics”,⁷⁵ and was particularly close to the thinking of Sukarno. When Dutch officials searched Permi’s schools and premises in 1933, they found “a great quantity of political propaganda of a radical nationalist kind”, including such material as Sukarno’s *Mencapai Indonesia Merdeka*, writings of Mohammad Hatta and Muchtar Luthfi, PNI publications, and newspapers and journals of the nationalist movement.⁷⁶ Sukarno himself lauded Permi efforts to emphasise the nationalist aspects of the Islamic struggle; “the two had a common ground in their obsession with national unity”.⁷⁷ Much more than their fellows in the PSII, these

Sumatran intellectuals had been captivated by the idea of Indonesia, "they already accept the name Indonesians".⁷⁸

Permi's attempt to synthesise nationalism and Islam contrasted sharply with the rejection of nationalism by PSII and by Persis, a small but influential body established in Bandung in 1923 and intellectually shaped by the Singapore-born Tamil, Ahmad Hassan,⁷⁹ which focussed on spreading its ideas directly rather than on developing institutional strength.⁸⁰ Permi, strengthened by the addition of a number of Minangkabau activists returning from their studies in Cairo and Mecca, was especially inspired by the thought of Ilyas Ya'kub. As a student in Cairo, he had closely studied the experience of the Egyptian nationalist movement before his return in early 1930 and he privileged the nation as the key modern political format.⁸¹ Permi sought to combine the power of the idea of Indonesia with Islam in new ways which gave appropriate emphasis to what had hitherto been contending streams of thinking. Its explicit ideological foundations were Islam and nationalism (*kebangsaan*); each needed the other for humankind's full development.⁸² As one Permi leader put it, "Men, no matter in whatever age or place they live, always have the feelings of religion and nationality. Religion is a spiritual feeling in our heart nation is a group of people who are bound together by various social and cultural ties".⁸³ In that sense, "Islam and nationalism are not to be divided and love for the land of one's birth is a part of belief Indonesians are one and the same people".⁸⁴ The preamble to Permi's August 1930 statutes noted that Indonesia's population was predominantly Muslim, and asserted that Indonesian Muslims, "basing their struggle on the principle of Islam and their nationality are striving for progress in order to fight for [their] human rights [which] are expressed in their social order and welfare and dignity".⁸⁵ In 1931, the return of Muchtar Luthfi, whose own experience in Cairo had fortified his preference for national, rather than pan-Islamic solutions, strengthened this intellectual tendency, as well as giving it a powerful new voice.⁸⁶ "In our opinion", Ilyas remarked early in 1931, "there is no difference or conflict between the goals of these two groups. Although they base [their struggles] on two different principles, they both want to lead on to direct our people toward the achievement of progress and human dignity". The Permi synthesis was the means to end this "tragic situation".⁸⁷

Permi's position attracted sharp and immediate rebuttal. Muhammadiyah figures like Haji Rasul (whose educational cen-

tre had given rise to Sumatera Thawalib in the first place)⁸⁸ and Hamka, outraged at Permi's reconciling conceptualisation,⁸⁹ saw Islam as completely providing all necessary elements and thus already encompassing the concept of nation; to look outside Islam to nation was itself blasphemous.⁹⁰ Mohammad Natsir, young disciple of Hassan, wrote that Permi leaders were not "satisfied with their Islam. They seem to feel that Islam is not enough, that they deem it necessary to add [something else]",⁹¹ and argued that such a position would mean, in time, that nationalism would assume ascendancy over religion.

Such criticism brought important containment to Permi's thinking. Thereafter, Permi leaders stressed that their sole ideological foundation was indeed Islam—not the nation as such as an end in itself, as the secularists demanded—and that nationalism provided merely the arena and the context of the action which belief in Islam prompted. While Islam and nationalism were not in contradiction, indeed, were "like the left and the right leg", and while the God-given attachment to *kebangsaan* was "inherent in man as the shadow is to the body",⁹² Permi resolved at its second congress in 1931 that nationalism was a "way of action" rather than an intellectual pillar. In Luthfi's words, "*kebangsaan* is just a way to achieving Indonesian independence", and its building a religious and meritorious work; "with a Free Indonesia we can obtain glorious Islam".⁹³ Nationalism gave direction and purpose to the task of human improvement—such as the struggle against feudalism, imperialism, and capitalism, as well as limiting provincialism and ethno-centrism, and for democracy and the rights and liberation of humans. But it was, in the final analysis, a work carried out in the name of God and in his service;⁹⁴ "the Qur'an says, God does not change the condition of a people until they change their own condition".⁹⁵ Independence was the means to the achievement of these goals—including the primacy of Islam and full commitment to its teachings, both deemed impossible under colonial rule—but would not itself necessarily bring them about or even guarantee their achievement.⁹⁶

Permi leaders, then, had attempted to bring together the increasingly fractious streams of Islam and *kebangsaan* by emphasising the positive character of both and ignoring the different visions each had for the future of Indonesia. That stance, of course, involved a wholesale rejection of the kinds of pan-Islamic thinking still dear to many PSII figures.⁹⁷ When challenged by outraged Muslim politi-

cians, they were forced, their bluff called, to acknowledge that their politics was framed in fundamentally Islamic terms. A Persis leader, accentuating what Permi leaders had earlier attempted to cloud and divert attention from, wrote that "the kebangsaan movement works with Indonesian people in the name of 'Mother Indonesia' and for the sake of the Indonesia *marhaen* [little people]. The Islamic movement in this country works with the Indonesian Muslims in the name of Allah and for the independence of Islam".⁹⁸ That concise assessment showed in fact how divergent the Islamist and nationalist visions were: the one, to create a state freed from colonialism whose inhabitants could fashion it as they chose; the other to create the freedom to install an Islamic state which would be shaped, as would the lives of its inhabitants, by Islamic ideals, laws, and beliefs. The Permi attempt at synthesis was crushed by its inability to marry those two notions.

Notwithstanding its intellectual defeat, Permi's great practical success in mobilising nationalism in the cause of Islam and merging religious attachment with political activism made it the largest and most popular political party in Sumatra, although it remained restricted to the regions of Minangkabau, Tapanuli and Bengkulu.⁹⁹ Together with the PSII it strove, "with equal fierceness", to bring about, as quickly as possible, a "free Indonesia".¹⁰⁰ It was, indeed, "the only political party of any significance outside Java", and the only one with its headquarters in Sumatra, with a membership estimated in mid-1933 at 10,000, of whom "some thousands" were women—twice PSII's membership in West Sumatra.¹⁰¹ That very success, inevitably, made it an important target for Dutch repression and intimidation. The arrests of Permi's major leaders in 1933,¹⁰² and the repressive limits the government thereafter placed on its political and educational activities, forced it to abandon its political activities the following year in favour of meek educational and social activities, the prestige and capacity of which also rapidly declined. That stance so weakened the party that it resolved in 1936 to disband, being finally wound up in October 1937.¹⁰³

The Jong Islamieten Bond

Permi was not the only site of intellectual contestation over the relationship of nationalism to religion. The Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB - Young Muslims' Association), created in 1925 from the Jong Java (Young Java) association by Syamsurijal under the sponsorship

of Salim, grew to a membership of 1000 by the end of 1925 and to around 4,000 by the early 1930s,¹⁰⁴ and became a significant source of elaborated thinking on that matter.¹⁰⁵ Its starting point, naturally enough, was Islam itself, and its goal one of “studying and exactly observing the usages prescribed by Islam”;¹⁰⁶ it thought of Islam not “like an heirloom which hinders progress, no more as a place to run to because we are afraid of the threat of the hereafter”.¹⁰⁷ Since “Muslims are brothers”,¹⁰⁸ it was Islam that underlay feelings of community among the Indonesian people; thus “the national spirit ... means for the J.I.B.: the spirit of Islam”;¹⁰⁹ the organisation’s success was deemed by its founders to be “a high national interest”.¹¹⁰ That sense brought one JIB delegate to disparage nationalism for its divisive tendencies, comparing it to Islam which “knows no divisions based on nation and contains nothing which stirs up hatred but by contrast encourages all peoples to mutual appreciation and understanding”. In that sense, then, a notion of the national was a “luxury item”.¹¹¹ Others, however, while affirming that Islam provided the real basis for Indonesian unity—“a unity which is not based on internal likeness is imperfect”¹¹²—and playing down or denying the apparent conflict between Islam and nationalism—“the J.I.B. and Indonesian nationalism go hand in hand. This had been the case right from the beginning”¹¹³—moved to improve links with nationalist-inclined youth and even with Christian youth, a strategy that was not reciprocated.¹¹⁴ JIB, indeed, was a professedly national, not regional or ethnic body, and it named its scouting body the National Indonesian Scout Movement, reflecting something of the ambivalence of its position.¹¹⁵ All the while, JIB maintained a strong sense of religious toleration (“Indonesia has many religions we must not force our religion on others who believe differently, but must work together with them if possible”)¹¹⁶ and a fixedly apolitical position, something nicely manifested by the deployment of its Dutch-language name. But one indication of its desire for distance was its refusal to join the fusion of youth groups established in 1931, Indonesia Muda (Young Indonesia) in order to preserve its identity as a dedicated Muslim group.¹¹⁷

Islam versus nationalism

The threat of secular nationalism to Islamism was not just that it opposed, in the name of emancipation, some fundamental Islamic tenets, or even that it criticised the hajj as a means to “enrich the

Arabs at the cost of [Indonesians'] own land".¹¹⁸ The problem was more fundamental, as one PNI leader noted: "the P.N.I. was not established to involve itself with religious matters, not even to act against the laws of Mohammed, but to work to make Indonesia free".¹¹⁹ Indeed, one young nationalist activist thought that "there was no unity in Islam and that people involved in the movement must set aside Islam".¹²⁰ That kind of thinking made Muslim leaders fearful, antagonistic and defensive; what might become of Islam should the nationalists succeed in enthroning the nation? One PSII member, indeed, expressed the fear that "as soon as 'Indonesia' falls into the hands of the P.N.I., the Islamic religion will be brought down".¹²¹

The Persis leader Hassan opposed the concept of the nation-state and saw nationalism as a dangerously fissiparous tendency for the global Muslim community, dividing people one from another rather than bringing them together as Muslim brothers. Indeed, he thought that "to set up a *kebangsaan* organization, to invite and persuade people to join *kebangsaan*, to assist a *kebangsaan* party, is forbidden in Islam", indeed a form of apostasy. "Islam", he argued, "orders us to unite ourselves according to Islam and on the basis of Islam. Islam obliges us to seek freedom, not on account of happiness or misery, but in order to realize fully the commandments of Islam in every respect".¹²² Indeed, "to belong to the nationalist party means leaving Islam".¹²³ Haji Rasul thought along similar lines, if not quite so severely: "1. Islam is tolerant, *kebangsaan* is not. Thus they contradict each other and therefore cannot be united. 2. Islam brings peace and unity to the world, *kebangsaan* divides the world. 3. Islam embraces mankind in general, and strengthens the brotherhood of man, even the tie between Muslims and non-Muslims may not be severed".¹²⁴

