

STUDIA ISLAMIKA

INDONESIAN JOURNAL FOR ISLAMIC STUDIES

Volume 22, Number 2, 2015



THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF CONTROL
OVER DEVIANT GROUPS IN MALAYSIA:
OFFICIAL *FATWA* AND REGULATION OF INTERPRETATION

Yuki Shiozaki

THE SURAMADU BRIDGE AFFAIR: UN-BRIDGING THE STATE
AND THE *KYAI* IN NEW ORDER MADURA

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POET IN AN ISLAMIC COMMUNITY:
CULTURAL AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES OF
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Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies

Vol. 22, no. 2, 2015

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STUDIA ISLAMIKA (ISSN 0215-0492; E-ISSN: 2355-6145) is an international journal published by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University of Jakarta, INDONESIA. It specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies in particular, and Southeast Asian Islamic studies in general, and is intended to communicate original researches and current issues on the subject. This journal warmly welcomes contributions from scholars of related disciplines. All submitted papers are subject to double-blind review process.

STUDIA ISLAMIKA has been accredited by The Ministry of Education and Culture, Republic of Indonesia as an academic journal (SK Dirjen Dikti No. 56/DIKTI/Kep/2012).

STUDIA ISLAMIKA has become a CrossRef Member since year 2014. Therefore, all articles published by STUDIA ISLAMIKA will have unique Digital Object Identifier (DOI) number.

STUDIA ISLAMIKA is indexed in Scopus since 30 May 2015.

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Editorial Office:

STUDIA ISLAMIKA, Gedung Pusat Pengkajian
Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) UIN Jakarta,
Jl. Kertamukti No. 5, Pisangan Barat, Cirendeu,
Ciputat 15419, Jakarta, Indonesia.
Phone: (62-21) 7423543, 7499272, Fax: (62-21) 7408633;
E-mail: studia.islamika@uinjkt.ac.id
Website: <http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/studia-islamika>

Annual subscription rates from outside Indonesia, institution:
US\$ 75,00 and the cost of a single copy is US\$ 25,00;
individual: US\$ 50,00 and the cost of a single copy is US\$
20,00. Rates do not include international postage and
handling.

Please make all payment through bank transfer to: **PPIM,
Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang Graha Karnos, Indonesia,**
account No. **101-00-0514550-1 (USD),**
Swift Code: bmrriidja

Harga berlangganan di Indonesia untuk satu tahun, lembaga:
Rp. 150.000,-, harga satu edisi Rp. 50.000,-; individu:
Rp. 100.000,-, harga satu edisi Rp. 40.000,-. Harga belum
termasuk ongkos kirim.



Pembayaran melalui **PPIM, Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang
Graha Karnos, No. Rek: 128-00-0105080-3**

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Yanwar Pribadi

The Suramadu Bridge Affair: Un-bridging the State and the *Kyai* in New Order Madura

Abstract: *This paper by and large explores state-society relations and for the most part discusses the Indonesian government's plans to 'modernize' Madura during the New Order administration and how a number of kyai responded to these plans. Specifically, it is concerned with a conflict between the state and the kyai in the Suramadu Bridge Affair, particularly in the rejection of the industrialization scheme by the Kyai of Bassra. An obvious aspect that can be highlighted from the conflict is the inability of state officials, especially at regional levels, to cope with the high expectations of the central government. Another central aspect underlined is the undemocratic approach of the government towards the implementation of its plans. The government's plans to 'modernize' Madura eventually created resistance among some segments in society, and they made use of, among other things, Islamic symbols in resisting the government's plans.*

Keywords: Madura, *Kyai*, New Order, the Suramadu Bridge, Industrialization.

Abstrak: *Tulisan ini secara umum menelaah hubungan negara-masyarakat dan untuk sebagian besar mendiskusikan rencana pemerintah Indonesia untuk 'memodernisasi' Madura pada masa pemerintahan Orde Baru dan bagaimana sejumlah kyai menanggapi rencana tersebut. Secara khusus, tulisan ini menaruh perhatian pada sebuah persetujuan antara negara dan kyai dalam permasalahan-permasalahan mengenai Jembatan Suramadu, terutama dalam hal penolakan Kyai anggota Bassra terhadap rencana industrialisasi. Satu hal yang terlihat jelas dari persetujuan tersebut adalah ketidakmampuan pejabat negara, terutama di tingkat daerah, memenuhi harapan pemerintah pusat yang tinggi. Hal penting lainnya adalah pendekatan pemerintah yang tidak demokratis dalam usahanya mengejawantahkan rencana mereka. Rencana pemerintah untuk 'memodernisasi' Madura pada akhirnya menciptakan penolakan di masyarakat, dan mereka menggunakan, di antaranya, simbol-simbol keislaman dalam menolak rencana pemerintah tersebut.*

Kata kunci: Madura, Kiai, Orde Baru, Jembatan Suramadu, Industrialisasi.

ملخص: تهدف هذه الدراسة، بشكل عام، إلى استكشاف العلاقات بين الدولة والمجتمع، وهي في معظمها تناقش خطة الحكومة الإندونيسية الرامية إلى «تحديث» إقليم مادورا في عهد حكومة النظام الجديد، وردود أفعال عدد من المشايخ على هذه الخطة. كما تهتم الدراسة، على وجه التحديد، بصراع بين الدولة والمشايخ في القضايا المتعلقة بجسر سورامادو وخاصة موقف الشيخ بسرا Bassra الراض لخطة التصنيع. والشيء الذي يمكن ملاحظته بوضوح من خلال هذا الصراع هو عدم قدرة المسؤولين في الدولة، وخصوصا على المستوى المحلي، على التعامل مع توقعات عالية من الحكومة المركزية، وأما الشيء الآخر المهم فهو المقاربة غير الديمقراطية التي تبنتها الحكومة في جهودها لتنفيذ الخطة، مما أدى في نهاية المطاف إلى حدوث المقاومة الشعبية، حيث كانت الشعارات الإسلامية من الوسائل المستخدمة لرفض تلك الخطة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: مادورا، الشيخ، النظام الجديد، جسر سورامادو، التصنيع.

This paper examines state-society relations related to the conflict between the state and the *kyai* (religious leaders) during the Suramadu Bridge affair in Madura, Indonesia, particularly in the rejection of the industrialization scheme by the *kyai* of Bassra (Badan Silaturahmi Ulama Pesantren Madura - The Association of Friendship of Madurese *Pesantren Ulama*). The questions posed are: What are the characteristics of Madurese *kyai*? What were the aspects of the New Order in Madura? What was the genesis of the Suramadu Bridge affair? What were the government's efforts in implementing plans to 'modernize' Madura? How did the *kyai* and the people respond to the government's approaches? How were Islamic symbols used in order to convey messages of rejection?

Since independence, the Indonesian government seems, for the most part, to have neglected Madura, and so the island has become one of the disadvantaged areas in the larger Java-Madura region. Even during the *pembangunan* (development, modernization) era of the New Order, the island, in comparison with other regions in East Java, had a weak economy. Due to infertile land, limited economic activities, and inadequate development of human resources, the local economy was too weak to absorb the abundance of laborers that resulted from the high population growth during the New Order. Indeed, quality of life was so poor that, until the 1970s, about seventy per cent of the Madurese population was illiterate. In general, Madura scored low on the social indicators for education and employment. Moreover, in areas such as health, food and nutrition, and human settlement, Madura was also underdeveloped compared to other regencies in East Java (Rachbini 1995).

Under the Suharto administration, the lack of state¹ capability to implement its policies was often demonstrated in pressure upon the people. Nevertheless, the inability of the state to govern was not the only factor generating resistance in society. Indeed, there was another significant factor, the structure of the society. The structure of Madurese society affected state capability during the New Order, for instance, as it influenced the state when the state wished to implement its policies. The structure of society in Madura has been dominated by religious facets, which have often generated difficulties for the state in terms of getting the people to comply. The high position of religious leaders in society places them as commanding figures that the people follow. Although

according to James (1990, 20) "... the *santri*² group has not emerged as a significant threat to the administration due to their dependence upon the government for subsidies and other benefits, and their vulnerability vis-à-vis the peasantry", in Madura, the *kyai* who composed the main element of the *santri* group, actually posed a constant critical stand to the government during the Suharto administration. Their strong identification with Islam was applied politically in the form of support for the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan – the United Development Party), and they were seen by the state as a regular menace, especially during elections.