The controversy reached its most sophisticated form, in ways that served further to separate the two streams of thinking and to deepen their differences, in the thinking of the Persis leader Natsir, expressed in a series of articles in *Pembela Islam* in 1931 and 1932. Himself schooled in both Islamic (informally) and Western styles,¹²⁵ Natsir naturally saw Islam as providing the fundament for nationally-minded thinking in Indonesia: "It was the Islamic movement which first paved the way in this country for political actions aiming at independence, which first planted the seeds of Indonesian unity ... which first planted the seed of brotherhood with those of the same faith outside the boundaries of Indonesia"¹²⁶ Islam, then, the religion of the great majority of Indonesians, provided

the necessary basis and ground for the archipelago's solidarity and unity.¹²⁷ For Muslims, independence would provide "the freedom of Islam in order that Islamic rules and regulations be realized for the well-being and perfection of the Muslims as well as of all Allah's creatures".¹²⁸ Religiously-neutral nationalists, by contrast, sought to downplay the importance of Islam and replace it with a basis which was "vague, and does not meet the requirements we desire".¹²⁹ Islam provided not just the foundation for unity but a moral and political guideline for the new state, "a code for the upholding of ethics for the regulation of man's relations at home, in society, in the governance and the state the regulation of relations with people of other faiths with people of other countries; which gives guidance to the fulfilment of the physical and other spiritual needs of man in order to attain his highest aspirations".¹³⁰ Natsir did not mince his words in contrasting his vision for Indonesia with that of the nationalists. *Kebangsaan*, like regional or ethnically based solidarity, was essentially divisive, self-serving and selfish. Islam, by contrast, preached altruistic, not competitive, qualities of community: "Islam plants in the heart of the Javanese, the Sumatrans, the Chinese etc [the consciousness of] belonging to the noblest creatures of Allah Only with these teachings can the love of one's people which is indeed a nature of mankind be safeguarded from falling into the low and intolerant fanaticism of *kebangsaan* which teaches: 'in our interest, in the interest of our needs, we do not care [if we] harm others'".¹³¹ Responding to the nationalist plea to put religion to one side, he remarked:

Our aim and purpose are not similar. You seek independence for Indonesia on account of the Indonesian nation, on account of Mother Indonesia. We struggle for independence because of Allah, for the well-being of all the inhabitants of the Indonesian archipelago we go separate ways!¹³²

Islamist Isolation

The developing clarity and fixity of the Islamist position served only to isolate it politically. PSII remained the largest political party in the country, claiming at the end of 1931 a membership of around 30,000.¹³³ But the attempt to Islamise the idea of Indonesia circumscribed a notion the greatest virtue of which was its broad inclusiveness. Islamists thereby distanced themselves from the mainstream of Indonesian political thinking and refused to engage constructively

with the now deeply-anchored popularity of the idea of Indonesia amongst the educated elite. The simple idea proclaimed by nationalist leaders—"that only a free Indonesia can bring salvation"¹³⁴—had found a deep resonance especially with young Western-influenced elites and even among people who had no deep grasp of the concept or of its implications. They proclaimed that the Indonesia they sought must be united, notwithstanding differences in ethnicity, religion and region. "A people who cannot be one are like loose sand, easily blown apart by the wind", Sukarno asserted; "But if this sand remains together, and is pressed together into cement, the cement of the soul, then it can become concrete, that is, the concrete of that national will, from which finally national deeds proceed".¹³⁵ Even when the non-cooperating group of parties was finally crushed by the government—Sukarno, Hatta, and Syahrir arrested and imprisoned, Sukarno repudiating non-cooperation, the PNI Baru dead and Partindo dissolving itself in 1936¹³⁶—that idea of Indonesia still shone brightly and effectively amongst other parties.

Nationalist leaders were often cruelly dismissive of Islamism's pretensions, but Sukarno made one of the few efforts to intellectualise the Islam-nationalism problem. Exiled by the Dutch in Ende, he expressed in a series of letters to Ahmad Hassan his dismay at what appeared to him as Islam's lack of dynamism, its reticence towards progress, modernity and Western knowledge.¹³⁷ Later, now exiled elsewhere in Flores, Sukarno, sought to clarify further his own, and the general nationalist attitude, to the political manifestation of religion. He wrote approvingly of the example of secular Turkey: "Islam has not been wiped out by Turkey, but Islam has been given over to the people of Turkey themselves, and not to the state For us Islam is a matter for ourselves and not a matter for the state".¹³⁸ While he accepted the generalised notion of a lived, but non-institutionalised, relationship between religion as such and the coming Indonesian state¹³⁹—and, indeed, hoped that "all the people will burn with the fire of Islam"¹⁴⁰—his difficulties with the Islamist political agenda began with Islam itself which he saw, at least in its extant manifestation, as backward and lacking in important elements.¹⁴¹ He argued that the union of state and religion in a society that was not wholly Muslim would be fatal for democracy: "for countries like this there are only two alternatives *the unity of state and religion, but without democracy, or democracy, but the state separated from religion!*"¹⁴² While he found much to praise in Islam's religious and spiritual message, he found the Islamic claim to political domi-

nance, especially if it were expressed through the authority of *ulama*,¹⁴³ repellent. Equally, Sukarno scorned the weakness of a religion that would seem to depend so utterly on state sponsorship.¹⁴⁴

In his response to Sukarno, Natsir offered nothing new. He emphasised the particularly all-embracing, unsegmented quality of Islam which saw no division into the divine and secular domains; earlier he had quoted approvingly Gibb's phrase that Islam was a "complete civilisation".¹⁴⁵ The state, indeed, had an obligation to ensure that its subjects followed the prescriptions ordained by God himself;¹⁴⁶ "the State, for us, is not an aim but a tool. The affairs of state are at root one part, one 'integrating part', which cannot be separated from Islam".¹⁴⁷ Indeed, "in Islamic statecraft there is absolutely no place for dualism".¹⁴⁸ Islam provided "the basis for regulating society, the importance and the need for which does not change while people remain people".¹⁴⁹ Islam demanded no specific form of government, apart from prescribing the need for consultation; Islam was democratic "insofar as Islam is anti-autocracy, anti-absolutism, anti-despotism".¹⁵⁰ Parliamentary democracy might be appropriate, even good, but it had no power to change the essential teaching of Islam, notwithstanding the popular will. "If indeed a law or an intention of humankind conflicts with the laws and intention of Islam, the law and intention of God must stand, the law and intention of humankind must fall".¹⁵¹ State neutrality towards religion simply demonstrated that leaders did not value Islamic principles.¹⁵² In an Islamic state, though, non-Muslims need not be concerned: they enjoy "broad freedom of religion With the Laws of Islam in force, their Religion will not be disturbed, will not be damaged and will not be diminished in any way".¹⁵³

This interchange is instructive. For Sukarno, religion was essentially a matter of private observation, encouraged perhaps by the state, but not ordained and controlled by it; such, indeed, threatened to endanger the integrity and life of the state. For Natsir, the divine revelation made it incumbent on the state to be informed by and to implement Islamic law. He saw no salvation through nationalism as such. That no grounds for compromise could be found suggests two things: first, that in the context of colonial domination and with the prospect of freedom apparently distant, the protagonists could maintain their positions without the incursion of pragmatic reality upon their thinking. Second, and more specifically, it underlines the failure of Natsir to think imaginatively about how the practical realities of governance might give him cause to moderate his Islamist

strictures—if only to provide a sense of greater detail about how an Islamist government and a regime of Islamic law might respond to the specific conditions of Indonesian society. As things stood, however, Islamism saw no need to move; its exclusivism would endure until pragmatics would much later force at least a partial accommodation.

Emerging disunity

By the early 1930s, the PSII's sense of self-privileged mission and self-importance and consequently its desire for distance from the Dutch-managed political arena had hardened. S.M. Kartosuwiryo saw the hijrah policy as a means "to hold [the party] apart and to establish in Indonesia its own organisation which satisfies the requirements of Islamic society".¹⁵⁴ Aruji Kartawinata, chairman of the party's Garut (West Java) branch, remarked that one goal of the PSII was to form the youth "in such a way that they are able to create a society which satisfied the requirements of Islam".¹⁵⁵ Abikusno Cokrosuyoso, Cokroaminoto's brother and later party leader, responded to an attack by Hatta on his proposed agrarian program by retorting that "society must be organised not according to Marxist, but according to Islamic collectivism".¹⁵⁶ In May 1934, Cokroaminoto's "General Regulation for the Islamic Community" ("Reglement umum bagi Ummat Islam") was endorsed by PSII's 20th congress in Banjarnegara.¹⁵⁷ PSII's exclusivism could only have been strengthened by continuing expressions of anti-Islamic sentiment, such as that reported of a Kediri Catholic schoolteacher in 1934 who had encouraged his students to desecrate the Qur'an (resulting in a protest meeting attended by 4,000 people and the teacher's dismissal),¹⁵⁸ a similar case in Surabaya in the same year,¹⁵⁹ and 1937 press articles critical of the Prophet's stance on polygyny, deemed a consequence of his alleged wantonness.¹⁶⁰ That such things could happen, remarked one Muslim, was testimony to "the decline of Islam as a consequence of the indifference of Muslims who increasingly ignore Allah and His precepts".¹⁶¹

But PSII's complacent self-satisfaction with its political views and the range of its duties led to a sense of stagnation ("in general the public remains cold")¹⁶² which invited internal contestation. Suryopranoto's efforts to turn around the PSII position, expressed in his plea for positive self-criticism of the party itself and its leadership at the 1930 conference, had little impact, despite the meeting's

conclusion that the party faced serious deficiencies in the range of its branch activity, and problems in its loose financial management, the excessive and uncritical reverence it accorded its leaders, and its lack of success in competing with other organisations.¹⁶³ Sukiman's disaffection with the PSII's exclusivism, his attachment to the national aspect of emancipation—at the second PSII conference he spoke of the struggle “for the interests of the Indonesian nation and the hopes for the freedom of our country and the Islamic religion”¹⁶⁴—and the failure of his efforts to reform and modernise PSII policies, procedures and attitudes, finally led to his decision to chart a new path. His persistence in seeking, like Permi, collaborative interaction with the nationalists—evidenced by his invitation to Hatta (rejected by the party) to become joint editor of the PSII newspaper *Oetoesan Indonesia*—inevitably led to sharp personal conflict with Cokroaminoto. Both Suryopranoto and Sukiman were expelled from the PSII in March 1933,¹⁶⁵ an event, *Pandji Timoer* concluded, with “serious consequences for the whole national movement”.¹⁶⁶ *Djawa Barat* asked, in a pointed reference to Cokroaminoto's dictatorial grip on the party: “Is the P.S.I.I. the party of Cokro or the party of the people?”¹⁶⁷ while party dissidents in Makassar, annoyed at “the manner the leaders misuse the organisation for their own personal interests”, established their own party.¹⁶⁸