The New Order was an era of development. During this period, the central government targeted Madura as one of the many areas to be modernized. The process, however, was not smooth. There were several rejections of plans to build mega-projects on the island. One of the rejections was the *industrialisasi* (industrialization) scheme (to introduce industrialization and to create industrial estates in Madura) by some *kyai*, especially the *kyai* of Bassra.³ The industrialization scheme was included in a plan to build the Suramadu Bridge that would connect the islands of Java and Madura and be the country's longest bridge.⁴

One of the most obvious aspects that can be highlighted from these rejections is the inability of state officials, especially at regional levels, to cope with the high expectations of the central government, such as winning the support of the stakeholders. In relation to the industrialization plans, for much of the 1990s, the central and regional governments did not succeed in convincing the *kyai* of Bassra to approve the industrialization as had been expected.

Another central aspect underlined by these rejections is the undemocratic approach of the government towards the implementation of its plans. In the industrialization plans, the central and regional governments seem to have neglected the power of the religious leaders in society. For some non-state sponsored *kyai* (those who did not or did not often receive state funds in the forms of, among other things, governmental projects) the industrialization posed a potential threat that would possibly diminish their influence and might even deprive *kyai* of their authority. For others, the industrialization posed an enigma such as for the Madurese who lacked an adequate education to take advantage of industrialization, let alone manage it. To show that the *kyai* were influential and to try to maintain their authority, the *kyai* responded to

the government's plan by launching a series of rejections. As we shall see, the government's plans to 'modernize' Madura eventually created resistance among some segments in society and these segments made extensive use of Islamic symbols in resisting the government's plans.

The Characteristics of Madurese *Kyai*

According to Deliar Noer (1973, 8) the term *kyai* indicates two kinds of people. The first is someone whose knowledge of Islam surpasses that of the ordinary man, and who typically devotes himself to teaching. The second is more closely related to a *dukun* (healer) who teaches mystical and secret doctrines and practices all kinds of medicine. Hiroko Horikoshi distinguished the terms *kyai* and '*ulamā*' (Muslim scholars of Islamic disciplines).⁵ For Horikoshi, the difference was primarily in the more extensive charisma that a *kyai* possesses. The '*ulamā*' play more roles in the social system and the social structure of villages, and their ultimate status is legitimized by hereditary factors. Among the people, the *kyai* are higher than the village '*ulamā*' and their presence is regarded as a unifying symbol in society, since their moral and spiritual leadership is not tied to the normative structure of a village (Horikoshi 1987, 211-212). In Indonesian society at large, the word '*ulamā*' may be used arbitrarily to refer to *kyai*. In Madura the term *kyai* also has a meaning in terms of leadership. In a broader context, the term '*ulamā*' refers to men of Islamic learning and Islamic religious leaders in general. Hence, a strict distinction between the terms '*ulamā*' and *kyai* is not applied in this paper, and I use both terms, '*ulamā*' and *kyai*, interchangeably.

Although Madura is not entirely different from other parts of Indonesia with regard to socio-religious characteristics, a stronger religious tradition appears to have emerged as a result of a long-term Islamization process—marked by social and political processes—on the island, somewhat comparable to what has occurred in Aceh (Morris 1983, 22; Saby 1995, xix) and Banten (Van Bruinessen 1995a, 165). Therefore, many of the local traditions and customs have become linked with the religion.

In contemporary Madura, there are at least four types of *kyai*. *Firstly*, *kyai pesantren* are generally regarded as the highest in rank. *Secondly*, there are also *kyai tarekat* who usually lead a *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) too, but who are more commonly recognized as *tarekat*

(Muslim mystical brotherhoods) teachers. *Thirdly*, in this type there are *kyai dukun*, shamans, healers, or medicine men. *Fourthly*, the last and the lowest in the hierarchy of *kyai* in Madura are *kyai langgar*, who run small mosques in villages. The discussion in this paper is focused for the most part on the first type of *kyai*, since they are the real agents of socio-political-economic-cultural life in Madura. They are what Eric Wolf (1956, 1075) identified as cultural brokers, people who ‘connect the local system to the larger whole’ and who select what is appropriate for the local society, until recently.

An example of *kyai pesantren* is the legendary *Kyai* Muhammad Kholil of Bangkalan, the most celebrated *kyai* in the history of Madura. There are many stories about this legendary figure, and most are marked by myth. He was born in the first half of the nineteenth century (between 1819 and 1835) and died around 1923-1925.⁶ He was known not only as a *wali* (saint), but also as an expert in Arabic letters, as well as a master in *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) and mystical power. He is regarded as an essential figure in the formation of a *santri* community in the Indonesian archipelago, where his renowned *santri* established new *pesantren* as soon as they returned to their places of origin (Dhofier 1982; Van Bruinessen 1995b; Rachman 2001; Bakhri 2006). To many pilgrims, his grave is considered the final place in a pilgrimage which runs from Banten to Madura. When I visited Bangkalan in the last quarter of 2009, the mosque and the surrounding area of his grave was under construction. When I went to Bangkalan again in the first quarter of 2011, the project was completed and several new facilities had been added.

The *kyai* are the main actors in state-society relations in Madura. It should be kept in mind that the general situation in Madura is not free of conflict. Utilizing their capabilities and resources, state officials and *kyai* seem to have, openly or not, challenged each other in order to secure their own interests. The state, via local officials, has attempted to reduce the political influence of *kyai*. Meanwhile, through the networks of *pesantren* and the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama – the largest mass-based Islamic organization in Indonesia) and Bassra, the *kyai* have cautiously responded to state power by distancing themselves from the state. This has created an odd situation, as the *kyai* are in fact needed by the state to ensure that things go smoothly at the grassroots level. As Elly Touwen-Bouwisma (1992, 100) observed, at the village level, the support of the *kyai* is key to involving villagers in the implementation of government programs.

Some Aspects of the New Order in Madura

From the beginning of the New Order, Indonesia was concerned with constructing a viable local economy. The expectation was to create a modern industrial and service-based economy. In fact, economic development was viewed as the main goal of the era and all parts of society were to work towards this objective (Wood 2005, 89).

One of the most significant characteristics of the New Order political system was the electoral three-party system. During the New Order, the government applied an authoritarian rule and dominated elections throughout most of the Archipelago through its electoral machine, Golkar (the ruling party during the New Order). In some 'Islamic' areas the influence of the PPP and its support from the '*ulama*' and the *santri* represented a significant challenge to the existing government. Madura was one of these areas.

The roles of *kyai* in local politics in Madura were most visible during the New Order when the state attempted to break into and arrange all aspects of its citizens' lives. The power of the state rested upon its dominant control over the public and private realms. At first glance, it seems that the state—through its hierarchical authority—was able to intervene within the society. In reality, large segments of society were able to form informal ties and operate within their own hierarchies of authority. In a society in which traditions and customs are identified with Islam, the roles of religious leaders to perceive, censor, and disseminate political perceptions are highly evident as noted in areas of Madura, Minangkabau (Dobbin 1983; Yunus 1981) and Aceh (Alfian 1987; Amiruddin 1994). During the New Order, when access to information was limited, the *kyai* were the central sources of information, including political affairs, for commoners. Even if access to information was not limited, the influence of *kyai* effectively determined what was appropriate and what was not.

In general, the local governments recognized the power of the *kyai*, particularly when general elections were approaching. It is true that the government perceived *kyai* who did not serve as partners of the state as competitors. It is also true that the state-sponsored *kyai* would endorse Golkar's campaigns and help ensure its victory. However, when more traditional persuasion techniques, utilizing notions of order, stability, and development, were seen to have failed, the local governments would turn to 'alternative options' to secure Golkar's victory. It is important

to note that illegal 'alternative options', such as vote buying, multiple votes, misreporting of votes, or destruction of ballots, were frequently claimed but rarely proven.

On the surface, Golkar might look weak if we talk about the traditional support of voters. However, in every general election after 1971, Golkar gradually gained more support. In 1977, Golkar collected thirty per cent of all votes in Madura (De Jonge 1989, 275), while in 1971 it only amassed 24.45 per cent (Panitia Pemilihan Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Timur 1971, 170-171). In the 1987 general elections in Pamekasan, Golkar collected 173,204 votes, while the PPP only accumulated 140,305 votes (*Jawa Pos*, April 25th, 1987). This positive trend for Golkar continued until the last general elections of the New Order, the 1997 general elections. Therefore, it would be incorrect to underestimate the people's support of Golkar. Nonetheless, it would also be mistaken to state that most *kyai* served as partners of the government. Indeed, most *kyai* remained outside the structure of central power. Although in religious affairs, *kyai* who supported the PPP were hardly challenged by those of Golkar, in politics, since they were not able to promise anything but conviction in religious matters to their followers, the people could have been tempted to vote for the party who could provide them with facilities, i.e. Golkar.

The Genesis of The Project

According to Harold Crouch authoritarian administrations exercise substantial control over society. One of the main characteristics of such administrations is their capacity to maintain themselves in power through direct repression. In addition, there is another significant way in which authoritarian administrations dominate society; that is to say, the development of political methods to maintain control. Such political methods range from formulating national ideologies to justify rule, to holding elections to provide the administration with legitimacy. Despite the administrations' claims that the political institutions of authoritarian administrations permit the people to participate in the decision-making process, such pseudo-democratic characteristics typically administer the people in well-designed ways that reinforce the administrations. Indications of pseudo-democratic characteristics include the victory of the government party in all elections, which results in parliament being dominated by the administration, and

situations when mass organizations serve to control rather than represent. According to this description, the New Order administration in Indonesia was a typically authoritarian administration (Crouch 1990, 115-116).

During the New Order, political methods were also used to manipulate government projects. Foreign and domestic private investment rapidly entered Indonesia in the name of development. Many government projects, such as high-rise buildings, roads, and bridges were financed by such investments in which the government facilitated the investors as part of the industrialization programs. Frequently, in order to implement a project, other projects had to be executed by the government to meet all the requirements by the investors. It could also be the case that the government felt it necessary to execute related projects to accelerate development or regain capital. Meanwhile, if there was any disagreement about such projects from society or oppositional parties, the authoritarian New Order administration responded with manipulative methods.

The plan to build the Suramadu Bridge was characterized not only by such manipulative methods and the pseudo-democratic characteristics of the New Order administration, but also by a division among the Madurese religious elite where the use of ideologies, institutions, and organizations was prevalent. At the same time, both the government and the religious elite targeted the people to gain support.

At the end of 1990 (after a number of discussions between, among other things, local-regional and central governments), through the Keppres No. 55/1990 (presidential decree), dated December 14th, 1990, the government stated that it would build the Suramadu Bridge. The government also asserted that the development of the bridge would go hand in hand with the establishment of industrial estates on the island, especially in Bangkalan. In other words, both plans were arranged in one policy package. According to the governor of East Java, Soelarso (r. 1988-1993), in the future all industrial activities would have to be concentrated in one area to avoid the annexation of fertile agricultural land. In order to do this, the development of the Madura region was seen as an alternative option to the development of other industrial areas in East Java, alongside the existing industrial estates such as in Surabaya, Sidoarjo, Gresik, and Pasuruan (*Surabaya Post*, December 4th, 1991).

The idea to build a bridge had, apparently, been there long before the government issued the decree. In the 1960s, Professor Sedyatmo,⁷ a notable engineer, raised the idea of bridging the islands of Java and Sumatra and Java and Bali. He named these bridges after Ontoseno (Antasena), a mythical figure in the Javanese version of the Mahabharata epic (Effendi & Aksan 2009, 235). The idea then developed into a plan to build a bridge connecting Java and Madura since this was more practical in terms of implementation.⁸ Another early idea concerning the bridge is said to have come from R.P. Mohammad Noer, known as Pak Noer (b. 1918, d. 2010). Noer claimed that the idea came to him when he served as *patih* (deputy regent) of Bangkalan between 1950 and 1959 (Siahaan & Purnomo 1997, 46, 53, 179). The idea became stronger during his tenure as the governor of East Java between 1971 and 1976. He claimed that he never officially stated his idea when he held the governor position, because he feared that people would accuse him of giving preference to his home island, Madura.⁹ A third idea about the bridge seems to have arisen during the Sukarno presidency. The initial plan was to build the bridge between Kebomas, Gresik (Java) and Kamal, Bangkalan (Madura). Due to the left-wing officers coup (G30S/PKI) in 1965, the plan was not implemented (Subaharianto *et al.* 2004, 103). In 1965, a blueprint of the Sumatra-Java Bridge was formulated by Sedyatmo at ITB Bandung. The blueprint was seen by Suharto in June 1986, two years after Sedyatmo passed away (Effendi & Aksan 2009, 239).

The idea to include the establishment of industrial estates was determined mainly by economic reasons. The development of the bridge was estimated to have cost around Rp. 500,000,000,000 (roughly US\$ 300,000,000) or Rp. 1,000,000,000,000 including the establishment of industrial areas (Muthmainnah 1998, 54; Siahaan & Purnomo 1997, 181; *Surabaya Post*, August 2nd, 1991). As is the case in other investments, investors expect a quick return on their capital. However, depending on the bridge to deliver immediate profit was not considered an appropriate or suitable option. There had to be a way that investors would be attracted to investing in the bridge based on economic calculations. Therefore, in the ambitious plan to build the bridge, the government believed that industrial estates had to be established along with the development of the bridge as a way for investors to obtain a quick profit. This seemed to be a common

centralization policy of the Guided Democracy (1959-1966) and the New Order administration in which regional governments had neither influence over central government policies, nor the power to control their own affairs. Local politics and power constellations reflected the interests of central government, rather than those of regional governments (Aspinall & Fealy 2003, 2).

Two years after Sedyatmo passed away, his wife, Sumarpeni Sedyatmo, wrote a letter to one of the personal assistants of President Suharto, Ario Darmoko, about the blueprint for a project called the Trinusa Bima Sakti Bridge. Based on the basic concepts outlined by Sedyatmo, in July 1986 Suharto assigned Menteri Negara Riset dan Teknologi (Menristek)/Kepala Badan Penerapan dan Pengkajian Teknologi - BPPT (the State Minister of Research and Technology/Chairman of Body of the Application and Assessment of Technology), B.J. Habibie, to conduct research on the feasibility of building the Java-Sumatra, Java-Bali, and Java-Madura bridges. This project, which was initially named the Trinusa Bima Sakti Bridge, was later officially named the Trinusa Bima Sakti and *Penyebrangan Utama* (hereafter *Trinusa*), based on the earlier name given by Sedyatmo. The Japan Indonesia Science and Technology Forum (JIF), a cooperation forum comprising of Japanese private companies and BPPT, supported the research project between 1986 and 1989 by conducting a number of preliminary studies on the feasibility of building the bridges. Based on these studies, the most feasible plan seemed to be to build a bridge that would connect Java and Madura. On January 9th, 1989, a committee, led by Wardiman Djojonegoro, an official at the BPPT, was established to implement the Trinusa project (Effendi & Aksan 2009, 239-241).

Mohammad Noer saw many opportunities in the Trinusa project. He was aware that local people would be involved in the project, and that such a plan would end Madura's relative isolation from Java. On May 3rd, 1989, Noer established P.T. (Perseroan Terbatas – Inc. or Ltd.) *Dhipa Madura Pradana* (DMP), a private company that would be part of the consortium charged with building the Suramadu Bridge. *Summa Group*, a large conglomerate group, was also part of P.T. DMP and Noer became the director president. P.T. DMP was given a significant role in surveying the location, executing land acquisition, and financing the mega project. Based on the decree of Menristek/Kepala BPPT No. 283/M/BPPT/VI/1991 dated June 5th, 1991, P.T. DMP was appointed

as the project coordinator for the Suramadu Bridge. Noer became the project coordinator of the industrial and housing areas until he was replaced by the governor of East Java, Basofi Sudirman (r. 1993-1998) on March 14th, 1995 who was seen by the central government as a 'capable' person and because Noer was considered too old (Siahaan & Purnomo 1997, 182; Muthmainnah 1998, 69).

On November 20th, 1990 in Tokyo, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between P.T. DMP and a Japanese consortium, consisting of the Mitsubishi Corporation, C. Itoh & Company (now known as Itochu Corporation), the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan,¹⁰ and the Shimizu Company. The agreement was intended to implement further research on the feasibility of the project, and it was expected that the project would commence in 1992 (Siahaan & Purnomo 1997, 182). After Summa Bank, a major company within the Summa Group, collapsed in 1992, due to highly concentrated intra-group lending, the Indonesian government expected that a new consortium would be established. Habibie explained there would only be three groups in this new consortium: the BPIS (Badan Pengelola Industri Strategis - the Strategic Industries Management Board), the provincial and municipal government, and national private companies (*Jawa Pos*, July 3rd, 1992). In order to get national private companies involved in financing the project, the governor of East Java, Soelarso, asked the Bimantara Group, a business emporium belonging to Bambang Trihatmojo (a son of President Suharto), to be included in the consortium. Bimantara, however, turned down this invitation (*Surya*, July 17th, 1992).

An agreement between P.T. DMP and The Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), an implementing agency for loan aid furnished by the Japanese government, was made in 1992 when another MoU was signed on December 18th, 1992. This time the agreement was about financing project. After this, the financing would be the responsibility of the OECF (80 per cent), a Japanese consortium (10 per cent), and an Indonesian consortium (10 per cent), consisting of P.T. DMP, P.T. PAL, P.T. Barata, P.T. Boma Bisma Indra, P.T. Krakatau Steel, P.T. SIER (Surabaya Industrial Estate Rungkut), P.T. Jasa Marga, and Bukaka Group (Siahaan & Purnomo 1997, 183; Muthmainnah 1998, 54).