Thereafter, Sukiman and his supporters considered the possibility of establishing themselves as Permi branches, but ultimately decided to form a new party, the Indonesian Islamic Party (Partai Islam Indonesia - Parii) in June 1933. The new party was firmly based upon Islam—its leaders thought that “purifying society in general and ‘Indonesian’ society in particular is possible only if God's will is observed”¹⁶⁹—and upon non-cooperation, and sought alliance, and perhaps even unity, with nationalists in the cause of independence.¹⁷⁰ It saw the need, as PSII often did not, to follow an aggressively activist political program. Sukiman saw in Islam and Muslim law the means to rescue humanity from division and turmoil: “All laws made by a group are especially for the interests of that group and thus disadvantage others. But Islam is a law drafted by God, is not for the sake of personal interests and disadvantages no one, indeed, it promotes the good”. He also saw the contemporary practice of Islam as skewed; “what is wrong with Muslims currently is that they are only interested in the little things such as celebrations, while no thought is given to the major goal of Islam”.¹⁷¹ Hopes for closer collaboration with Permi and even JIB—“thereby possibly to arrive

at the establishment of a large modern Islam party"—evaporated with the government's repression of Permi. But Sukiman's new party, notwithstanding its emphasis on political activity, gained no popular traction, and disappeared within a year.¹⁷² However, his actions were a serious and damaging reproof to the PSII's sense of self-satisfied withdrawal from serious political involvement.

The departure of Sukiman and Suryopranoto did not heal the PSII's problems of strategy and personality;¹⁷³ *Soeara Oemoem* thought the party out-of-date, poorly led, and badly in need of new leadership.¹⁷⁴ Shortly thereafter, Salim, an "outstanding leader" renowned for "his intellect, his great oratorical skills, his many years of experience in the political movement and the power of his special personality",¹⁷⁵ manifested his own increasing doubts about the party's exclusivist and self-regarding attitudes, and especially about the hijrah policy. By the mid-1930s, he had adopted the view that the PSII had to abandon its exclusionism and embrace collaboration with other parties and even with the colonial government.¹⁷⁶ His thinking may have been influenced by suggestions that he might be proposed for a seat in the Volksraad¹⁷⁷—his opponents certainly thought him a slave to his ambition¹⁷⁸—as well as his testy relationship with Cokroaminoto,¹⁷⁹ but he must also have come to realise that the hijrah policy was in many respects counterproductive and even potentially fatal given the government's dangerously repressive mood, especially after 1933.¹⁸⁰ As things stood, Salim argued, the hijrah policy achieved nothing except to isolate the party from playing an effective role in politics.¹⁸¹ As he later remarked, "we hoped to get a podium or a platform in the Volksraad in order to propose various changes which would improve the situation of the people".¹⁸² Through the hijrah policy, his supporters averred, "a political party is turned into a party for Qur'an reading and religious propaganda etc. etc."¹⁸³ and, Salim remarked, "increasingly drifts away from the political arena to a world of visions where there is no place for any social action".¹⁸⁴ Such distancing and quietude meant, as well, that there was little sense of deeply-rooted activism. A Dutch political survey remarked in 1936, that "a socio-religious association such as the Muhammadiyah, which does constructive work in the interests of the people, has greater drawing power with the masses than a politico-religious organisation like the PSII, which mainly contents itself with proclaiming hollow slogans and fruitless mutual quarrelling".¹⁸⁵

Salim's failure to convince his party of the need for change and engagement stiffened an already tense relationship with Abikusno,¹⁸⁶ head of the party's executive committee following Cokro's death, who maintained that "it is clear that the glory and nobility of the Islamic community is found through the Hijrah".¹⁸⁷ Towards the end of 1936, Salim created an internal group, the "Barisan Penyadar PSII" (The Front of the Aware PSII) to campaign for his ideas, replete with numerous branch-level committees.¹⁸⁸ In consequence, "in numerous branches the members are divided into two camps, the one supporting the current administration and its hijrah principle, while the other rallies to the side of H.A. Salim".¹⁸⁹ The result was catastrophic for Salim's hopes, with Abikusno relentlessly favouring the hijrah policy. Salim, and those around him, who included such notables as A.M. Sangaji and the young law student Mohammed Rum, were expelled from the PSII early in 1937.¹⁹⁰

Salim then moved to create the Barisan Penyadar as a separate, cooperative ("striving to realise its ideals in cooperation with the Government")¹⁹¹ party, now renamed Pergerakan Penyadar (Movement of the Aware). It aimed to establish a parliamentary form of democracy,¹⁹² and to establish itself as a champion of the popular will,¹⁹³ but the movement attracted little interest; "it appeared to be a club too much tied to Salim".¹⁹⁴ The open meetings at Penyadar's first congress attracted only around fifty people,¹⁹⁵ and only a few local PSII branches, apparently disaffected by the uncompromising hijrah policy especially championed by Kartosuwiryo.¹⁹⁶ Moreover, PSII leaders, embittered by Salim's behaviour—"while Cokroaminoto was still alive, Salim did not have the courage to incite discord in the party"¹⁹⁷—gave the new party no respite, preventing, as we shall see, Penyadar's involvement in the more collaborative politics of the late 1930s. Salim seemed to be, one newspaper averred, "a leader without followers",¹⁹⁸ and the party struggled to articulate a clear sense of aims and purpose, not to mention a plan of action. Its increasing marginalisation was reflected in Salim's failure to be named to the Volksraad in 1939.¹⁹⁹

For their part, Sukiman and his colleagues, having toyed with overtures offered them to rejoin the PSII,²⁰⁰ determined to re-establish the old *Parii* under the name Partai Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Party - PII) in December 1938. It was loosely based around the Islam Study Club, a group of Muslim intellectuals established in Yogyakarta on the initiative of Muhammadiyah chair Mas Mansur, rejected the ideas of party discipline and non-cooperation,²⁰¹ and

foreswore purely social action in favour of politics—"each Muslim, according to the teaching of our religion, is obliged to move into the political terrain ... our whole way of life and everything we do is a function of politics. Politics is a means to power".²⁰² It made its goals clear in its statutes: "to make the Indonesian people ready to accept the absolute position of Islam and its followers, a goal they try to achieve by the closer invocation of the brotherly connection between Muslims and their associations and by bringing to the people the realisation of their right to regulate their lives according to the prescriptions of Islam".²⁰³ PII's deliberate focus on politics as a means of enhancing Islamic interests was a reflection of its antipathy towards Muslim political quiescence; it lamented that while the nationalists busily involved themselves in politics, "one hears and notes virtually nothing from the Muslim community, at least not in proportion to its numbers".²⁰⁴ PII was equally adamantly opposed to the exclusiveness of bodies like PSII. The new party was to be "a torch, which enlightens the Muslim world, calling upon and urging the whole Muslim community in Indonesia to get involved in the political terrain", even if it endured some early tensions concerning the relative weight to be given to Islam as against nationalism.²⁰⁵ Its chair was Wiwoho Purbohadijoyo,²⁰⁶ member of the Volksraad (sometimes thought of, indeed, as that chamber's only Muslim representative, to the chagrin of Muslims who called for an increase in their representation),²⁰⁷ and its leadership included Sukiman himself and the Cairo-educated Abdulkahar Muzakkir. The party was particularly fortunate in attracting the support of Mansur, who had pushed Muhammadiyah more strongly into an activist stance by proclaiming at the 1938 Muhammadiyah congress his organisation's willingness to pursue collaboration with political parties,²⁰⁸ and who became himself a PII member and leader. Partly as a consequence of these strategic appointments and contacts, the party quickly began to develop, even in the Outer Islands; by mid-1939 it had around sixty branches and by early 1940 115.²⁰⁹ PII's disciplined intellectual approach to politics produced a clear political agenda by 1940, which saw Indonesia as a unitary state with democratic parliamentary institutions—"indeed the religion of Islam obliges us to support with all our strength the demands of the Indonesian people for a proper parliament"²¹⁰—at both central and regional level, its citizens with rights of free expression and thought, a state-centred economic system which aimed at the protection and advancement of indigenous entrepreneurs, Islam left free to manage its own af-

fairs, an ending to state subsidies to all religions, and opposition to the notion of a native militia.²¹¹

PSII: an end to Exclusivism

The PSII maintained its virulent opposition towards cooperation following Salim's departure. For Abikusno, "much association with 'kafirs', as well as taking a seat in the representative councils together with 'kafirs', is not good and contravenes the orders of God. If the P.S.I.I. were in the future to embrace the cooperative principle this would be a sin against God".²¹² Such rhetoric was underpinned by reference to the difficulties the Prophet himself faced in his original hijrah.²¹³ But the political utility of the party's exclusivism was now increasingly under question. While the PSII remained the biggest political party in the Indies, with an estimated membership of between 40,000 and 50,000 members in the mid-1930s, it was plagued by chronic division and long-term institutional difficulties of a financial and disciplinary kind.²¹⁴ More immediately important was its deepening awareness of the political ineffectiveness its non-cooperation policy had brought it. One newspaper remarked that the party had "left the field of political action and become 'non-dangerous'",²¹⁵ while the dissident Sabirin argued that non-cooperation "is worthwhile only if the political party concerned is powerful enough to achieve its goal by 'extra-parliamentary' means. However, non-cooperation is pointless and even damaging and dangerous for the movement if a political party thereby wholly cuts out avenues for further action, as is currently the case. Further, by maintaining a non-cooperation standpoint, the P.S.I.I. isolates itself more and more from other parties and from society".²¹⁶

Accordingly, the PSII, while it remained entrenched in its non-cooperation policy with the government, began to reorient its attitude to other parties and groups, something partly occasioned by increasing Muslim resentment at persistent government interference in the religious arena, such as a proposed new marriage ordinance,²¹⁷ a 1937 regulation which moved the treatment of matters of inheritance from the religious to the regular court system,²¹⁸ "the insults which have been done in recent times to Muslims",²¹⁹ and perhaps as well the continuing misery caused by the Depression and gathering international tensions.²²⁰

One aspect of that more ecumenical mood was the lifting of the expulsion placed on Sukiman and his supporters in July 1937.²²¹ In

that same month, the PSII congress, at which there was talk of a "Muslim brotherhood",²²² embraced the notion of developing an Islamic Congress along the lines of the Al-Islam congress last held five years before. It was eventually held in Surabaya in February 1938—the tenth such Congress, by PSII reckoning—with twenty-five Islamic organisations attending, although, as in times past, the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (which claimed 67,000 members by 1935),²²³ having sent a delegation, withdrew from the congress because of doctrinal disagreements and the manner in which PSII dominated proceedings.²²⁴ The congress was intended to bring together all Muslim associations to work together and to mediate disputes within the Islamic community, to develop closer relations with Muslim communities overseas, to work for the welfare of Islam and the Muslim community, and to establish an Indonesian Muslim Congress. It made determinations to oppose Dutch plans to change marriage law and the making of insults against the Prophet and Islam generally, and on various points of Islamic ritual, on improving hajj travel, and even on supporting the Muslim community of Palestine.²²⁵ A further Al-Islam congress was held in Solo in May 1939, and another in Solo in July 1941, which made important decisions regarding the form of the state, the problem of an Indonesian militia, and on blood transfusions.²²⁶ The congress now counted amongst its numbers 14 ordinary members, 7 extraordinary ones, and another 7 candidate organisations; all the major Muslim organisations, including PSII, PII, Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam, and NU were involved.²²⁷ It was treated to a rousing speech from Wahid Hasyim on the need for Muslim unity: "a watch is one, because each wheel likes and wishes to be united; whether it is a big wheel or a small one, whether it turns to the left or to the right, whether it has springs or not, all of them like and want to be united One for all and all for one. Is the Indonesian Islamic community prepared to be like that?"²²⁸

A further concrete result of the PSII's partial abandonment of its exclusivism was its participation in the MIAI (Al-Madjlisul-Islamil-A'laa Indonesia – Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia), established in September 1937 in Surabaya as a consultative federation of Muslim organisations on the initiative of Muhammadiyah's Mas Mansur, NU's Ahmad Dahlan Kebondalem and Abdul Wahab, as well as PSII's Wondoamiseno. That combination was itself a sign of a more highly cooperative attitude amongst Muslim organisations, notwithstanding PSII's pointed refusal to countenance the admis-

sion of Salim's *Penyadar*.²²⁹ PSII soon formed the MIAI's core, and the able Wondoamiseno spearheaded its administration. The MIAI's goals were framed in terms of strengthening the bonds between Muslim organisations, defending Islam from attack, and promoting ties between Muslims both inside and outside the country.²³⁰ While the MIAI, numbering seven organisations after its foundation (but not NU, which joined the body only in late 1940),²³¹ formally limited its considerations to religious matters, "the boundary between Islam and politics was difficult to draw".²³²

In October 1937, PSII announced that although "the P.S.I.I. has for a considerable time in its activities held itself aside from the national movements", it had come to the conclusion that "such separation appears to be less useful for the 'Indonesian' people's movement in general". Accordingly, it had determined to reconnect "in order to work together with the national movements".²³³ By the end of 1937, an initiative by Abikusno with Sutomo's *Parindra* had resulted in the idea of an Indonesian National Congress, "a place for consultation by the whole people".²³⁴ That collaboration was "a symptom of the inclination for cooperation between a religious political group and a pure nationalist one".²³⁵ Sutomo himself remarked on "the good understanding and cooperation which now exists between *Parindra* and other parties, for example, the Indonesian People's Movement (*Gerindo*) and the Indonesian *Sarekat Islam Party*".²³⁶ It was itself a consequence of the dire political situation in which the general Indonesian movement had found itself in its quest for an independent Indonesia.²³⁷ It was formalised in April 1938 as *Badan Perantaraan Partai-partai Politik Indonesia* (*Liasion Board of Indonesian Political Parties - Bapeppi*), and included as well the staunchly secularist *Gerindo* and the ethnically-based West Java association *Pasundan*; each of the four parties "represent[ing] a specific group or stream".²³⁸ *Bapeppi* sought "the development of cooperation between the Indonesian Political Parties";²³⁹ as Abikusno remarked, "the nation must be educated in the idea of working together".²⁴⁰ But *Bapeppi*, while it was open to non-indigenous organisations (unlike the old *PPPKI*), was rent by jealousies and fears; it enjoyed little success and lasted less than a year.²⁴¹ Moreover, there were still voices within the PSII which championed exclusivism; one PSII party leader in Palembang remarked that "the political, economic and social *hijrah* means that this party will have nothing to do with anything which is not in accord with the regulations of Islam given in the *Qur'an*".²⁴²

Another and more successful effort at mutual engagement saw the appearance of a federation of parties, Gapi (Gabungan Politik Indonesia – Indonesian Political Federation) in May 1939, with its stated aim to create a responsible parliamentary form of government for the Indies.²⁴³ Its emergence signalled even more strongly that the old issue of cooperation or non-cooperation had sagged in relevance, especially given the increasingly threatening international situation and the emerging, slight, possibility that the Dutch might be amenable to cooperating in incremental reform, notably the formation of a responsible parliament for the Indies.²⁴⁴ Gapi included the four major parties—*notwithstanding* Salim's reservations that such an alliance would restrain the political freedom of Muslim parties²⁴⁵—as well as PII, Persatuan Minahasa (Minahasa Union), and Persatuan Politik Katholiek Indonesia, but non-indigenous organisations were not permitted to join. Gapi was not intended to pursue ideological unification, but rather "unity of action in matters which are thought important from the point of view of the community and which the community needs".²⁴⁶ Its aim, as expressed in its statutes, was "to implement the ideals of the Indonesian people".²⁴⁷

The PSII was an especially strong supporter of the notion of a parliament.²⁴⁸ In Abikusno's view, "Islam teaches that the world was created for [humankind's] wellbeing, and because 'Indonesians' did not yet possess this wellbeing, it could be achieved through a parliament".²⁴⁹ At the "Congress of the Indonesian People" (Kongres Rakyat Indonesia) established by Gapi,²⁵⁰ Wondoamiseno expressed his hope "for the speedy establishment of an Indonesian parliament".²⁵¹ At the same time Sukiman claimed democracy as a Muslim concept; "the government desired by Islam is a government which accords with deliberation, which does not depend on the wish of a single group, much less a single individual",²⁵² a view which accorded with Salim's earlier explanation that "the democracy of Islam is not the Western kind of one-half plus one but that they who come to do the work for it have the right and therefore the responsibility and bear power".²⁵³ The Congress, establishing itself as a permanent body under the aegis of Gapi, declared its goal as "the welfare and prosperity of the Indonesian people" and its method of decision as majority vote democracy.²⁵⁴ The parliamentary idea, naturally, did not enjoy the support of the Dutch government, ever more convinced of Indonesian political and social immaturity.²⁵⁵ As Syahrir had already observed, "the Dutch and the Indonesians ... have only learned to distrust each other".²⁵⁶ Further, it saw the

emergence of another Islamist contrarian, Kartosuwiryo, whose contradiction of the PSII's newly engaged approach to politics, and especially its participation with non-Muslim parties in the push for an Indonesian parliament, and perhaps as well his idiosyncratic mystical leanings, led to his estrangement from the party and then his expulsion, together with his close associates, in January 1939.²⁵⁷

Pandji Islam asserted that "a new time has dawned, the time of co-operation between the Islamic movement and the Government".²⁵⁸ Indeed, the MIAI was becoming an ever more influential player in politics as it cast itself as the representative body of definitive Muslim sentiment in relation to the government and the channel for the government's communications regarding Islamic affairs.²⁵⁹ By September 1940, the MIAI comprised seventeen member organisations; even the Indonesian-Malayan student association in Cairo was a probationary member.²⁶⁰ Late in 1939, Wondoamiseno issued a demand for an "Indonesian parliament on the basis of Islam",²⁶¹ a notion adopted by the MIAI in July 1941.²⁶² The 1940 PSII congress in Palembang was of a similar mind, asserting the notion that an appropriate parliament was one which "produces the greatest benefits and advantages for the Indonesian Muslim community and which meets the desires of society".²⁶³ Further, the support of Muhammadiyah and NU for a Muslim parliament represented "an enormous step away from political neutrality".²⁶⁴ Early in 1941 the MIAI sought from Gapi recognition of its centrality and authority in things Islamic, and even an acknowledgement that Indonesia was "a Muslim land".²⁶⁵

MIAI's April 1941 support for Gapi's memorandum to the Dutch-instituted Visman Commission on political reform, however, was qualified, since "the popular representation proposed by Gapi is in various respects not sensitive to the principles of Islam relating to statecraft the largest part of the society, in this case the Muslim community, would not be represented in appropriate ways in this parliament".²⁶⁶ At the very least, Muslim support involved the notion that within such a parliament Muslims would be dominant, with a Muslim as head of state, and at least two-thirds of the ministry comprising Muslims, with a dedicated Ministry for Islamic affairs, and the addition of a crescent to the flag.²⁶⁷ MIAI's demands caused an uproar in nationalist ranks, given their potential to damage Gapi's case—Wondoamiseno was absent through illness at the MIAI meeting which had made that determination—but the cleavage was papered over by subsequent declarations on both sides

that there was no difference in meaning, while MIAI declared that it was not intervening in politics. Within Muslim ranks, Abikusno and Wondoamiseno, deeply concerned at the injury inflicted on Gapi's unity, emphasised the slightness of the difference with Gapi. Abikusno, indeed, remarking that he did not agree with the MIAI proposals, thought that "people must first strive to obtain a parliament and leave until later the discussion of how the parliament will work. If we talk now about details there will be no agreement, since each association had its own point of view".²⁶⁸ In the end, following robust discussion, the 1941 MIAI conference confirmed its earlier support for a full parliament based on Islamic principles, and left the MIAI council to draft a document on how such a parliament might operate.²⁶⁹

By contrast, the PII, maintaining a cooperationist stance as circumstances dictated, "struggling by means of the ideologies of Islam and nationalism",²⁷⁰ and in ever deepening competition with PSII (whose membership was estimated by the government at around only 12,000 members by the end of 1940),²⁷¹ took a more emphatic and unqualified position on Muslim political supremacy.²⁷² That approach may in part have been a component of PII's gathering attempts to usurp PSII dominance within the MIAI.²⁷³ Other members groups within MIAI were concerned that MIAI had overstepped its formal apolitical stance.²⁷⁴ That issue was addressed at a June 1941 MIAI meeting, where Wondoamiseno remarked that MIAI had not changed its position, "which remains based on Islamism". In Islam, he explained, there were provisions relating to every realm, relating both to the present world and to the world hereafter: "Islam gives rules relating to politics, education, marriage, inheritance, trade, war, and so on. It is therefore inaccurate to assert that Islam provides rules only for serving God People should not be puzzled that a Muslim organisation from time to time moves into the political sphere".²⁷⁵

In the end, though, PSII's efforts to maintain good relations with Gapi came to nothing. Gapi's attempt in the Majelis Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People's Council - MRI), a kind of proto-Indonesian parliament formed in September 1941 to develop a democratic front with the Dutch in the event of war in the Pacific, was too much for PSII to bear, and resulted in fierce attacks on those nationalist leaders, Sartono and Sukarjo, who, in the eyes of PSII leaders, had exceeded their authority in asserting their loyalty to the colonial government.²⁷⁶ Gapi's refusal to reconsider its position re-

sulted in the PSII—perhaps more indifferent than Westernised secular intellectuals to the challenge of fascism and disappointed at the small fruits of its collaboration—leaving Gapi and, indeed, the MRI, in December 1941. The MIAI and PII supported PSII's position, but did not take their leave. The break was only sharpened when the government invited the MRI for talks, at which Islamist politicians were not represented.²⁷⁷ These feelings of disenchantment, coupled with the anticipation of a Japanese victory, pushed the PSII back to its old non-cooperative position with regard to the Dutch.²⁷⁸

Nonetheless, the most striking aspect of Islamist political action towards the end of the 1930s was its vigorous embrace of mainstream politics as a means of advancing its interests. The Dutch themselves were at least superficially conscious of this turn, noting that "religious consciousness has constantly strongly expanded in recent years" and "the continuing struggle against statements in word and in writing which are deemed insulting to Islam".²⁷⁹ The Dutch thought that the Muslim community had gained in self-confidence, that Muslims had become "more aggressive", and more "intolerant through an increasing sense of identity in both religious and political spheres".²⁸⁰ But how far had Islamism come both in defining its core values and in pressing them politically?