Although the development of the bridge was arranged in one package with the establishment of industrial estates, the governor Basofi

Sudirman and ex-governor Soelarso expected the bridge to be built first, because in order to build the industrial estates the bridge was required to be fully functional. This was because the only transportation system at the time, a number of ferries, could not support the creation of the industrial estates (*Surabaya Post*, February 17th, 1994; *Bisnis Indonesia*, February 17th, 1994). The industrial estates were to be divided into two parts. In the south, approximately 15,000 hectares of land would be used for electronic industries in the sub-districts of Labang, Kamal, Socah, Burneh, and Tragah. In the north, heavy industries would cover around 8,000 hectares of land in the Tanjung Bumi sub-district (Siahaan & Purnomo 1997, 182).

The start of the project was postponed a couple of times. After it was realized that the project could not be inaugurated in 1992, it was expected that the plan would start in March 1994. In 1994, however, in a meeting between Menristek, Kasospol (Kepala Staf Sosial Politik – Chief of Social and Politics of the Indonesian Armed Forces) Lieutenant General R. Hartono, the governor of East Java, and Madurese public figures, it was decided that the project would begin in April 1995 (*Surya*, September 24th, 1994). When the Asian financial crises occurred in 1997, governmental projects worth, in total, around Rp. 135,000,000,000,000 (roughly US\$ 67,500,000,000) were postponed or re-scheduled under Keppres No. 39/1997 on the suspension/reconsideration of governmental projects by BUMN (Badan Usaha Milik Negara - state-owned enterprises) and private sectors attached to BUMN. The Suramadu Bridge project was included in these postponements (Siahaan & Purnomo 1997, 183; Muthmainnah 1998, 107; *Memorandum*, September 17th, 1997; *Karya Darma*, September 17th, 1997; *Surabaya Post*, September 17th, 1997). Before the financial crises hit the Indonesian economy, the delays were thought to be part of the business strategy of the OECF, which demanded assurance from the Indonesian government in case loan repayments were hampered, so that the agency could maximize possible benefits and minimize risk (Siahaan & Purnomo 1997, 183; Muthmainnah 1998, 104).

The Stances of Bassra and Non-Bassra ‘*Ulamā*’

From the beginning of the plan, a number of ‘*ulamā*’ in the group of Bassra objected to the idea of combining the bridge with the establishment of industrial estates. They wanted the bridge to be

built, but thought that the plan to establish industrial estates, which later became known among them as industrialization, should not be implemented for various reasons. Bassra's opinions became a point of argument among the decision-makers at the national as well as regional level. Through Habibie, the central government attempted to influence the *'ulamā'* and get them to change their opinion. Such attempts included holding national seminars to which Bassra members were invited, making visits to industrial areas in Surabaya and Batam, and inviting Bassra to P.T. IPTN (Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara - Nusantara Aircraft Industry). State officials from the central government (Jakarta), such as the Pangab (Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata – the Armed Forces Commander) and Minister of Religious Affairs, visited Madura frequently to hold talks with the *'ulamā'*.

Objections also came from a number of *'ulamā'* who lived in the area surrounding where the bridge would be built. In a meeting with members of the regency parliament, around fifty *kyai* of several *pesantren* in Sukolilo Barat village, Labang sub-district, Bangkalan, requested that the government keep the educational institutions in the area. In the village, there were around seventeen educational institutions, such as *Pesantren Al-Ittihad Yasi* and *Pesantren K.H. Ishak*. According to the RUTRK (Rencana Umum Tata Ruang Kota - urban spatial planning) of Labang, all educational institutions were to be demolished should industrialization be introduced (*Surabaya Post*, December 10th, 1991).

Meanwhile, on August 31st, 1991, IMABA (Ikatan Mahasiswa Bangkalan - the Bangkalanese Student Association) held a seminar entitled 'Persepsi Masyarakat tentang Industrialisasi di Madura' (People's Perceptions of Industrialization in Madura) in the Bangkalan town hall. *Kyai* Kholil A.G. was one of the speakers (Moesa 1999, 118). In the following year, on January 13th and 14th, IMABA held another seminar 'Menyongsong Industrialisasi di Madura' (Welcoming Industrialization in Madura) in the Bank Jatim, Surabaya. On December 14th and 15th, 1993 Bassra held a seminar entitled 'Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Madura Memasuki Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Tahap II (PJPT II)' (The Development and Construction of Madura in Entering the Second Period of Long-Term Development) (Moesa 1999, 119; Muthmainnah 1998, 82).

The attempts by top-level officials to encourage Bassra to support the plan were not completely successful. On August 18th, 1994, Bassra sent 'Sembilan Pokok Pikiran Bassra' (the Nine Opinions of Bassra), information regarding the industrialization plan, to Habibie and related government officials, such as the Pangab, the governor of East Java, Pangdam V/Brawijaya (Panglima Komando Daerah Militer - the Regional Military Commander), the Regional Governor Assistant in Madura, all regents in Madura, the DPRD I (the provincial parliament) East Java and the DPRD II (the regency/municipal parliament) of all regencies in Madura. Bassra had high expectations that the government would implement policies that would benefit the Madurese. The fundamental issues were:

1. The development and improvement of Madura on a bigger scale was essential and urgent.
2. Developments and improvements have to be in line with Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara 1993 (GBHN - Broad Guidelines of State Policy).
3. In order to achieve developments and improvements, there are several elements that need to be considered:
 - a. Developments and improvements have to be compatible with Islamic, Indonesian and human rights values.
 - b. Developments and improvements have to accommodate aspirations of the Madurese in order to be constructive for the Madurese.
 - c. Developments and improvements have to actively involve society, particularly the '*ulamā*', from the outset.
 - d. Developments and improvements have to be implemented gradually.
 - e. Human resources have to be organized as early as possible and must involve *pesantren* in Madura.
 - f. Equal cooperation between the '*ulamā*', the government, and entrepreneurs should be promoted in order to ensure fruitful outcomes.
4. In order to help development, the Madurese '*ulamā*' are willing:
 - a. To enhance the integration of the people and the role of '*ulamā*' with the intention that development is not against Islamic values.
 - b. To maintain Islamic values, observe the outcomes of the

development, and anticipate its negative effects as early as possible.

5. The expected economic growth in Madura has to be compatible with people-oriented economy.
6. In order to accelerate the developments and the improvements, infrastructure must be built quickly.
7. The development of agri-business, agro-industry and home industries supported by *pesantren* cooperatives is the main option for development and the improvement of Madura.
8. In order to solve the problem of lack of water in Madura, the building of dams is not the only solution. Reforestation and greening are more positive alternatives.
9. The development and the improvement of the tourism industry in Madura should not be incompatible with Islamic Madurese norms. (Muthmainnah 1998, 122-125; Moesa 1999, 123).

This list was taken by the government as a rejection of the bridge plan, and to some degree, as a bargaining tool. The government responded by threatening to cancel the establishment of industrial estates in Madura and to move them to Gelangban (regencies of Gresik, Lamongan, and Tuban). Meanwhile, the regent of Lamongan, R. Mohammad Faried, was expecting that industrialization would be introduced to his regency (*Karya Darma*, August 30th, 1994).

The government, via Menristek, insisted that the project to put the plans together in one policy package was not open to negotiation. The two plans would fail if the government could not obtain sufficient land for the project: 'if industrialization failed, [building] the bridge would automatically fail. We do not want to only build the bridge, then it would be used by a limited number of people for getting about, it is useless' (*Surabaya Post*, September 4th, 1994).

Meanwhile, the non-Bassra *'ulamā'*—generally those who occupied government or governmental-related positions—had a different opinion regarding the gigantic project. The chairman of MUI Bangkalan, *Kyai* Luthfi Madani, believed that having the bridge and the industrial estates in one package was a fair plan, because the government believed that no investor would build the bridge if they did not get a return on their investments as quickly as possible. He also stated that the realization of the bridge was the most urgent part of the plan (Muthmainnah 1998, 138; *Karya Darma*, September 7th, 1994). On another occasion, *Kyai*

Luthfi also stated that the social function of the bridge should not be denied by those with business interests (*Karya Darma*, August, 22nd, 1994).