The meaning and limits of Islamism

Dutch scepticism about the religious core of Islamist politics ("religious slogans ... are nothing other than means to move towards the goal: bringing down Dutch authority")²⁸¹ seriously underestimated the significance of a distinctive, carefully cultivated Islamic identity and discourse and a growing Islamist conviction. Since the PSII had first specifically adopted Islamism in the early and mid-1920s, some slow progress had been made in clarifying just what the concept meant and what its implications might be. All Islamists agreed that Islam should function as a centrally determining aspect of the state apparatus. For the Sumatran PSII leader Datuk Singo Mangkuto, "the Islamic religion is the religion of Allah. For this reason, no single temporal power can dominate it".²⁸² The blunt fundamentalist *kaum muda* figure Haji Rasul—"a passionate, puritanical teacher"²⁸³—saw his ideal society as one in which human law was wholly based upon and was consonant with the law of God, and which drew its legitimacy from that fact, even though he recognised the political reality of Dutch dominance and sought as best he could

to inject an Islamic sensibility into political discourse.²⁸⁴ Less nuanced was the view of the Persis figure Sabirin, who thought that Muslims were "forbidden to honor 'homeland' and flag forbidden to follow a nationalist cause"²⁸⁵ The PSII's Sangaji saw the task in terms of the establishment "of a society regulated by the will of God".²⁸⁶ Penyadar stated in its principles that "matters concerning society and the state, as well as the place and the lives of each individual therein, should be regulated in accordance with the principles and main features in the laws and prescriptions of the Islamic religion and avoiding all things which contravene them".²⁸⁷ That was because "the [Muslim] religious system is the best system for the general wellbeing".²⁸⁸ For Cokroaminoto, "the teachings of the Qur'an sufficiently cover everything relating to man's needs and requirements, in other words, they are sufficient to provide the basis for our actions."²⁸⁹ Further, "the Qur'an and hadith are sufficient to be used as the basis or compass for all laws which we need to make, so that we can lead the kingdom (state) to the goal: to make every person as happy as possible in himself, and to make each person to the fullest extent possible useful to the community as a whole and for all of humankind by means of developing physical skills and spiritual good works".²⁹⁰ Already in 1931, noted Wondoamiseno, the PSII congress had refined and clarified its program "so as to create a P.S.I.I. ideal or ideology in shaping an Islamic State in accord with the teachings of the Prophet and according to the orders of God contained in the Qur'an".²⁹¹ According to the PII's Wali Al-Fatah, "there are sufficient regulations in Islam which provide for all the needs of society, the highest as well as the lowest".²⁹²

To achieve the desired goal Islamist political parties sought to deepen Islam's hold on Indonesian society. For Cokroaminoto, PSII's aim was "to put Islam into effect as widely and as fully as possible, so that we can obtain a genuine World of Islam".²⁹³ For Hassan, it was the duty of Muslims to "emphasise Islam-ness in a country governed by foreigners in order to obtain the broadest freedom, so to be able to implement Islamic laws".²⁹⁴

How that might be achieved was a matter of considerable and sometimes angry dispute. Some Muslims like Mas Mansur emphasised the need for personal devotion and attachment to Islamic fundamentals as the means for emancipation, self-improvement and self-strengthening.²⁹⁵ His organisation, Muhammadiyah, did not see a necessary connection between Muslim political dominance and the establishment of an Islamic state; rather, it sought the develop-

ment of an Islamic society, a society in which Muslim precepts and values were dominant and would as a matter of course eventually guide state policy and the making of laws. Thereby an Islamic state would inevitably develop.²⁹⁶ Fachruddin al-Kahiri was similarly focussed on religious seriousness as the means to freedom: "so long as the Muslims of Indonesia consider Indonesian freedom as more important than the freedom of all Muslims, consider politics as more important than worship exchange obedience to the religious scholar for obedience to the [national] leader consider emotions more important than examination of substance and consider the enemies endangering Indonesian freedom more important than the enemies who endanger Islam so long will Indonesian freedom remain only a phrase on the lips".²⁹⁷ But for others like Sukiman, the explicit practice of politics was deeply important in their mission; it was not enough to pray and to perform good works, one had actively to participate in politics and to seek the political ends which the full message and implementation of Islam demanded. To Sukiman, Muslims bore responsibility to take an active part in the work of striving "for the progress of Indonesia and its people", and he lamented their characteristic political passivity and political ignorance which, he claimed, had led to their weakened condition.²⁹⁸ Similarly, in order to realise his aim of establishing a "United Islamic Community", Cokroaminoto spoke of the necessity first of creating "a Group (Party) which is not continually discordant and divided".²⁹⁹ The PSII program emphasised the obligation of political activity, with its "goal of obtaining the freedom of Muslims" and the creation of "a favourable and secure Muslim kingdom in Indonesia".³⁰⁰

The gradual and sometimes reluctant embrace by Islamist organisations of the idea of Indonesia had become, for the most part, a thing of the past. By the late 1920s, it had become evident to most Islamists that the fate of Islam was now inextricably tied to Indonesia's destiny; the key to achieving their goals was Indonesian independence, which would truly free all the people from slavery of every kind—as long as that freedom was based upon Islam.³⁰¹ *Pembela Islam* argued that "national freedom is what the Islam-movement needs more than anything else".³⁰² Kartosuwiryo thought in 1932, that "as long as the Netherlands government existed, people cannot follow the prescriptions of Islam".³⁰³ In that sense, the 1930s had brought a significant clarification from an earlier position which had given pride of place to a notional Islamic community rather than a spe-

cific national identity. One Muslim, perplexed that "in the midst of this holy war [against colonialism] a group of *'ulamā'* have risen up forbidding patriotism and making war on patriots in the name of the Islamic religion and its doctrines",³⁰⁴ even sought the opinion of the revered Rashid Rida. He responded that "the type of patriotism that should adorn a Muslim youth is that he be a good example of the people of the homeland, no matter what their religious affiliation, cooperating with them in every legitimate action for independence", while reminding him that "he is a member of a body greater than his people, and his personal homeland is part of the homeland of his religious community. He must be intent on making the progress of the part a means for the progress of the whole".³⁰⁵ The old tension between *ummat* and nation was ebbing, if not completely erased. Both NU and Muhammadiyah judged that participation in war to defend the Dutch-ruled Indies could not be countenanced as holy war in defence of Islam.³⁰⁶ In similar vein, the MIAI ruled that Muslim Indonesians should not provide blood transfusions for soldiers wounded in such a war.³⁰⁷

Islamists remained generally uncertain and confused about how independence, once obtained, might be organised. Cokroaminoto, according to Wondoamiseno, had been convinced that "our State and nation will be unable to achieve a just and prosperous life, a secure and peaceful society while social justice according to Islamic teachings are not yet in force or implemented to become law in our state, even if we are independent."³⁰⁸ But most Islamist organisations recognised the need for freedom of religious practice. Penyadar argued that since faith was a gift from God, it was not something that could be forced. Accordingly, "in society and the regulations of the state, every person's freedom of religion must be acknowledged, as long as thereby no intrusion is made on the freedom of others or the general good customs or the order and the peace of the country".³⁰⁹ That freedom, however, carried with it an obligation for Muslims to form organisations "to expand knowledge and science and for the regulation of social life, such as this is desired by Islam for all the people in the whole world".³¹⁰ More broadly, PSII proclaimed an essential equality in humankind "in society and in law",³¹¹ which included an acknowledgement of the equal value of believers, whether male or female,³¹² and equality of rights in marriage.³¹³ That view, however, did not prevent PSII from threatening that, upon independence, the Dutch, together with Chinese and Arabs, would be expatriated.³¹⁴ PII's attitude to non-Muslims was negotiable, as Zainal

Abidin Ahmad explained: "Provided they and their organisations do no damage to the interests of Islam and the Islamic community, our attitude towards them is naturally good. Where that is possible, we work together with them. But if they harm those interests, then they become our unconditional enemies and they will encounter positive and serious opposition".³¹⁵ But Ahmad Hassan was unsympathetic to non-Muslim Indonesians who wanted a neutral basis for the state: "Is it proper that because of 10% of the population, we wipe out the interests of 90% of the population?"³¹⁶

There was uncertainty as well about the political machinery and policies of an independent Indonesian Islamic state. While Natsir remained agnostic about the particular political form that Islamism might inhabit, there was broad general attachment to the notion of democracy as an integral aspect of Islam.³¹⁷ Cokroaminoto thought that "the free country (Indonesia) which PSII is attempting to bring about must be democratic, as is stated in the Qur'an".³¹⁸ Indeed, Cokroaminoto saw the referendum as a tool for parliament to keep the will of the people at the forefront, "to strengthen the influence of the People on the parliament, so that parliament continually develops in response to the will of the People".³¹⁹ The Perserikatan Ulama (Ulamas' Association) based its call for a parliament on Qur'anic teaching.³²⁰ MIAI, as we have seen, supported the Gapi move for a responsible parliament.³²¹ Connecting democracy with anti-colonialism, Abikusno remarked in 1941, that "the striving of democracy towards an international community of free peoples can be achieved only by the abolition of colonial relationships".³²² Penyadar claimed "Islam and democracy" as its basis,³²³ and Salim spoke of the need for local grassroots parliaments.³²⁴ But a lack of clarity and precision about how a democratic system and popular sovereignty might accommodate the normative demands of Islam endured.³²⁵ There was uncertainty about the role an Indonesian government might play in promoting Islam, just as there were differences about how Islamic fundamentals might be deployed in such a state. Muhammadiyah, for example, saw Islam as providing a broad guide to the making of law, and "rejected formal jurisprudential law codes as proposed by the traditionalist Muslims".³²⁶ There was more clarity on the future nature of the economy. Islamism generally opposed the capitalist system. According to Cokroaminoto, "the wickedness of capitalism which acts violently and powerfully in our Land has clearly been the cause of our nation losing its freedom, falling into the humiliation of 'national slavery' and the humiliation of 'the slavery of poverty'".³²⁷