In the opinion of the non-Bassra *'ulamā'*, globalization was an unstoppable phenomenon and would, inevitably, come to Madura. As it could not be prevented, it should, instead, be anticipated. The way to do so was to educate the people morally in preparation for this globalization. *Kyai* Luthfi's opinion was also shared by *Kyai* Mahfudz Hadi, the FKP (Fraksi Karya Pembangunan - the Golkar fraction in the DPRD II) chairman of DPRD Bangkalan (Muthmainnah 1998, 139). To support the non-Bassra *'ulamā'*, the ex-governor Soelarso stated that, in principle, the Madurese were relatively flexible. When the *'ulamā'* acknowledged crucial points related to socio-religious issues, the people would eventually follow their leaders. Nevertheless, this was not a completely stable relationship: if the *'ulamā'* were seen to be misleading, these people would be disappointed, and the *'ulamā'* would no longer be able to rally support for industrialization (*Surya*, September 14th, 1994). According to *Kyai* Nuruddin, the then spokesperson and secretary of Bassra, 'the state *'ulamā'*' (those who are regarded by the Bassra *'ulamā'* as *'ulamā'* who serve the government's interests) attacked Bassra for their negative attitude towards industrialization by asking: 'Is Madura going to be reforested? Do we want to be forest men?' (*Apakah Madura mau dihutankan? Apakah kita mau menjadi orang hutan?*) (Interview with *Kyai* Nuruddin, Bangkalan, December 1st, 2009).

If we compare the two groups of *kyai*, we may assume that the Bassra *kyai* focused more on morality, while the non-Bassra *kyai* were concerned more with economic factors. According to Muthmainnah, a different view on the difference between the two groups is that before they voiced their concerns, the *'ulamā'* of Bassra observed the situation and conditions in other industrial estates, such as Batam, while the non-Bassra *'ulamā'* were fully convinced that the government would create a prosperous society by implementing industrialization (Muthmainnah 1998, 140). It seems, however, that Bassra *'ulamā'* did not base their opinions solely on their visit to Batam. Even before the trip, they disagreed with industrialization because of the possibility of losing some of their influence. Their disagreement had been shown in, among other things, a number of seminars in early 1990s (described earlier in this paper) where they built communications with intellectuals and

activists. It might also be true that some *kyai* were really concerned with the people; in particular, some *kyai* were concerned that the Madurese were not ready to accept industrialization since they lacked adequate education to compete with outsiders in gaining employment in industry. On the other hand, the support of the non-Bassra *'ulamā'* towards industrialization was not only because they believed that it would bring prosperity to the people, but also because they were convinced that they would benefit politically and economically from the project. As governmental agents, they also believed that they should support the government's plans.

Clearly, both Bassra and non-Bassra *'ulamā'* were aware that various possibilities and opportunities could be used to amplify their interests. For instance, it is important to note that the opinions of Bassra actually varied over time. On one occasion they might strongly reject industrialization, while on another occasion, they might be relatively accepting of it. In one instance, they stated that they did not reject industrialization. They would accept it if it would be established gradually so that the people would be able to adjust to the change (*Merdeka*, September 14th, 1994). Another time, *Kyai* Nuruddin, told journalists that

'Massive industrialization to turn Madura into an industrial area equipped with hotels and bars could materially improve people's well-being, but if they were morally corrupt, it would be useless. Therefore, the industry should be integrated with moral development through a gradual process' (*Merdeka*, September 14th, 1994).

Kyai Badrus Soleh of *Pesantren* Darul Aitam, Kwanyar in Bangkalan, as well as being the fraction chairman of the PPP in the DPRD II and a member of Bassra, stressed the social function of the bridge. He said that it should be able to bridge the gap between the presently less developed Madura with the more developed Madura in the future (*Karya Darma*, August 22nd, 1994). *Kyai* Nuruddin feared that the Madurese would no longer be religious if industrialization became a reality. He commented that industrial estates should be compatible with Islamic values. In other words, there should be mosques in factories and that the workers should be provided with sufficient time during work to pray (Interview, Bangkalan, December 1st, 2009). *Kyai* Alawy expected *pesantren* to have a vital role in bridging the government's interests on the island and people's expectations about the future of Madura, in initiatives

such as running cooperatives (*Surabaya Post*, February 26th, 1994). The chairman of Bassra, *Kyai* Kholil A.G., argued that the bridge was vital as a means of transportation connecting Java and Madura (*Surya*, September 25th, 1994). A similar statement was released by *Kyai* Mahfudz Siddiq, another prominent member of Bassra's board. He pointed out that the bridge would be a tool to open up Madura as well as improve the connection between Java and Madura (*Surya*, September 25th, 1994). *Kyai* Nuruddin stated that the Madurese did not reject industrialization. What they actually expected was that the government should not neglect the Madurese when it developed Madura (*Memorandum*, September 17th, 1997).

As revealed on a number of occasions, such as seminars, hearings, and interviews with newspapers, Bassra's rejection of industrialization can be classified into a number of reasons. *Firstly*, the plan to establish industrial estates on the island was seen to lack adequate preparation, especially considering the fact that many Madurese were not sufficiently educated. Some *kyai* were concerned with the lack of education of Madurese people and their ability to compete with outsiders in the manufacturing industry should industrialization be implemented. *Secondly*, there were concerns about the negative impacts of industrialization. Some *kyai* were concerned that outsiders who came to Madura would introduce 'un-Islamic' cultures. *Thirdly*, all the plans and ideas came directly from the central government, while neglecting opinions from the people and the Madurese religious figures. *Fourthly*, some *kyai* were sincerely concerned with the fate of the Madurese in the rapid development era. *Finally*, some *kyai* also feared that when the industrialization plan was realized, the '*ulamā*' might not be able to maintain their religious authority. The reasoning behind this last point was that if the '*ulamā*' lost their control in society, they would naturally find themselves in a difficult situation. For instance, Bassra '*ulamā*' would no longer have large followings; consequently, the association would no longer be a major oppositional power to the government and the state-sponsored '*ulamā*', at least during the New Order. Moreover, the '*ulamā*' would no longer be frequently visited since the people might become more conscious, and would no longer feel it necessary to seek guidance from the '*ulamā*'.

The opposition of Bassra to industrialization was seen by the New Order government as a main obstacle to the integration of a regional

society in the Indonesian social, political and economic system. For the *'ulamā'*, it was seen as an attempt to reduce the socio-political influence of the religious leaders in society. Thus, the process from the first rejection to the consensus between Bassra and the central government did not take an easy road. Eventually, however, construction of the bridge, under the new Keppres No. 79/2003 that replaced the Keppres No. 55/1990, started on August 20th, 2003 and the bridge was officially opened to the public on June 10th, 2009. After the project was postponed due to the financial crises, and after the new post-Suharto government introduced a more decentralized administration, the Bassra *'ulamā'* gradually changed their attitude. The shift was caused, *firstly* and primarily, by the separation of the establishment of the industrial estates from the plan to build the bridge. In other words, the establishment of industrial estates was not a compulsory requirement to build the bridge. *Secondly*, since industrialization was not compulsory, concerns over its negative impacts gradually diminished. *Thirdly*, the earnest democratization of the political system that created a situation in which the voices of the people and *'ulamā'* were tended to be listened to. This, in turn, created an environment in which the region was able to see the benefits of the bridge more clearly.

'Modernizing' Madura

According to Michael van Langenberg (1990, 122) the New Order was both state and state system. While the state was an entity, an arena, and an idea, the state system was made up of the executive government, military, police, parliament, bureaucracy and courts. Thus, it can be perceived as a network of institutions, through which the rulers of the government attempted to control civil society and manipulate the means of production, distribution and exchange, in pursuance of declared national and community interests. In principle, according to Pierre James (1990, 20), the New Order administration was dependent upon the production of capital in Indonesia to ensure that the administration had sufficient funds for the continuation of its rule. According to Richard Robison (1986), the concept of an authoritarian-bureaucratic capitalism was born in a place where the state figured prominently.

The New Order government obviously tried to make industrialization a reality. While some officials, such as Habibie, tried to directly implement industrialization the hard way, other individuals, such as Pak Noer, tried to persuade the *'ulamā'* and the people to accept

industrialization in a more nuanced way. In a seminar held at BPD Jatim on January 13th and 14th, 1992, Noer and Soelarso, in front of Rahardi Ramelan of BPPT, Muspida of East Java (a group of officials of the East Java Province), and other officials, argued that industrialization should be adjusted to the readiness of the Madurese, and that the situation of *kekeluargaan* (literally kinship or familiness, here it means friendship - good relations) should be kept (*Surabaya Post*, January 13th, 1992).

In order to persuade the *'ulamā'* to accept the project, Noer regularly visited a number of *pesantren*, not only in Madura, but also in Java. In Probolinggo, for instance, in a visit that is usually called *'silaturahmi'* (good relationship/friendship), Noer visited *Kyai* Wahid Zaini of *Pesantren* Nurul Jadid, Paiton and *Kyai* Badri Masduqi of *Pesantren* Badridduja, Kraksaan. In the two *pesantren*, Noer asked *kyai* and the *pesantren* world in East Java to support the bridge plan. In order to win sympathy for the cause, he promised to build workshop centers that would be used to train local people to be able to work in the new industrial estates. He also assured the public that there would be mosques and Islamic educational institutions in such areas (*Surabaya Post*, February, 7th, 1992).

Noer shared his ideas on the creation of workshop centers with the Minister of Manpower, Cosmas Batubara. The idea was sparked by a rumour that East Java was receiving foreign aid to establish an industrial training center. Having found out about the news, Noer suggested that the center should be built in Bangkalan, because the regency would soon become a new industrial area in East Java (*Surabaya Post*, February, 21st, 1992). In order to attract supporters among the public, Noer stated that he would resign as the project coordinator should the project have detrimental effects on the local people. As he did in Probolinggo, he visited a number of *'ulamā'* in Bangkalan. He restated this pledge to resign in a visit to prominent *'ulamā'* in Bangkalan, such as *Kyai* Abdullah Schal, *Kyai* Kholil A.G., and *Kyai* Machfud Siddiq. In the meeting, he also raised his concerns about the steadily rising prices of the land in the surrounding areas of the bridge (*Surabaya Post*, January 20th, 1994).

In the early phase in 1990s, after the issuance of Keppres No. 55/1990, it was not clear who would conduct the land acquisition. It was not clearly stated in the Keppres which parties would be in charge of the land acquisition. For example, there was nothing stated in SK (*Surat Keputusan* – decree) Menristek No. 283/M/BPPT/1991 about

the appointment of a project executor for the Surabaya-Madura Bridge and the development of industrial estates and housing zone (a decree on Penunjukkan Pelaksana Proyek Jembatan Surabaya-Madura dan Pengembangan Kawasan Industri dan Kawasan Perumahan). Equally, the SK Gubernur KDH Tk. I Jawa Timur No. 39/1991 did not outline measures for the supervisory team of the development of the Surabaya-Madura Bridge (a decree on Tim Pengawas Pembangunan Jembatan Surabaya-Madura) (Muthmainnah 1998, 92). The provision on land supply was actually regulated in the Deregulasi Oktober 1993 (the October 1993 Deregulation), which mandated the provincial government of East Java and the regency government of Bangkalan to handle the land acquisition. In order to expedite the supply of the land, the governor formed Panitia Pembebasan Tanah untuk Negara (P2TUN - State Committee for Land Acquisition) (Muthmainnah 1998, 93).

In reality, the acquisition was also executed by BPPT and P.T. DMP between 1993 and 1994. BPPT acquired land for the area at the foot of the bridge in the *kampung* (hamlet) of Sekar Bungoh, Sukolilo Barat village, at the price of Rp. 7,000 per square meter. Meanwhile, P.T. DMP executed the acquisition in Pangpong village for the construction of a toll road Kamal-Tanjung Bumi at prices between Rp. 3,000 and Rp. 4,000.00 per square meter. The price depended on the quality of the land and the availability of the land certificate. If the land was fertile and certified, then the prices would be higher (Muthmainnah 1998, 93).

What we can observe from the acquisition is that there were overlapping plans by central and local governments and other parties regarding provision on the procedure or on the parties in charge of the acquisition. As the *Surabaya Post* reported, a number of landowners were forced to give up their land for the bridge. They were concerned that if they stayed at their asking price of Rp. 90,000 to Rp. 100,000 per square meter, their property rights would be taken over by the government. Instead, they accepted Rp. 7,000 per square meter (*Surabaya Post*, February 18th, 1994).

There were at least two possibilities that made the landowners anxious: *firstly*, that the government would not recognize their property rights; and *secondly*, that the government would take over their property rights. However, there was no indication from the government in respect of either of these two possibilities. It seems that some landowners were

looking to make the most of the situation, even without knowing exactly the price of their land.

Although the plan to establish industrial estates in Madura became the main issue for Bassra, in the beginning there were no precise details regarding the establishment of such areas. Even though Article 9 of the Presidential Decree (Keppres No. 55/1990) stated that ‘in order to obtain economic value, the development of the Surabaya-Madura Bridge should be followed by industry development at both ends of the bridge by the project organizers’, initially it was never made clear whether the establishment would be conducted before the development of the bridge, at the same time, or after (Muthmainnah, 1998, p. 73).

The government seemed to have applied a ‘wait and see’ policy, especially when dealing with financial issues. After the financial support was thought to be adequate, Habibie stressed that the industrial estates would come in one package with the bridge. He stated that it was a compulsory demand from the Japanese side, and that the Japanese had made it clear they would not assist the project if the bridge was not accompanied by industrial estates (*Surya*, February 8th, 1994). Bassra responded to this by calling for the development of the bridge to be prioritized, or at least for adequate and exact plans about the industrial estates to be clearly arranged before both plans were simultaneously implemented (*Surya*, February 17th, 1994).

The idea of implementing industrial estates was actually rather vague, not only for the Madurese ‘*ulamā*’, but also for the decision-makers. A number of attempts to introduce the concept were executed. Some initiatives came from Bassra. One of these attempts was to hold a seminar on December 14th and 15th, 1993 (described earlier in this paper). A number of state officials, including the Minister of Religious Affairs, Munawir Syadzali, and the governor, Basofi Sudirman, were present at the seminar (Muthmainnah 1998, 82; Moesa 1999, 119).

From this meeting, Bassra ‘*ulamā*’ issued statements that urged the government to involve them in the project. They also asked the government to take them to other industrial estates in Indonesia to conduct *studi banding* (comparative research). Habibie responded to the request by attending a national dialogue held by Bassra on January 7th, 1994 in *Pesantren Banyuwani*, Pamekasan. He expressed his perceptions of industrialization. He said that if Madura was industrialized, it would be greater in many aspects than Batam because Madura was bigger in

size and population. In his speech, and contrary to what he said further, Habibie tried to alleviate the concerns of the *'ulamā'* about the negative impacts of industrialization. However, he disagreed that the Madurese should be given priority in industrialization because all Indonesians had the same right and opportunity to participate in industrialization. Therefore, if the Madurese were not prepared to compete in the job market, other Indonesians would fill the positions:

'We cannot say that if we establish industrial areas in West Java, only West Javanese can work there. It is not right, nor [industrialization] in Batam that it is only for Riaunese, and [industrialization] in Madura it is not only for Madurese. It is not right' (*Memorandum*, September 8th, 1994).

It is said that a number of Bassra *'ulamā'* were offended by these statements. According to Muthmainnah, *Kyai* Nuruddin was resentful of Habibie's words, such as 'Madura does not belong to the Madurese, but to the Indonesians' or 'I do not develop Madura, but the country'. *Kyai* Nuruddin understood it as a sign that the Madurese would be neglected in their own home island, and he was concerned that other people would exploit Madura (Muthmainnah 1998, 83-84).

As promised by Habibie, the Bassra *'ulamā'* were taken to the industrial estates in Batam and IPTN in Bandung from January 31st to February 4th. The *'ulamā'* asked to be taken to Aceh too, for they believed that Aceh shared similar religious sentiments to Madura. However, Habibie refused, as he believed that visiting Aceh had nothing to do with the purpose of the tour (Muthmainnah 1998, 84-85).

In September 1994, Habibie discussed the industrialization plans again with Bassra. After a fruitless meeting, he sent a letter, via *Kyai* Amin Imron, a prominent Madurese *'ulamā'* and a member of DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat - the national parliament) from the PPP, demanding that Bassra approve industrialization by signing a letter of approval. After the *'ulamā'* discussed the letter during an internal meeting at the residence of *Kyai* Kholil A.G., they decided not to sign it, because they were waiting for the government to respond to their nine opinions first (Muthmainnah 1998, 87-88; Moesa 1999, 124). In response, *Kyai* Kholil A.G. stated that Bassra could not simply be asked to approve industrialization. Moreover, he also revealed that in order to reach an agreement, all members of Bassra had to discuss the issue at length (*Surabaya Post*, September 27th, 1994).

On another occasion, as the project coordinator, Noer voiced his opinion about Bassra's rejection, and stressed that only the DPRD (I and II) had the right to voice people's aspirations. Therefore, he argued that it was only the DPRD, not Bassra, who had the right to voice the people's opinions on the industrialization plans. He believed that Bassra did not represent the people (*Surabaya Post*, September 9th, 1994). Moreover, in early 1995, Noer and the regent of Bangkalan had a meeting without inviting the *'ulamā'* to discuss land acquisition. After finding out, the *'ulamā'* held their own meeting to discuss the 'secret' meeting. The *'ulamā'* denounced the government for not responding to their opinions and pushing ahead with land acquisition (Muthmainnah 1998, 89).