Salvation was a function of the creation of a government-sponsored economy, "fully supervised by the People, the whole based upon the foundation of Islam".³²⁸

Conclusion

Through the decade or so immediately before the outbreak of World War II, Indonesian Islamism endured a tumultuous period, characterised by fierce internal competition over strategy and followings, as well as the manifestation and exacerbation of deep suspicion and discord between Islamism's view of the political future and that of the secularist champions of the idea of Indonesia. "There could never be a political stream as powerful and vehement as a politico-Islamic movement"; remarked one Indonesian in 1939.³²⁹ True in theory, perhaps, but in the circumstances of Indonesia in the late colonial period, Islamism was characterised more by weakness than strength. It struggled to accommodate the attraction of the idea of Indonesia with its pan-Islamic imaginings, but found itself compelled to attempt the task in order to retain its relevance. It fought unrelentingly against what it often saw as nationalists' blasphemous privileging of the Indonesian nation over Islam. It was racked by division, notably when the PSII's hijrah policy and a more general reluctance to cooperate with other political groups caused the departure of strong and able leaders like Sukiman and Salim.

There had been some advance, despite Islamism's division and the fact that it remained on the back foot in relation to the efforts of the secular nationalists (themselves sorely weakened by Dutch repression). In the last part of the 1930s, most Islamists had abandoned the pretensions to exclusivity which had so deeply wounded their capacity to make a political mark, and began a process of collaboration with other political forces which aimed to accelerate the process of achieving Indonesia's freedom.

Overall, however, Islamism remained marginalised within the general and dominant discourse of nation. That outcome was a result of the fact that Islamism could find no meaningful compromise with the proponents of the simple idea of Indonesia. It could agree that Indonesia must be free from colonial domination, but Islamism's sense of what that might mean remained a central source of disputation with the nationalists. Islamism sought a free Indonesia in which Islam would be the political and legal compass; that central fact found no sympathy with and often fierce opposition from those

who sought to shape a new Indonesia according to their own non-Islamic agendas.

It could have been different. The Islamist message was heavily tinged with religious idealism. Cokroaminoto remarked that "we believe with all our being in the establishment of a Kingdom of Islam in Indonesia, where our community can live in happiness and glory".³³⁰ As Taufik Abdullah has suggested, that idealism distracted Islamists from the difficult task of negotiating a more pragmatic domain for Islam in a new Indonesia.³³¹ Islamists found it impossible to temper their moral and political demands to what might have been more generally acceptable and achievable in a society renowned for its internal social and religious differences. A major problem throughout was the fact that Islamism's major political vehicle, the PSII, spent much of the decade in internal rancour because it adopted a politics of distance from both government and other political actors that left it estranged from the demands of political combat and thus politically impoverished. An earlier and more enthusiastic engagement with the idea of Indonesia and its proponents might have forced Islamism not to seek solace in stubborn defensiveness but to strive for a form of pragmatic compromise with the secular nationalists. That, of course, would have required thoughtful, courageous and more detailed and expansive analysis of the political implications of Islamism, and how they might better be accommodated in an imagined nation inhabited by different peoples of different systems of belief.

That did not happen. When the Japanese arrived in Java early in 1942, Islamism was internally more unified and purposeful than it had been a decade before. But it was no more capable of managing its differences with its political competitors than it had ever been, and no further advanced in the search for a practical solution to the problem of how Islam might best be manifested in the political institutions of an independent Indonesia in ways that did not invite contestation from other Indonesians. Accordingly, the Islamist understanding of Indonesia remained peripheral to the "normal" practice of late colonial-era politics, and consequently disregarded as a serious contribution to politics. An opportunity, never to appear again in quite this form, had been lost.

Endnotes

- * The research in this article was funded by a grant from the Australian Research Council. I am grateful to John Butcher for his helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. *Swara Publik*, 29 September 1930, *Overzicht van de Inlandsche en Maleisch-Chineesche pers* [IPO] 41/1930, p. 80.
 2. Acting Advisor for Native Affairs [ANA] (E. Gobée) to Governor-General [GG], 2 July 1927, Archive Ministerie van Koloniën [AMK], Mailrapport [MR] 830*/1927, National Archive, The Hague [NA]. See also Harry A. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Harry A. Poeze (ed.), *Politiek-politionele overzichten van Nederlandsch-Indië* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982, Dordrecht: Foris, 1983, 1988; Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 1994) [PPO], vol. 2, pp. xxvii, xxxi; "Politiek Politioneel Overzicht" [PPO] March 1929, PPO July 1929, PPO December 1929, PPO January 1930, PPO July 1930, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 2, pp. 72, 164, 275, 292, 408; "Verslag van de Conferentie met de Hoofden van Inlandsch Bestuur in de Provincie Oost-Java gehouden op dinsdag, 5 mei 1931, in het Kunstkringgebouw te Soerabaja", AMK, MR 745*/1931, NA; Charles O. van der Plas, *Nationalism in the Netherlands Indies* (n.p.: Netherlands-Netherlands Indies Council/Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942), p. 7.
 3. Gobée to GG, 2 July 1927; Taufik Abdullah, *Schools and politics: the kaum muda movement in West Sumatra (1927-1933)* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1971), p. 122.
 4. See R.E. Elson, *The idea of Indonesia: a history* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 13-47.
 5. *Warna Warta* [n.d.], IPO 25/1928, p. 587.
 6. *Soeloeh Rajat Indonesia*, 15 February 1928, IPO 8/1928, p. 348.
 7. *Darmo Kondo*, 2-7 July 1928, IPO 23/1928, p. 81.
 8. Sabirin, *Fadjar Asia*, 8 November 1928, IPO 46/1928, p. 214.
 9. J.Th. Petrus Blumberger, *De nationalistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1987 [1931]), p. 326. See also "Nota der algemene secretarie inzake de Partij Sarekat Islam" [September 1927], in R.C. Kwantes (ed.), *De ontwikkeling van de nationalistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, vol. 3 (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1978), pp. 590-91, 605.
 10. Anon., "Islam kena boycot", *Pembela Islam* 1 (1929), p. 5.
 11. *Ibid.*, p. 10. See also Comité dan Redactie Pembela Islam, "Pendirian 'Pembela Islam'", *Pembela Islam* 10 (1930), pp. 15-16, and Sukiman, "Tentangn terhadap agama Islam" [1930], in Amir Hamzah Wirjosukarto (ed.), *Wawasan politik seorang Muslim patriot Dr Soekiman Wirjosandjojo (1998-1974): kumpulan karangan* (Malang: Yayasan Pusat Pengkajian, Latihan dan Pengembangan Masyarakat, 1984?), pp. 15-22.
 12. *Fadjar Asia*, 3 January 1929, IPO 2/1929, p. 47.
 13. *Pembela Islam* 3 (1929), IPO 51/1929, p. 351.
 14. PPO November 1929, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 2, pp. 250-51; John Ingleson, *Road to exile: the Indonesian nationalist movement 1927-1934* (Singapore: Heinemann, 1979), p. 68.
 15. Hadji Agoes Salim, "De Perhimpoeaan Indonesia en de Indonesisch-nationalistische beweging", *De Socialist*, 19 October 1929 [typed pamphlet, KITLV, Leiden], p. 2.

16. *Fadjar Asia*, 17 July 1919, quoted in Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran politik proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia S.M. Kartosoewirjo: fakta dan data sejarah Darul Islam* (Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1999), p. 38.
17. *Pembela Islam* 12 (1930), *IPO* 38/1930, p. 441.
18. Petrus Blumberger, *De nationalistische beweging*, p. 325.
19. Ingleson, *Road to exile*, p. 32.
20. *Fadjar Asia*, 9 April 1928, *IPO* 15/1928, p. 72; Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, p. 142; PPO January-February 1933, in Pocze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, p. 262.
21. See, e.g., S., "Kebangsaan", *Pembela Islam* 12 (1930), pp. 1-3.
22. See, e.g., F., "Sedikit pemandangan boeat T.M.O.", *Pembela Islam* 12 (1930), pp. 34-36; *Pembela Islam* 19 (1931), *IPO* 14/1931, p. 2.
23. "Congres P.S.I., M.O.I., en S.I.A.P. van 16 tot 23 januari 1929 te Batavia", AMK, MR 334*/1929, NA.
24. *Al Noer*, November-December 1928, *IPO* 4/1929, p. 97.
25. "Congres P.S.I., M.O.I., en S.I.A.P."
26. *IPO* 18/1932, p. 267.
27. *Het Licht*, March 1930, *IPO* 13/1930, p. 462.
28. "Kort verslag van de openbare vergadering van den 'Jong Islamieten Bond' afd. Batavia op zondag 23 October 1932 in de 'Gedoeng Nasional Indonesia' (Gang Kenari)", AMK, MR 1189*/1932, NA.
29. PPO August 1929, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 2, pp. 184-85.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 185. For a similar view expressed by the head of the PSI scout association, see *Fadjar Asia*, 30 August 1928, *IPO* 36/1928, p. 475.
31. PPO October 1929, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 2, pp. 231-32.
32. "Congres P.S.I., M.O.I., en S.I.A.P."
33. PPO March 1931, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, p. 47.
34. PPO August 1929, p. 186.
35. "Verslag van het XVIde Congres van de P.S.I.I., gehouden van den 24sten tot den 27sten januari 1930 in de Adhidharmoschool, Bintaranlor, Jogjakarta", AMK, MR 230*/1930, NA.
36. Comité dan Redactie Pembela Islam, "Pendirian 'Pembela Islam'", *Pembela Islam* 10 (1930), p. 15.
37. PPO January 1929, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 2, p. 13. Ironically, PSI had adopted its hijrah policy in response to the failure of the government to appoint Cokroaminoto to a Volksraad (People's Council) seat.
38. PPO December 1929, p. 275.
39. PPO September 1929, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 2, p. 211.
40. PPO January 1930, pp. 295-96.
41. H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, *Tafsir program azas dan program teudhim Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia* [1931], in Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto hidup dan perjuangannya*, vol. 2 (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952), pp. 24. See also p. 31.
42. Sukiman in "Verslag van het XVIde Congres van de P.S.I.I."
43. PPO January 1929, PPO March 1929, PPO August 1929, pp. 2, 65, 178.
44. Bernhard Dahm, *Sukarno and the struggle for Indonesian independence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 82.
45. *Bintang Timoer*, 7 January 1931, *IPO* 2/1931, p. 57.
46. *Pembela Islam* 4 (1930), *IPO* 5/1930, p. 135. "Mr" was the title carried by Western-educated lawyers.
47. At Sukarno's trial in 1930, the prosecution introduced a series of letters written by Cipto Mangunkusumo to Sukarno in 1928, warning him that the PSI would attempt to take over the PPPKI with catastrophic consequences for the movement as a whole (Attorney-General to GG, 17 September 1932,