The fate of the bridge was discussed again on March 14th, 1995 in a meeting of several ministers. The meeting strengthened the plan to have the development of the bridge and the establishment of industrial estates in one package. After the meeting, Habibie issued a statement that there had been no disputes between the Bassra *'ulamā'* and the government, and that both sides were concerned about the people's interests and welfare. The 'letter of approval' issue eventually was never discussed again.

The Suramadu Bridge Affair: The Drama of *Pembangunan*?

If we look at the situation at the end of the twentieth century more globally, it is not surprising to see that the rapid and sustained development in Indonesia also took place in other developing countries in Asia and Latin America.¹¹ What is more interesting to note is that the efforts to launch development in all these places were typically state-led or state-designed in top-down policies.

In New Order Indonesia, development was associated with the slogan of rapid industrial transformation and efforts to narrow the large gap between the middle class and workers, peasants, and other city dwellers. The main positive aspect learnt from the New Order experience is that an open trade and investment administration and efficient supply-side investments were beneficial for Indonesia. This can be seen from Indonesia's thirty years of rapid growth and the rapid improvement in living standards (Hill & Narjoko 2010, 63).

Anne Booth (1986, 329) suggested that the New Order government saw two distinct phases of 'liberation' of the economy. The first of these

occurred between 1967 and 1973. During these years inflation was reduced, the exchange rate unified, and controls on capital flows into and out of the country were removed. Meanwhile, there was much talk in the 1970s and the early 1980s concerning Pancasila (the official five pillars and philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state) economics, which emphasized the role of state enterprises and cooperatives in the economy, the importance of egalitarian social and religious values in tempering the selfish and individualistic aspects of market capitalism, and the need for economic nationalism, and consequently of limiting the role of foreign and Chinese business in the economy. However, the second phase, which took place in the 1980s and early 1990s, saw the progressive liberalization of both the financial sector and the real economy, as for instance, witnessed in the industrialization plans in Madura.

The development aspect of the New Order, according to Robert Cribb (2010, 70), was characterized by unity, uniformity and conformity, contrary to the colonial era, which was characterized by a thoroughgoing fragmentation of society, culture and politics. It was during the Suharto administration that development became a hot subject in the Repelita (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun - the Five Years Development Plan).¹² According to Hans Antlöv (1995, 35), the New Order built a centralized economy system in which government agencies monitored credits, technological inputs, distribution, and prices. Moreover, if Pancasila represented the political character of the New Order, then development represented the economic character. Opposition to development policies was seen as being political opposition to Pancasila (Antlöv 1995, 43).

John T. Sidel (2004, 65) argued that the efforts of centralized authoritarian rule, which continuously attempted to implement development programs, were mediated by the interests of pro-government local notables who controlled lower administrative hierarchies. For instance, in Banten during the New Order, it was the *jawara* (local strongmen in Banten) groups who had the ability to obtain most governmental projects since they maintained closed patron–client relationships with the rulers (Pribadi 2013, 333). In the industrialization plans, it was the inability of state officials, especially at regional levels, to cope with the high expectations of the central government. Moreover, the plan to establish the industrial estates

was characterized not only by manipulative methods and the pseudo-democratic characteristics¹³ of the New Order administration, but also by sets of conflict of interest among the Madurese elite where the use of ideologies, institutions, and organizations was prevalent. It seemed, for the most part, that the socio-political loyalty in Madura was divided. The division reminded us of Joshua Barker and Gerry van Klinken's (2009, 18) suggestion that evidently, Indonesia's political culture was not integrated but deeply divided between an elite and the rest of society, like what happened in the rejections of industrialization.

Under the New Order the socio-political domination of the state over society was extended enormously. Suharto and his supporters, especially the armed forces, moved to limit socio-political participation and to concentrate power. In a range of different ways, the scope for societal groups to influence the content and direction of public policy was reduced as the government set about a massive restructuring of the country's socio-political landscape (Macintyre 1991, 2-3). The role of authoritarian governments, such as the New Order administration, was very important as they functioned as strong and active socio-economic actors and consequently became vigorous in projecting and designing all aspects of development. In the Suramadu Bridge affair, however, state intervention ignored people's rights and disregarded the *kyai*'s authority.

During the New Order, state-society relations were principally based on centre-region (*pusat-daerah*) connections. Manipulations of local interests became one of the main concerns of the central government, although local leaders, such as *kyai*, could sometimes act independently and press local governments at the provincial and regency levels. State control was, however, not always firm, and sometimes local authorities opted for less direct interference in civil affairs, particularly in areas strongly influenced by Islam, such as Madura, where Islamic leaders dominated local parliaments. This is in line with Van Klinken and Barker's (2009, 6) argument that the Indonesian state is much lighter on the ground than it has often been assumed to be.

In the Repelita VI (which began in 1994 and ended suddenly when the Suharto administration collapsed in 1998), *tinggal landas* (literally, 'take-off') was a term to denote the stages of development that would supposedly be achieved by the end of the Repelita year in 1999. However, the discourse on *tinggal landas* had surfaced in the previous

Repelita IV and Repelita V. The government intensified development in Repelita IV and Repelita V as an effort to prepare for the *tinggal landas* era in Repelita VI.

Nevertheless, the economic element of the development policies of the New Order seem to have neglected the un-readiness of social, political, and cultural aspects of development and certainly the people in many parts of Indonesia. In Madura, the rejections of industrialization occurred in the last years of the Suharto administration. We can see that the regional government was unable (or perhaps did not want) to conceive a development plan that would place the people as equal partners whose opinions would be taken into consideration. In general, during the New Order, despite the prevalence of development programs enjoyed by many people, undemocratic approaches were exercised by state officials to reach the goals. Therefore, it was not surprising to find out that a lot of ambitious development projects in numerous places during the New Order were met with popular resistance. Clearly, the industrialization plans and the whole Suramadu Bridge affair were one of them.

Conclusion

The Bassra *‘ulamā’* rejected the introduction of industrialization and the establishment of industrial estates in Madura. However, the rejections are not singularly identified as a refusal of development. Principally, general elections were regarded as an important means to legitimate the administration politically (Antlöv 2004, 114), while development was seen by the New Order administration as an important way to legitimate the administration economically. The rejections were not directed against the bridge, which symbolized the unremitting efforts of the government to develop the country. Indeed, the *kyai* and the people realized that the bridge was essential in the process of development for Madurese society. The construction was eventually accomplished after the government tried a few different policies. Therefore, the rejections are best described as the dissatisfaction of segments of society towards the undemocratic and authoritarian policies of development.

With these rejections, segments of society, especially the *kyai*, maximized the use of cultural and Islamic symbols. In the whole Suramadu Bridge affair, issues such as demoralization and incompatibility with Islam became the main arguments of Bassra *kyai* when voicing their concerns over industrialization. The *kyai* believed that industrialization

would cause more disadvantages than benefits. One notion was the unreadiness of the Madurese to accept industrialization since they lacked adequate education to fulfill positions in the manufacturing industry. Here we see the *kyai* attempting to speak for the people. Another important notion was the fear of negative side effects of industrialization that would bring immorality to Madura, such as the introduction of modern cultures that would destroy the local cultures and worse, the emergence of whorehouses such as those in Batam.

Since the New Order administration, like any other authoritarian administrations, considered the development programs key to its claimed legitimacy rule, it unhesitatingly intervened in all aspects of development. In New Order Indonesia, development was associated with rapid economic transformation and efforts to narrow the large gap between the middle and working classes, the peasants, and other city dwellers. In reality, development policies significantly benefited small components of society: bureaucrats, state-backed entrepreneurs, big business and conglomerates. On the other hand, they neglected larger parts of society. Moreover, state intervention in development policies generated varied results, such as conflicts between the state and society. In Madura, such challenges were clearly seen in the whole Suramadu Bridge affair.

It is clear that Madurese *‘ulamā’*, particularly those who were not affiliated with the state, were very much aware and conscious of contemporary socio-political circumstances. Most Madurese *kyai* were not partners of the state and they remained outside the state system. However, they were aware that their influence in society was great and, thus, they attempted to maintain their authority and prevent it from being usurped by the state. We can conclude, therefore, all rejections against industrialization witnessed in the whole Suramadu Bridge affair were not solely meant to guard Islamic principles, but also because the plans might have a direct impact on their authority, not only in terms of religious authority, but also social, political, economic, and cultural authority. In order to protect themselves, they used their religious authority extensively to convey their messages; indeed, this was their main weapon and the people did not expect anything less.

Endnotes

- Materials used in this paper are parts of my Ph.D. dissertation at Faculty of Humanities, Leiden University, the Netherlands in 2013 based on two sets of library research in libraries in the Netherlands and Indonesia and two sets of fieldwork from July 2009 until January 2010 and from October 2010 until July 2011 in Madura; Jakarta; and Surabaya, Indonesia, while some parts are elaborated later.
 - I thank to three anonymous reviewers for the comments and suggestion, but all mistakes found here are mine.
1. I follow Pierre James's (1990, 15) concept of 'state', which is defined as the government, bureaucracy, and other instruments of the government. Another concept of 'state' is taken from Hans Antlöv (1995, 7): an apparatus embracing the legislative, executive, and judicial arms of central and local governments, including their offices, office holders and resources.
 2. The term *santri* has several meanings, such as pupils of *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools). Here it simply refers to devout Muslims. In the Indonesian languages, such as Javanese, Madurese, and Bahasa Indonesia (the official language of Indonesia), the term *santri* can be used in both singular and plural forms. Other non-English terms in this study can be used as both singular and plural forms as well.
 3. Bassra consists of *kyai* who lead *pesantren* in Madura. The unofficial membership is spread all over the island. *Kyai* Muhammad Kholil A.G., a charismatic *kyai* of Madura from the legendary *Kyai* Kholil dynasty, and *Kyai* Tijani Jauhari of *Pesantren* Al-Amien Prenduan, Sumenep from the renowned *Kyai* Chotib family of Sumenep were the main architects of Bassra. As a non-formal organization, Bassra does not have fixed members. Any *kyai* in Madura is said to be able to join the organization. *Kyai* Nuruddin claims Bassra has ninety per cent of *kyai* in Madura as its supporters (Interview with *Kyai* Nuruddin, Bangkalan, December 1st, 2009). In another interview with *Kyai* Mashduqie Fadly, a *kyai* who represented the PPP in DPRD I and II - the provincial and the regency/municipal parliament of the East Java province and the Bangkalan regency, respectively, I found out that some *kyai* have never been asked to participate in Bassra. *Kyai* Mashduqie, however, did not reveal why he was not asked to participate in Bassra (Interview with *Kyai* Mashduqie Fadly, Bangkalan, December 1st, 2009). In general, Bassra was said to have been established because of the desire of Madurese *kyai* to strengthen the ties between *kyai* who lead *pesantren* in Madura (Interview with *Kyai* Nuruddin, Bangkalan, December 18th, 2009). As a non-formal organization that has become influential in socio-religious issues in Madura, Bassra has made efforts to appear more organized. Although it was founded in 1991, Bassra recently attempted to reformulate its structure and to strengthen the ties between its supporters. In its draft of statutes, which was issued in 2009, Bassra is said to be a medium of communication, consultation and coordination for *kyai pesantren* from all groups in Islam. Bassra is an association which does not belong to any organization, political party, or group. While Bassra does not have fixed members, it has a Dewan Penasehat (Advisory Council), Dewan Koordinator Pusat (Central Coordinator Council), Dewan Koordinator Daerah (Regional Coordinator Council) and Dewan Perwakilan Bassra (Bassra Representative Council). All councils are represented by Madurese *kyai pesantren*. Of these councils, all *kyai* involved in Bassra's activities are identified as participants (*Draft Pokok-pokok Pikiran Reorganisasi Bassra*).
 4. I will refer to this henceforth as the Suramadu Bridge affair.
 5. I use the Indonesian language spelling for all Madurese terms to identify their distinctive meanings in society.

6. No one knows the exact date of birth or death of this *kyai*, as his lifetime is not well documented. A recent book published in June 2010 gives a story from *Kyai* Muhammad Ghozi Wahib praising *Kyai* Kholil's heroic role in the struggle against the 'aggressors' on November 10th, 1945 in Surabaya (p. 101). However, on an earlier page, the author writes that *Kyai* Kholil died in 1925 (p. 82) (Arrifa'i, 2010). Many lower ranking '*ulamā*' I have met often mentioned *Kyai* Kholil's epic participation in the struggle against the colonialists, both the Dutch and the Japanese, without being aware of the anachronism.
7. Prof. R.M. Sedyatmo was born in Karanganyar in 1909 and died in Jakarta in 1984. He was an engineer trained at Technische Hogeschool (now ITB - Bandung Technological Institute). The toll road that connects Jakarta with the Soekarno-Hatta international airport is named after the engineer (Effendi & Aksan 2009).
8. Connecting Java and Sumatra by bridge is naturally very difficult in an island group of such volcanic activity. Krakatoa (*Krakatau* in Indonesian) lies in the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra. Connecting Java and Bali has not been seen as urgent since direct flights to Denpasar from major cities in Java have existed for years.
9. There have been recent discussions that the name of the bridge should be changed to the Mohammad Noer Bridge (*Tempo*, April 17th, 2010; *Surabaya Post*, April 19th, 2010)
10. Nationalized in 1998, in 2000 the bank was purchased by a group led by US-based Ripplewood Holdings and was renamed Shinsei Bank.
11. See for instance Berendsen, Bernard, Ton Dietz, Henk Schulte Nordholt, and Roel van der Veen, 2013. *Asian Tigers, African Lions: Comparing the Development Performance of Southeast Asia and Africa*. Leiden etc.: Brill.
12. Repelita was a grand design for development created by the New Order administration. For instance, in Repelita I (1969-1974), the focus lay primarily on the fulfillment of basic needs and infrastructure with the focal point on agriculture, while in Repelita V (1989-1994), the fields of transportation, communication, and education took centre stage. The last Repelita, Repelita VI, ended suddenly when the Suharto administration collapsed in 1998.
13. The explanations on manipulative methods and the pseudo-democratic characteristics of the New Order are described earlier in this paper.

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1. Hefner, Robert, 2009a. "Introduction: The Political Cultures of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia," in *Making Modern Muslims: The Politics of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia*, ed. Robert Hefner, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
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6. Ms. *Undhang-Undhang Banten*, L.Or.5598, Leiden University.
7. Interview with K.H. Sahal Mahfudz, Kajen, Pati, June 11th, 2007.

Arabic romanization should be written as follows:

Letters: ' b, t, th, j, ḥ, kh, d, dh, r, z, s, sh, ṣ, ḍ, ṭ, ḏ, ḡ, f, q, l, m, n, h, w, y. Short vowels: a, i, u. long vowels: ā, ī, ū. Diphthongs: aw, ay. *Tā marbūṭā*: t. Article: al-. For detail information on Arabic Romanization, please refer the transliteration system of the Library of Congress (LC) Guidelines.

ستوديا اسلاميكا (ISSN 0215-0492; E-ISSN: 2355-6145) دورية علمية دولية تصدر عن مركز الدراسات الإسلامية والمجتمع بجامعة شريف هداية الله الإسلامية الحكومية بجاكرتا. تختص هذه الدورية العلمية ببحوثها في دراسة الاسلام باندونيسيا خاصة وبجنوب شرقي عامة، وتستهدف اتصال البحوث الأصيلة والقضايا المعاصرة حول الموضوع. ترحب هذه الدورية العلمية بإسهامات الدارسين أصحاب التخصصات ذات الصلة. وتكون قابلة لعملية مراجعة من قبل مجهول الهوية.

تم اعتماد ستوديا اسلاميكا من قبل وزارة التعليم والثقافة بجمهورية اندونيسيا كدورية علمية بقرار المدير العام للتعليم العالي رقم: 56/DIKTI/Kep/2012.

ستوديا اسلاميكا عضو في CrossRef (الاحالات الثابتة في الأدبيات الأكاديمية) منذ ٢٠١٤م. ولذلك جميع المقالات التي تصدرها ستوديا اسلاميكا مرقم حسب معرف الوثيقة الرقمية (DOI).

ستوديا إسلاميكا مجلة مفهرسة في سكوبس (SCOPUS) منذ ٣٠ مايو ٢٠١٥.

حقوق الطبع محفوظة

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قيمة الاشتراك السنوي خارج إندونيسيا:

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رقم الحساب:

خارج إندونيسيا (دولار أميركا):
PPIM, Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang Graha Karnos, Indonesia
account No. 101-00-0514550-1 (USD).

داخل إندونيسيا (روبية):

PPIM, Bank Mandiri KCP Tangerang Graha Karnos, Indonesia
No Rek: 128-00-0105080-3 (Rp).

قيمة الاشتراك السنوي داخل إندونيسيا:

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ستوديا إسلاميكا

مجلة إندونيسيا للدراسات الإسلامية
السنة الثانية والعشرون، العدد ٢، ٢٠١٥

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مجة إنءونيسية للءراساء الإسلامية

السنة الثانية والعشرون، العدد ٢، ٢٠١٥



القرآن والاسءعمار: رء الشبخ
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من ءلال ءفسىر ملجأ الطالبىن
جاءانج أ. رحمانا

ءءىء ءءربىة الإسلامية
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