- in Kwantes (ed.), *De ontwikkeling*, vol. 3 (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhof/Bouma's Boekhuis, 1981), pp. 659-60).
48. PPO January 1929, PPO December 1929, PPO January 1930, pp. 13, 265, 286-87; Nan Sing, 26 September 1930, *IPO* 41/1930, pp. 77-82. See also Sangaji's comments in "Verslag van een openbare vergadering der Partij Sarekat Islam Indonesia gehouden te Batavia op den 28sten december 1930", AMK, MR 327*/1931, NA.
 49. PPO January 1930, p. 288.
 50. PPO July 1931, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, p. 86.
 51. *Sedio Tomo*, 26-27 February 1931, *IPO* 10/1931, p. 417.
 52. *Pertjatoeran*, 12 March 1931, *IPO* 13/1931, p. 531.
 53. PPO July 1930, p. 405; Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 2, p. xxx. See "Ma'loemat Comité Oemmat Islam Soerabaja, kepada segenap Oemmat Islam di Indonesia", *Pembela Islam* 12 (1930), pp. 38-40.
 54. PPO August-September 1930, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 2, p. 420-22; Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, p. 156.
 55. *Lasjkar*, September 1930, *IPO* 51/1930, p. 490.
 56. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 2, pp. xxii-xxiii; PPO January 1930, PPO August-September 1930, PPO October 1930, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 2, pp. 288-89, 422-23, 439. See also 't Bestuur M.P.I., "Ma'loemat Madjelis Permoesjawaratan Islam (M.P.I.) Soerabaja", *Pembela Islam* 14 (1930), pp. 4-6.
 57. PPO March 1931, p. 45.
 58. "Bestuurs- en Regentenconferenties 1930. Overzicht van den inwendigen politieken toestand sedert januari 1929, afgesloten in januari 1930", AMK, MR 155*/1930, NA; Sukarno, in *Warna Warta*, *IPO* 25/1929.
 59. PPO April 1931, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, pp. 55-56.
 60. PPO March 1931, p. 41.
 61. *Sin Tit Po*, 30 December 1930, *IPO* 2/1931, p. 70.
 62. *Soeloeh Rajat Indonesia*, 7 January 1931, *IPO* 3/1931, p. 115.
 63. PPO October 1930, p. 440; see also Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 2, p. xxxi; H. Aboebakar, *Sedjarah hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim dan karangan tersiar* (Jakarta: Panitia Buku Peringatan Alm. K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim, 1957), p. 221.
 64. NU did not attend the AI-Islam congress since it was alienated by PSII attacks on government and religious officials, particularly in the wake of the naming of a Christian to the position of Regent (PPO April 1931, p. 61).
 65. PPO May-June 1931, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, p. 72; "De Islam in actie", *IPO* 32/1931, pp. 280-83; Aboebakar, *Sedjarah*, pp. 310-11; Ismatu Ropi, "Depicting the other faith: a bibliographical survey of Indonesian Muslim polemics on Christianity", *Studia Islamika* 6, 1 (1999), p. 88-90.
 66. PPO May-June 1931, p. 73. See also *Pembela Islam* (October) 1931, *IPO* 47/1931, pp. 299-300.
 67. PPO May-June 1931, p. 73. That latter sense was reflected in criticism of the actions of Italian troops against Tripoli Muslims (pp. 72, 107).
 68. PPO April-May 1932, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, p. 188.
 69. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, p. xxxix.
 70. Aboebakar, *Sedjarah*, p. 311.
 71. Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, pp. 110, 136.
 72. In November 1928 there were 39 Thawalib schools educating around 17,000 students ("Gegevens betreffende de godsdienstige stroomingen

- in het gewest Sumatra's Westkust" [by Ch. O. van der Plas], AMK, MR 567*/1929, NA).
73. Acting ANA (E. Gobée) to GG, 11 July 1930, AMK, 698*/1930, NA.
 74. PPO July 1930, p. 409. See also Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, p. 130.
 75. Aboebakar, *Sedjarah*, p. 220. See also Deliar Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 155.
 76. "Rapport over het onderwijs aan godsdienstschoolen, in verband met de ontdekkingen tijdens de huiszoekingen in september 1933", AMK, MR 1518*/1933, V 19 April 1934/V9, NA.
 77. Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, sp. 163.
 78. "Nota over de godsdienstig-politieke beweging ter Sumatra's Westkust" [3 June 1929], AMK, MR 1518*/1933, V 19 April 1934/V9, NA.
 79. Fauzan Saleh, *Modern trends in Islamic theological discourse in 20th century Indonesia: a critical study* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 137; Syafiq Mughni, "Warisan A. Hassan dalam arus pemikiran Islam di Indonesia", in H. Endang Saifuddin Anshari and Amien Rais (eds), *Pak Natsir 80 tahun: buku kedua: penghargaan dan penghormatan generasi muda* (Jakarta: Media Da'wah, 1988), pp. 169, 172; Tamar Djaja, *Riwayat hidup A. Hassan* (Jakarta: Mutiara, 1980), pp. 19-29; G.F. Pijper, *Studijn over de geschiedenis van de Islam in Indonesia 1900-1950* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977), pp. 120-22.
 80. A. Jainuri, *Muhammadiyah: gerakan reformasi Islam di Jawa pada awal abad kedua puluh* (Surabaya: PT Bina Ilmu, 1981), pp. 81-83; Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 85; Howard M. Federspiel, *Islam and ideology in the emerging Indonesian state: the Persatuan Islam (PERISIS), 1923 to 1957* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p.viii.
 81. Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, pp. 147-49.
 82. *Ibid.*, p. 130, 131, 154, 157
 83. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 158.
 84. PPO August-September 1930, p. 428.
 85. Quoted in Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, p. 131.
 86. Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, pp. 146-47, 158.
 87. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 155.
 88. Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 38.
 89. They were, perhaps, concerned as well that the emphasis on nation might fuel the sense of Minangkabau group longing which included an attachment to adat (Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, pp. 157, 160).
 90. Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, pp. 134-35, 158; Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 264.
 91. Quoted in Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, p. 159.
 92. *Semangat I*, c. 1932, quoted in Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 263.
 93. Mukhtar Lutfi, "A. Hassan dan Permi", in Djaja, *Riwayat hidup A. Hassan*, p. 61.
 94. Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, pp. 160-61.
 95. *Semangat I*, c. 1932, quoted in Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 263.
 96. Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 155; Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, p. 167.
 97. Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, p. 172.
 98. Quoted in Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, pp. 161-62

99. Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, p. 163; Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 4, p. xli.
100. GG to MvK, 29 August 1933, AMK, V 19 October 1933/O24, NA.
101. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, pp. xli-xlii. See also Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 31.
102. See, inter alia, AMK, MR 1451*/1933 and MR 861*/1934, NA.
103. GG to MvK, 29 August 1933; *IPO* 20/1936, pp. 318-19; *IPO* 21/1936, pp. 326-28; Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, p. 224; Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, pp. 50-52; 172; Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 4, p. xli.
104. "Verslag van het Congres van den Jong-Islamieten Bond, gehouden te Jogjakarta, op 25 en 26 december 1925", AMK, MR 76*/1926, NA; Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, p. xlvi.
105. Kasman Singodimejo remarked that the JIB was not interested in questions of cooperation and non-cooperation, and members were free to join any political organisation they chose (PPO June-July 1933, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, p. 302).
106. Surowiyono at the December JIB congress, PPO December 1929, p. 276. See also Sidi Mawardi, *Bibit persetujuan: nasionalis Islam versus nasionalis sekuler: pengalaman Jong Islamieten Bond 1925-1942* (Jakarta: Yayasan Studi Perkotan, 2000), pp. 6-7.
107. Mohamad Roem, "Haji Agus Salim", in Hazil Tanzil (ed.), *Seratus tahun Haji Agus Salim* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan: 1996 [1984]), p. 188.
108. Syam, quoted in "Verslag van het Congres van den Jong-Islamieten Bond".
109. Surowiyono at the December JIB congress, paraphrased in PPO December 1929, p. 276. See also "Jong Islamieten Bond" [January 1925, by R. Kern], AMK 198*/1925, NA; Roem, "Haji Agus Salim", p. 187.
110. Quoted in ANA to GG, 13 February 1925, AMK, MR 198*/1925, NA.
111. Sutiyono at the December 1929 JIB congress, paraphrased in PPO December 1929, pp. 276-77.
112. Kasman Singodimejo at the December 1930 JOB congress, paraphrased in PPO January 1931, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, p. 12.
113. Kasman Singodimejo, paraphrased in "Kort verslag van de openbare vergadering van den 'Jong Islamieten Bond' afd. Batavia". See also Mawardi, *Bibit*, pp. 108-114.
114. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 2, p. xxxiii.
115. Roem, "Haji Agus Salim", p. 187; Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, pp. 265.
116. Sam, quoted in "Verslag van het Congres van den Jong-Islamieten Bond".
117. Taufik Abdullah et al., *Sejarah ummat Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta: Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 1991), p. 249; Ridwan Saidi, "The organizations of young Moslem intellectuals past and present", *Mizan* 2, 1 (1985), p. 36.
118. PNI commissioner Raharjo in September 1930, PPO September 1929, p. 208.
119. *Ibid.*
120. Alam Siregar, *IPO* 36/1932, p. 170.
121. PPO May 1929, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 2, p. 119.
122. Quoted in Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, pp. 259-60. See also Federspiel, *Islam and ideology*, p. ix.

123. Quoted in Pijper, *Studiën*, p. 125. For a more elaborate discussion of the matter, see A. Hassan, *Islam dan kebangsaan* (Bangil: Lajnah Penerbitan Pesantren Persis Bangil, 1984 [1941]), p. 37-39.
124. *Suara Muslimin* 2-3 (1932), quoted in Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 264.
125. Aboebakar, *Sedjarah*, p. 217; Yuzril Ihza, "Combining activism and intellectualism: the biography of Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993)", *Studia Islamika* 2, 1 (1995), p. 117.
126. Natsir, *Pembela Islam* 36 (1931), quoted in Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 260.
127. Natsir, *Pembela Islam* 43 (1932), quoted in Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 262.
128. Natsir, *Pembela Islam* 36 (1931), quoted in Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, pp. 260-61.
129. Natsir, *Pembela Islam* 41 (1932), quoted in Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 261.
130. Natsir, *Pembela Islam* 43 (1932), quoted in Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 262.
131. Natsir, *Pembela Islam* 35 (1931), quoted in Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, pp. 264-65.
132. Natsir, *Pembela Islam* 43 (1932), quoted in Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 263.
133. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, p. xli.
134. Iskaq, in *PPO* August 1932, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, pp. 205-06.
135. "Rede uitgesproken door Ir. Sukarno op het eerst Indonesia Raja congres" [January 1932], AMK, MR 100^x/1932, NA.
136. Dahm, *Sukarno*, pp. 166, 173.
137. See, for example, his letter of 22 April 1936, in Sukarno, *Dibawah bendera revolusi*, vol. 1 (3rd pr. Jakarta: Panitia Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1964), pp. 333-35.
138. Sukarno, "Me-'muda'-kan pengertian Islam" [1940], in Sukarno, *Dibawah bendera revolusi*, vol. 1, pp. 377-78.
139. Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the state in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), pp. 26-27.
140. "Saja kurang dinamis" [1940], in Sukarno, *Dibawah bendera revolusi*, vol. 1, p. 453.
141. Dahm, *Sukarno*, p. 183.
142. "Saja kurang dinamis", p. 452. [emphasis in original]
143. "Me-'mudah'-kan pengertian Islam" [1940], in Sukarno, *Dibawah bendera revolusi*, vol. 1, pp. 398.
144. "Saja kurang dinamis", p. 454.
145. M Natsir, "Islam dan kebudayaan" [1936], in *Capita selecta* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1954), p. 21.
146. Natsir, "Arti agama dalam negara", in *M. Natsir versus Sukarno: persatuan agama dengan negara* (Padang: Yayasan Pendidikan Islam Padang, 1968), pp. 7-8, 14-15.
147. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
148. Natsir, "Dualisme dalam Cacsaro-Papisme", in *M. Natsir versus Sukarno*, p. 36.
149. Natsir, "Mungkinlah Quran mengatur negara?", in *M. Natsir versus Sukarno*, pp. 21-22.
150. Natsir, "Islam 'demokrasi'?", in *M. Natsir versus Sukarno*, p. 27.

151. Natsir, "Dualisme", p. 36. Hassan was of a similar view (*Pemerintahan tjara Islam* (Malang: Toko Timoer, 1936), p. 13).
152. Natsir, "Menasih Islam bersinggasana dalam kalbu", in *M. Natsir versus Sukarno*, p. 43.
153. Natsir, "Berhakim kepada sedjarah", in *M. Natsir versus Sukarno*, p. 77.
154. PPO March 1933, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, p. 268.
155. *Ibid.*
156. PPO April 1933, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, p. 281. See also *IPO* 15/1933, pp. 232-34.
157. Amelz, *Tjokroaminto*, vol. 2, p. 75.
158. PPO August-September 1934, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, p. 398; "Nota over Islamietische reacties in Nederlandsch-Indië gedurende de laatste jaren", AMK, MR 821*/1938, V30-9-1938-15, NA; *IPO* 33/1934, p. 518; *IPO* 36/934, p. 550.
159. "Nota over Islamietische reacties".
160. *Ibid.*; *Adil*, 11 November 1937, *IPO* 47/1937, pp. 771-71; *IPO* 52/1937, pp. 845-50; Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 245.
161. *Adil*, 5 September 1934, *IPO* 36/1934, p. 551.
162. "Verslag van de 2e al-Islam congres in de maand april 1932 te Malang gehouden" [2 May 1932, by E. Gobée], AMK, MR 472*/1932, NA.
163. PPO January 1930, pp. 291-92; PPO March 1931, p. 46.
164. Soekiman Wirjosandjojo, *Peranan ummat Islam Indonesia* (n.p.: n.p., 195?), p. 6.
165. PPO January-February 1933, pp. 258-59; Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, pp. xxxix-xl, xlviii-xlix; "Nota van den Regent van Malang", AMK, MR 954*/1936, NA; *IPO* 10/1933, p. 145-46; *IPO* 11/1933, pp. 161-63; *IPO* 13/1933, p. 204, *IPO* 18/1933, pp. 280-87; Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, pp. 312-13.
166. *IPO* 12/1933, p. 183.
167. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
168. *Al-Wafid*, September-October 1933, *IPO* 41/1933, p. 644.
169. PPO December 1933, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, p. 348.
170. *Sikap*, 28 August 1933, *IPO* 35/1933, p. 545; *Oetoesan Indonesia* [n.d.], *IPO* 23/1935, pp. 359-60.
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172. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, p. xl; Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, p. 184; Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, pp. 157-58; PPO June-July 1933, pp. 301-02.
173. PPO April 1933, p. 281.
174. *Soeara Oemoem*, 31 May 1935, *IPO* 23/1935, pp. 356-59.
175. ANA (G.F. Pijper) to GG, 2 November 1938, AMK, MR 1056*/1938, V 23 November 1938/K38, NA.
176. *Pemandangan* 13 July 1936, *IPO* 29/1936, pp. 449-52; Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 145.
177. *Pemandangan*, 30-31 October 1934, *IPO* 43/1934, p. 677-78; *Pemandangan* 30 November 1934, *IPO* 48/1934, pp. 764-65.
178. *Mata Hari*, 27 May 1937, *IPO* 23/1937, p. 373.
179. PPO January 1930, pp. 294-95.
180. PPO April-May 1935, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 4, p. 17; *Mata Hari*, 1 May 1937, *IPO* 20/1937, pp. 318-20; Hadji A. Salim, *Perggerakan politik di Indonesia: Penjadar - Volksraad - Konsentrasi* (Bangkalan: Locaal Comité

- Pergerakan Penjadar Bangkalan, 1939), p. 32; Suradi, *Haji Agus Salim dan konflik politik dalam Sarekat Islam* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1997), pp. 62-63; Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 3, p. xl.
181. *Sinar Padoendan*, 18 August 1936, *IPO* 34/1936, pp. 533-34.
 182. Salim, *Pergerakan politik*, p. 11.
 183. PSII press communique, 2 December 1936, *IPO* 49/1936, p. 772.
 184. *Pemandangan*, 4 December 1936, *IPO* 50/1936, p. 791.
 185. PPO June-July 1936, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 4, p. 112.
 186. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 4, p. xxxvi.
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 191. ANA to GG, 2 November 1938.
 192. *Ibid.*
 193. Salim's paraphrased speech in "Kort verslag van het Eerste Congres van de 'Pergerakan Penjadar', gehouden te Batavia-Centrum (Karetweg 44), van 21 tot 25 September 1938", AMK, MR 1056*/1938, V 23 November 1938/K38, NA.
 194. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 4, p. xxxvi-xxxviii. See also PPO January-March 1938, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 4, p. 198; ANA to GG, 2 November 1938.
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 196. *Pemandangan*, 27 January 1937, *IPO* 6/1937, pp. 91-92. See also S.M. Kartosoewirjo, *Sikap hidjrah PSII* (Buitenzorg: Buitenzorgsche Drukkerij, 1936), especially pp. 65-69; Al-Chaidar, *Pemikiran politik proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia S.M. Kartosoewirjo: fakta dan data sejarah Darul Islam* (Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1999), pp. 46-47.
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 205. *Ibid.*; *Mata Hari*, 14 January 1939, *Soeara Oemoem*, 17 January 1939, *IPO* 4/1939, pp. 65-67.
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211. Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 160.
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215. *Sin Tit Po*, 3 April 1937, *IPO* 15/1937, p. 224.
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220. *Pemandangan*, 27 July 1938, *IPO* 31/1938, pp. 514-15.
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224. *Berita Nahdlatol Oelama*, 1 April 1938, *IPO* 19/1939, pp. 300-02; PPO March-April 1938, pp. 212-13; Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 4, p. xxxix.
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226. ANA (Pijper) to GG, 28 August 1939, and "Verslag van het Tweede 'Congres Al-Islam Indonesia' gehouden te Soerakarta, van 2 tot 7 Mei 1939" [10 June 1939], both in MR 966*/1029, V 26-10-1939-E45, NA.
227. Aboebakar, *Sedjarah*, pp. 315-16; PPO April-July 1941, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 4, p. 434.
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239. *Tjaja Timoer*, 5 May 1938, *IPO* 20/1938, p. 319.
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241. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 4, p. xxix-xxx.
242. *Pertja Selatan*, 2 June 1938, *IPO* 24/1938, p. 393.
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245. PPO July 1939, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 4, p. 308. Salim's Penyadar was excluded from Gapi, as it had been from MIAI, something he attributed to his scepticism to the idea unity at all costs and his opposition to party elitism (Salim, *Pergerakan politik*, pp. 41, 43-44, 48-49; Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 4, p. xxx). The leaders of PSII and PII, however, simply refused to allow Penyadar's inclusion in Gapi (*Tjaja Timoer*, 22 May 1939, *IPO* 21/1939, pp. 369-71. See also *IPO* 24/1939, pp. 415-17.
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248. ANA to GG, 9 February 1940, in Van der Wal (ed.), *De Volksraad*, p. 513.
249. PPO August-September 1939, p. 326.
250. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 4, p. xxxii. See Abikusno et al. (eds), *Kongres Ra'jat Indonesia ke-1* (Batavia: Gaboengan Politik Indonesia, 1940); *Tjaja Timoer*, 23 December 1939, *IPO* 52/1939, p. 894.
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253. "Herdenkings vergadering van de Partij Sarekat Islam op 26 Januari 1928 te Jogjakarta (in verband met haar 15 jarig bestaan)", *AMK*, MR 332*/1928, NA.
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256. Soetan Sjahrir, *Out of exile*, trans. Charles Wolf Jr. (repr. New York: Greenwood Press, 1969 [1949]), pp. 96-97 [1936].
257. J.H. Status Muller to GG, 11 April 1940, in Kwantes (ed.), *De ontwikkeling*, vol. 4 (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhof/Bouma's Boekhuis, 1982), pp. 741-43; C. van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam: the Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p. 35.
258. *Pandji Islam*, 20 February 1939, *IPO* 9/1939, p. 161.
259. PPO November-December 1940, p. 390.
260. PPO September 1940, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 4, pp. 371, 374.
261. *Suara PSII* 5, 4-5 (1941), quoted in Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 270. See also Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 4, p. xxxii.
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265. *PPO* December 1940-January 1941, p. 397.
266. *PPO* March 1941, in Poeze (ed.), *PPO*, vol. 4, p. 402.
267. Nasution, "The Islamic state", p. 45; Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, pp. 269; *PPO* April-July 1941, p. 428.
268. *PPO* April-July 1941, p. 432.
269. *Ibid.*
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323. *Soeara Oemoem*, 29 March 1940, IPO 14/1940, p. 238.
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